Fordham Law School

FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Congressional Materials

Twenty-Fifth Amendment Archive

1-29-1965

Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of
the Vice President: Hearing before the
Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of
the Committee of the Judiciary, Sentate, 89th
Congress
Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments; Committee on the Judiciary. Senate. United States.

Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/
twentyfifth_amendment_congressional_materials
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments; Committee on the Judiciary. Senate. United States., "Presidential Inability and
Vacancies in the Office of the Vice President: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Committee of
the Judiciary, Sentate, 89th Congress" (1965). Congressional Materials. 9.
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/twentyfifth_amendment_congressional_materials/9

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Twenty-Fifth Amendment Archive at FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship
and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Congressional Materials by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of
Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY AND VACANCIES
IN THE OFFICE OF VICE PRESIDENT

HEARING
BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
O THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED, STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON

S.J. Res. 1, S.J. Res. 6, S.J. Res. 15, S.J. les. 25,
S.J. Res. 28
RELATING TO THE PROBLEM OF PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
AND FILLING OF VACANCIES IN THE OFFICE
OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

JANUARY 29, 1985

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

42-688

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1905

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
JAMES 0. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Ohairman
EVERETT McKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois
OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina
ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas
HIRAM L. FONG, Hawaii
SAM J. ERVIN, JR., North Carolina
HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania
THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut
JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
PHILIP A. HART, Michigan
EDWARD V. LONG, Missouri
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
BIRCH BAYH, Indiana
QUENTIN N. BURDICK, North Dakota
JOSEPH D. TYDINGS, Maryland
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
BIRCH BAYH, Indiana, Chairman
EVERETT McKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois
JAMES 0. EASTLAND, Mississippi
HIRAM L. FONG, Hawaii
THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut
LARRY A. CONRAD, Ohief Counsel
CLYDE FLYNN, Minority Counsel

CONTENTS
Senate
Senate
Senate
Senate
Senate

Joint
Joint
Joint
Joint
Joint

Resolution
Resolution
Resolution
Resolution
Resolution

1 -----------------------------------------6 -----------------------------------------15 ----------------------------------------25 ----------------------------------------28 -----------------------------------------

Page
1
2
2
3
3

STATEMENTS
Bayh, Hon. Birch, a U.S. Senator from the State of Indiana, chairman
of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments ----------------Brownell Herbert, former Attorney General of the United States, New
York,
Y
-----------------------------------------------Curtin, Hon. Willard S., a Representative in Congress from the Eighth
Congressional District of the State of Pennsylvania -----------------Deasy, Robert J., Providence College ------------------------------Dodd, Hon. Thomas J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Connecticut, as
presented by Dean Sharp ---------------------------------------Folsom, Hon. Marion B., Chairman, Committee for Improvement of
Management in Government, Committee for Economic Development..Fong Hon. Hiram, a U.S. Senator from the State of Hawaii -----------Hrusia, Hon. Roman L., a U.S. Senator from the State of Nebraska -----Katzenbach, Nicholas deB., Acting Attorney General of the United States.
Miller, Hon. Jack, a U.S. Senator from the State of Iowa ---------------Musmanno, Ion. Judge Michael, justice, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania._
Powell, Lewis F., Jr., president-elect, American Bar Association --------Taylor, Martin, chairman of the Committee on Constitutional Law, New
York Bar Association -------------------------------------------

5
57
75
84
74
46
30
32
7
43
77
58
02

STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
American Bar Association, consensus report --------------------------American Bar Association, house of delegates report ------------------Ervin, Hon. Sam J., Jr., a U.S. Senator from the State of North Carolina-..Javits, Hon. Jacob K., a U.S. Senator from the State of New York --------

Kraus, Lawrence G ----------------------------------------------Mundt, Hon. Karl E., a U.S. Senator from the State of South Dakota- - --Pearson, Hon. James B., a U.S. Senator from the State of Kansas -------Saltonstall, Hon. Leverett, a U.S. Senator from the State of Massachusetts.
Thurmond, Hon. Strom, a U.S. Senator from the State of South Carolina.
'H

57
57
104
105

107
106
101
103
105

PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
FRIDAY, JANUARY 29, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
OF THE C O
rI'cTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,

Wa8hington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in
room 2228, New Senate Office Building, Senator Birch Bayh (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Bayh, Tydings, Dirksen, Hruska, and Fong.
Also present: Larry Conrad, chief counsel, Clyde Flynn, minority
counsel; and Mary Day, clerk.
Senator BAYII. I would like to call to order the hearings of the
Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments. We are here this
morning to consider the various problems connected with Presidential inability and filling vacancies in the Office of Vice President.
I would like the record to show that notice of these hearings has
been duly published in the Congressional Record on Tuesday, January 26, 1965. Further, I ask that the following resolutions pertaining to this hearing be made a part of the record at this point.
(S.J. Res. 1, 6,15, 25, and 28.)
[S.J. Res. 1, 89th Cong., 1st sess.)
JOINT RESOLUTION Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States
relating to succession to the Presidency and Vice Presidency and to cases where the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House Concurring
therein), That the following article is proposed as an amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all intents and
purposes as part of the Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of
three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of Its
submission by the Congress:
"ARTICLE "SEcTION 1. In case of the removal of the President from office or of his
death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.
"SEC. 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President,
the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon
confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.
"Seo. 3. If the President declares in writing that he is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office, such powers and duties shall be discharged
by the Vice President as Acting President.
"SEC. 4. If the President does not so declare, and the Vice President with
the written concurrence of a majority of the heads of the executive departments or such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmits to the
Congress his written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume
the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
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"Seo. 5. Whenever the President transmits to the Congress his written
declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of
his office unless the Vice President, with the written concurrence of a majority of the heads of the executive departments or such other body as Con.
gress may by law provide, transmits within two days to the Congress his
written declaration that the President Is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office. Thereupon Congress will immediately decide the issue.
If the Congress determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President Is unable to discharge the powers and duties of the office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise the
President shall resume the powers and duties of his office."
[8.J. Res. 6, 89th Cong., 1st sess.]
JOINT RESOLUTION Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States
relating to cases where the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of
his office
Resolved bY the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Eongre8s assembled (two-thirds of each House concurring
therein), That the following article Is proposed as an amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all intents and
purposes as part of the Constitution only if ratified by the legislatures of
three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its
submission by the Congress:
"AnTIoLE
"SEc'rioN 1. In case of the removal of the President from office or of his
death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.
"SEc. 2. Whenever there Is a vacancy In the office of the Vice President,
the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon
confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.
"SEc. 3. If the President declares In writing that he is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office, such powers and duties shall be discharged
by the Vice President as Acting President until the disability be removed.
"SEC. 4. The Congress shall prescribe by law a procedure by which the
executive branch shall determine the presence and termination of the inability
of the President or Acting President.
"SEC. 5. Article II, section 1, paragraph 6 is hereby repealed."
M.. Res. 15, 89th Cong., 1st sees.]
JOINT RESOLUTION Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States
relating to vacancies in the Vice Presidency
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United State. of
America in Vongres assembled (two-thirds of each House concurring therein),
That the following article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of
the United States, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the
Constitution only if ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several
States within seven years from the date of its submission by the Congress:
ARTICLE "SECToN 1. In the case of the removal of the President from office or of his
death or resignation, the Vice President hall become President.
"Sc. 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall be a member of the same political
party as the President, who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote
of both Houses of Congress sitting in joint session."
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[8.3. Res. M, 89th Cong., lit sess.]
JOINT RESOLUTION Proposing an amendment to the Constitution to provide for the
succession of the Vice President to the office of President, and for the selection of a
new Vice President whenever there is a vacancy in the office of Vice President
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United Stactes of
America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House concurring therein),
That the following article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of
the United States, which shall be valid to al intents and purposes as part of the
Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several
States:
"ARTICLE "SFcTION 1. If the office of President becomes vacant because of the death,
removal from office, or resignation of the President, the Vice President shall
become President. If the office of Vice President becomes vacant because of the
death, removal from office, or resignation of the Vice President or the death of
a Vice-President-elect before the time fixed for the beginning of his term, or
because the Vice President or a Vice-President-elect has assumed the office of
President by reason of the death, removal from office, or resignation of the
President or the death of a President-elect before the time fixed for the beginning
of his term, the electors who were chosen to cast ballots In the most recent
election of President and Vice President shall meet in their respective States on
the Monday of the third week beginning after the date on which the office of
Vice President became vacant, and shall then vote by ballot for it new Vice
President. They shall name In their ballots the person so voted for ai Vice President, and shall make a list of all persons voted for as Vice President and the
number of votes for each, which list they shall sign and certify, and transmit to
the President pro tempore of the Senate. The votes so cast shall then be counted,
and a new Vice President shall be selected, In the manner prescribed by the twelfth
article of amendment to this Constitution for the selection of a Vice President
"SEo. 2. Electors for President and Vice President chosen in any State under
this Constitution shall serve as such until the date on which electors are chosen
for the next regular election of a President and a Vice President. Vacancies
which may occur before that date in the membership of electors of any State
because of death, removal from office, or resignation shall be filled by the selection
of successors in the next regular election of that State in which members of the
House of Representatives are chosen.
"SEo. 8. If the Congress is not in session at a time at which a new Vice Presi.
dent is to be selected under this article, the person discharging the powers and
duties of President shall convene the Senate and the House of Representatives In
joint session for that purpose.
"SEc. 4. A Vice President chosen under this article shall serve as such until
the end of the term for which the Vice President or Vice-President-elect whom he
succeeds was elected.
"SuE. 5. This article shall be Inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as
an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the
States within seven years from the date of its submission to the States by the
Congress."
[S.J. Res. 28, 89th Cong., 1st sess.]
JOINT RESOLUTION Proposing an amendment to the Constitution relating to the nomination and election of candidates for President and Vice President, and to succession to
the office of President in the event of the death or inability of the President
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each Hotse concurring therein),
That the following article Is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of
the United States, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the
Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several
States:
"ARTILE "SECTION 1. The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America. He shall hold his office during the term of four years and,
together with the Vice President, chosen for the same term, be elected as provided
in this Constitution.
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"SE. 2. The nominees of each political party for election as Presidnt shall be
nominated in primary elections held it the several States as provided by this
section. The places and manner of holding such primary elections shall be
presribed In each State by the legislature thereof. Congress shall determine the
time of such primary elections, which shall be the same throughout the United
States. The voters In such primary elections in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the legislature of such
State. Any such voter shall be eligible to vote only in the primary of the political
party of his registered affiliation. No person shall be a candidate for nomination
except in the primary of the political party of his registered affiliation, and tile
name of each such candidate shall appear on the ballot of that party in ill of the
States. A political party shall be recognized as such for the purposes of any primary election held pursuant to this article if at any time within four years preceding such election the number of its registered members shnll have exceeded 10 per
centumn of the total number of registered voters in the United States.
"Within fifteen days after any such primary, or at such time as the Congress
shall dliret, the official custodian of the election returns of each State shall make
separate lists of all persons for whom votes were cast as nominee for President
and the number of votes for each, which lists he shall sign and certify and transmit sealed to the seat of the Government of the United States. directed to the
President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, open all certificates, and tile votes
shall then be counted.
"Each political party in each State shall be entitled to a number of nominating
votes equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which such
State may be entitled in the Congress. Each person for whom votes were cast
as nominee for President In any State shall be credited with such proportion of lis
party's nominating votes in such State as lie receives of the total popular vote of
his party therein for President. In making the computation fractional numbers
less than one one-thousandth shall be disregarded unless a more detailed calculation would change the result of the election. The person having a majority of the
nominating votes as nominee for President in the case of each party shall be the
nominee of that party for President. If in any political party no person receives
a majority of the nominating votes an nominee for President, then a second primary for that political party shall be held and the names of the two persons seeking the Presidential nomination of that party who have received the greatest
number of nominating votes in the first primary shall appear on the second primary ballot, and the one person receiving the greater number of nominating votes
in the second primary shall be the nominee of that political party for President.
"In the event of the death or resignation, prior to the election, of the nominee
of any political party for President, the national committee of such party shall
designate a successor, but In choosing such successor the vote shall he taken by
States, the delegation from each State having one vote. A quormn for such purpose shall consist of a delegate or delegates from two-thirds of the States, and
a majority of all States shall be necessary to a choice.
"SEC. 3. The electoral college system of electing the President and Vice President of the United States Is hereby abolished. The President and Vice President
shall be elected by the people of the several States. The voters in each State
shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch
of the State legislature. The places and manner of holding such election shall
be prescribed In each State by the legislature thereof. Congress shall determine the time of such election, which shall be the same throughout the United
States. Until otherwise determined by the Congress, such election shall be
held on the Tuesday next after the first Monday in November of the year preceding the year in which the regular term of the President is to begin. Each
State shall be entitled to a number of electoral votes equal to the whole number
of Senators and Representatives to which such State may be entitled in the
Congress.
"Within forty-five days after such election, or at such time as the Congress
shall direct, the official custodian of the election returns of each State shall
make distinct lists of all persons for whom votes were cast for President and the
number of votes for each, and the total vote of the electors of the State for
all persons for President, which lists he shall sign and certify and transmit
sealed to the seat of the Government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate. On the 0th day of January following the election, unless the
Congress by law appoints a different day not earlier than the 4th day of Janu-
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ary and not later than the 10th day of January, the President of the Senate s'nall
in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives open all certificates
and the votes shall then be counted. Each person for whom votes were cast
for President in each State shall be credited with such proportion of the electoral
votes thereof as he received of the total vote of the electors therein for President.
In making the computations, fractional numbers less than one-thousandth shall
be disregarded. The person having the greatest number of electoral votes for
President shall be President, if such number be at least 40 per centumn of the
whole number of such electoral votes. If no person have at least 40 per centuni
of the whole number of electoral votes, then from the persons having the two
highest numbers of electoral votes for President, the Senate and the Iouse of
Representatives sitting in joint session shall choose immediately, by ballot, the
President. A majority of the votes of the combined authorized membership of
the Senate and the House of Representatives shall be necessary for a choice.
"The Vice President shall be likewise elected, at the same time and in the same
manner and subject to the same provisions, as the President, but no person constitutionally ineligible for the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice
President of the United States.
"The Congress may by laW provide for the case of the death of any of the
persons from whom the Senate and the House of Representatives may choose a
President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them, and for
the case of the death of any of the persons from whon the Senate and the House
of Representatives may choose a Vice President whenever the right of choice
shall have devolved upon them.
"Sac. 4. Whenever the powers and duties of the office of President shall devolve
upon the Vice President or upon one of the persons designated by the Congress
to act as President in the absence of a Vice President, and the date of the next
general election for Senators and Representatives In Congress to be held more
than ninenty days after such powers and duties shall have so developed is at least
two years prior to the date on which the next regular quadrennial election for
President is to be held, a special election shall be held in the several States for
the purpose of choosing a President and Vice President. Such special election
shall be held at the time of the next general election for Senators and Repxesentatives in Congress, and, except as provided in this section, candidates for such
special election shall be nominated and elected in the same manner as In the
case of regular elections. The lists required by the first section of this article
to be transmitted to the seat of the Government shall be transmitted within ten
days after the election and shall be opened and the votes counted on the fifteenth
day following such election. A President and Vice President elected at a special
election held pursuant to this section shall take office on the fifth day following
the day on which the result of such election shall have been determined and
shall hold office until noon on the 20th day of January following the expiration
of four years after the date on which they take office, and the terms of their
successors shall then begin. Thereafter, except as provided in this section, the
terms of the President and Vice President shall end at noon on the 20th day of
January in each fourth year, and the terms of their successors shall then
begin.
"SFac. 5. Paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of section 1, article II, of the Constitution, and
the twelfth article of amendment to the Constitution, and section 4 of the
twentieth article of amendment to the Constitution, are hereby repealed.
"SEo. 6. This article shall take effect two years following its ratification.
"SEa. 7. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an
amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the States
within seven yce.rs from the date of its submission to the States by the Congress."

Senator BAYn. We have several distinguished witnesses appearing
before the subcommittee this morning. I want to thank then in advance for giving so willingly of their time.
Prior to proceeding with the witnesses I think it would be wise to

note one or twvo ground rules which the subcommittee has traditionally

operated under. Because of national urgency, this inatter has received
the attention of a great number of organizations and individuals who
would like to be heard. We are going to try to emphasize in this hearing views front those who differ in part or entirely from the consensus
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which has developed over the past year on this issue. We are not trying to railroad anything or gag anybody. Our first witness this morning is the new Attorney General of the United States. ie is going to
be followed in turn by some outstanding individuals who will express
either the support or dissent. I want anyone to feel free to testify,
especially those who want to oppose the proposal on which we have
a road consensus, Senate JointTResolution 1. Senate Joint Resolution
1 has been supported by my colleagues on the subcommittee and is being
supported by 75 percent of the Senate.
As of today, Con ress is very close to adopting and submitting to
the States a reasonable, flexible, and workable constitutional amendment to give us a Vice President at all times and to permit the Vice
President to act temporarily for the President when the Chief Executive is disabled.
It may not please everyone. No law can. But it is a proposal that
would safeguard the Nation against interruptions in the continuity of
executive authority.
The fact ihat 76 Senators are cosponsoring Senate Joint. Resolution
1 does not mean that all of us agree to every comma and semicolon.
What it does mean is that all of us have agreed to compromise on one
point or another in order to achieve a consensus.
Problems of presidential inability and filling vacancies in the office
of Vice President will never be solved if we in the Congress are naive
enough to believe that there is a perfect solution that meets all conceivable contingencies. If we attempt to do this, we run the grave risk
of formulating a rigid and inflexible proposal that may well create
more problems than it solves.
As a preface to the hearing I would point out that on 16 occasions
in the history of our country where theVice President has either died
or left office or moved up to the office of the Presidency. The office
of Vice President itself has developed perhaps to a greater extent
than any other office in the United States. Today, the #ice President
is an important cog in the executive branch of our Government. Traditionally, we have been concerned about the office of Vice President
only because the man occupying it might succeed to the office of President. Now, however, today I think we have to be equally concerned
that although he may not, and we hope he does not succeed to the
office of President, he has full-time functions to perform as Vice
President.
He sits on the National Security Council. He participates in
Cabinet meetings. He heads the President's Commission on Equal
Employment Opportunities. He is Chairman of the National Aeronautics and Space Council. He is the Nation's No. 1 foreign ambassador.
The related problem of inability has been a particularly trying
one which, I am certain, the Attorney General can speak with great
authority.
I will therefore forgo any further remarks because of the number
of people who want to be heard and because of the fact that the Attorney General has a busy schedule and must leave shortly.
The first witness was previously the' Assistant Attorney General
in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel under President Kennedy. He
became Deputy Attorney General when Mr. Justice White was named
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to the Supreme Court. He became Acting Attorney General when the
now Senator Kennedy resigned. Yesterday he was given the great
honor which he so richly deserves of being nominated for the office of
Attorney General by the President of the United States.
This introduction is not sufficient to properly portray the fine legal
record of the first witness, but Mr. Attorney General, let that suffice
for now, if you will. My apologies and we are happy to have you
with us.
STATEMENT OF HON. NICHOLAS deB. KATZENBACH, ATTORNEY
GENERAL-DESIGNATE OF THE UNITED STATES; ACCOMPANIED
BY NORBERT SCHLEI, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, OFFICE
OF LEGAL COUNSEL
Attorney General KATZENBACH. Thank you very much for your
statement. I have a prepared statement here. It is likely to take
about 15 minutes for me to read it. Would you like me to do that or
would you prefer to have me answer questions I
Senator BAYh. We shall let you use your own judgment. We are
most anxious to have your thoughts, because in addition to having been
Assistant Attorney General, you have studied this problem in some
detail and I would rely on your judgment completely as to how you
want to present your testimony before the committee. You may read
your statement, paraphrase it, expand upon it, however you prefer.
Attorney General KATZENBACH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like also to note that I am accompanied by Mr. Norbert
Schlei, who is the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Office
of Legal Counsel.
Senator BAYII. We are glad to have Mr. Schlei with us.
Attorney General KATZENBACH. I am privileged to appear before
this subcommittee in support of Senate Joint Resolution 1, a proposal
which would amend the Constitution in order to remedy two critical
deficiencies. The proposed amendment would, first, clarify the situation that would exist in the event that the President should become
disabled and, second, provide a means for filling vacancies in the
office of Vice President.
The subcommittee may recall that in 1963, I testified on several
proposed amendments to the Constitution relating to cases where the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.
Last year the subcommittee continued its efforts and approved a bill
identical with Senate Joint Resolution 1 which was passed by the
Senate. Since the subcommittee has already made a comprehensive
study of this matter, I shall do no more today than to state fairly
briefly what we understand Senate Joint Resolution 1 proposes to
do and what the Department's views are respecting it.
At the outset, before considering the specific provisions of Senate
Joint Resolution 1, I want to reaffirm my prior position that the only
satisfactory method of settling the problem of Presidential inability
is by constitutional amendment, as Senate Joint Resolution 1 proposes. The same of course is true of the problem of filling vacancies
in the office of Vice President. I recognize that there are distinguished
scholars who are of the opinion that Congress has power to act in the
matter of Presidential inability under the "necessary and proper"
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clause (art. 1, see. 8, clause 18), and that a statute would therefore
suffice as a solution. There is, however, equally distinguished opinion,
including that of the last three Attorneys General for the proposition
that the problem can be adequately resolved only by constitutional
amendnment. And as a practical matter, if what we want is to assure
continuity in Executive leadership-and if what we want to avoid is
uncertainty, confusion, and dissension at the very time of crisisthen in my judgment a statute would not provide a satisfactory solution. So I fully agree with the constitutional amendment route
marked out by Senate Joint Resolution 1.
TILE PROBLEM OF PRESIDENTIAL INABIIrTY

Article II, section 1, clause 6 of the Constitution provides as
follows:
In case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the
Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law
provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the
President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President,
and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a
President shall be elected.

It is generally agreed that this provision no longer poses any
legal problem in the event of the death of a President. As a matter
of historical practice, first established by John Tyler and followed
by seven other Vice Presidents, the Vice President becomes President in such a contingency. Section 1 of the Senate Joint Resolution 1 confirms this practice in the case of death and extends the
same principle to the case of removal of, or resignation by, the President. Under section 1, therefore, the Vice President would become
President and be sworn in as President in the event of the latter's
removal, death, or resignation. I can see no objection whatever to
section 1.
With respect to the problem of presidential inability, there is no
similar settled practice because, of course, so far in our history no
Vice President has ever exercised the powers and duties of the Presidency during a period of Presidential inability. It is true that the
identical Eisenhower-Nixon, Kennedy-Johnson, Johnson-McCormack, and Johnson-Hmnphrey understandings as to these matters,
supported as they are by the views of the last three Attorneys General, have gone far toward establishing a settled practice. These
informal understandings, however, leave much to be desired as a
means of resolving such fundamental questions, and in any ease they
make no provision for the situation that would exist if the President
and Vice President were to disagree on the question of inability.
Accordingly, it is clear that what we need at this time is a lasting
and complete solution to the key questions which are apt to arise
under the ambiguous language of article II, section 1, clause 6 of
the Constitution when a President suffers inability. The first is
whether it is the "Office" of the President, or the "Powers and
Duties" of that Office, which devolve upon the Vice President in the
event of presidential inability. The second is who shall raise the
question of "Inability" and make the determination as to when it

commences and when 'it terminates.
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The great majority of constitutional scholars have expressed the
opinion that upon a determination of Presidential inability, the Vice
President succeeds only temporarily to the powers and duties of the
office and does not permanently become President. This has been
the unanimous view of Attorneys General of both Republican and
Democratic administrations for at .east the last decade. Similarly,
the majority of scholars are agreed that the Vice President has constitutional authority to make the initial determination of Presidential
inability, and that the President has the authority to determine when
his inability is at an end. My own judgment and that of many Attorneys General is that this is so. However, enough doubt has
existed on these subjects in the past that several Vice Presidents
have been deterred from acting as President when the President was
temporarily disabled. As you will recall, this happened most dramatically during the prolonged illnesses of Presidents Garfield and
Wilson, when the country was left without leadership and decisions
were made, to the extent that they were made at all, in a questionable manner.
The events of the last, decade show us all too clearly how quickly
disability can strike. We cannot afford to assume that our good
fortune hI the past will continue in the future. If a similar tragedy
should occur while section 3 of Senate Joint Resolution 1 is in effect,
it would not only fix beyond dispute the status of the Vice President
as Acting Prsident when he is discharging the powers and duties
of a disabled President, it would also give the President a firm constitutional guarantee that he could reassume these powers and duties
as soon as his inability has ended. On this basis, a President who
is sick, or about to undergo an operation which will temporarily
incapacitate him, will not hesitate to announce his inability, nor
will a Vice President be unduly slow to act if an emergency situation of this kind demands it.
The extraordinary situations-where the President cannot or does
not declare his own inability, or where a dispute exists between the
President and Vice President as to whether inability exists-are
covered by sections 4 and 5 of Senate Joint Resolution 1.
Section 4 provides that if the President does not declare his inability, the Vice President with the written concurrence of a majority
of the heads of the executive departments (that is, the members of
the Cabinet) or such other body as Congress might by law provide,
may transmit to Congress his written declaration that the President
is disabled, and immediately assume the powers and duties of the
office as Acting President. Section 5 provides that the President
can resume the powers and duties of his office by transmitting to the
Congress his written declaration that his inability has ended. If,
however, the Vice President does not agree that the President's
inability has ended, section 5 further provides that the Vice President
can, with the written concurrence of a majority of the heads of the
executive departments or such other body as Congress might by
law provide, within 2 days so advise Congress. Thereupon Congress
would be required immediately'to decide the issue. A two-thirds
vote of both Houses would be necessary to keep the President out
and permit the Vice President to continue to act as Acting President.
If the Vice President could not muster a two-thirds vote in each
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House in favor of a determination of continuing Presidential inability, the President would resume the powers and duties of his office.
As the subcommittee knows all too well, the factual situations with
which Senate Joint Resolution 1 is designed to deal are numerous and
complex. Inevitably, therefore, some aspects of Senate Joint Resolution 1 will raise problems of ambiguity for some observers. As the
chairman noted at the outset, it is almost impossible to please everyone
with respect to every problem that can come up in this situation. In
order to assist in minimizing any such ambiguity, I would like to set
forth the interpretations I would make of the proposed amendment in
several difficult areas so that the subcommittee may have an opportunity to consider whether clarification is needed.
First, I assume that in using the phrase "majority vote of both
Houses of Congress" in section 2, and "two-thirds vote of both Houses"
in section 5, what is meant is a majority and two-thirds vote, respectively, of those Members in each House present and voting, a quorum
being present. This interpretation would be consistent with longstanding precedent (see, that is, Missouri Pao. Ry. Co. v. Kan8a8, 248
U.S. 276 (191.9)).
Second, I assume that the procedure established by section 5 for
restoring the President to the powers and duties of his Office is applicable only to instances where the President has been declared disabled
without his consent, as provided in section 4; and that, where the
President has voluntarily declared himself unable to act, in accordance with the procedure established by secticn 3, he could restore himself immediately to the powers and duties of his Office by declaring
in writing that his inability has ended. The subcommittee may wish
to consider whether language to insure this interpretation should be
added to section 3.
Third, I assume that even where disability was established originally
pursuant to section 4, the President could resume the powers and duties of his Office immediately with the concurrence of the Acting President, and would not be obliged to await the expiration of the 2-day
period mentioned in section 5.
Fourth, I assume that transmission to the Congress of the written
declarations referred to in section 5 would, if Congress were not then
in session, operate to convene the Congress in special session so that
the matter could be immediately resolved. In this regard, section 5
might be construed as impliedly requiring the Acting President to
convene a special session in order to raise an issue as to the President's
inability pursuant to section 5.
Further in this connection I assume that the language used in
section 5 to the effect that congress "will immediately decide" the
issue means that if a decision were not reached by the Congress immediately, the powers and duties of the Office would revert to the President.
This construction is sufficiently doubtful, however, and the term "immediately" is sufficiently vague, that the subcommittee may wish to
consider adding certainty by including more precise language in section 5 or by taking action looking toward the making of appropriate
provision in the rules of the House and Senate.
In my testimony during the hearings of 1963, I expressed the view
that the specific procedures for determining the commencement and
termination of the President's inability should not be written into the
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Constitution, but instead should be left to Congress so that the Constitution would not be encumbered by detail. There is, however,
overwhelming support for Senate Joint Resolution 1, and widespread sentiment that these procedures should be written into the
Constitution. The debate has already gone on much too long.
Above all, we should be concerned with substance, not form. It is to
the credit of Senate Joint Resolution 1 that it provides for immediate,
self-implementing procedures that are not dependent on further congressional or Presidential action. In addition, it has the advantage
that the States, when called upon to ratify the proposed amendment
to the Constitution, will know precisely what is intended. In view
of these reasons supporting the method adopted by Senate Joint
Resolution 1, I see no reason to insist upon the preference I expressed
in 1963 and assert no objection on that ground.
I might add, Mr. Chairman, it would be a courageous man who
would take issue with 75 Senators.
FILLING THE VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF VICE PRESIDENT

Related to the problem of Presidential inability is the equally
critical problem of a vacancy in the office of Vice President. Too
often it is overlooked that the country has been without a Vice President 16 times-in almost half of the 36 administrations in the history
of the Nation. In an age marked by crisis, we can no longer afford
such a gap in the high command of the executive branch ofthe Government. Today more than ever, the working relationship between
the President and Vice President has become increasingly close; the
burdens of the Presidency and the exigencies of our time leave no
other alternative. The need is therefore manifest for a constitutional
amendment to assure that the office of Vice President will never again
remain vacant.
In my opinion, Senate Joint Resolution 1 embodies a highly satisfactory solution to this problem. Section 2 would amend- the Constitution to provide that whenever there is a vacancy in the office of
Vice President the President shall nominated a Vice President who
shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses
of Congress.
Permitting the President to choose the Vice President, subject to
congressional approval, in the event of a vacancy in that office, will
tend to insure the selection of an associate in whom the President has
confidence, and with whom he can work in harmony. Participation
by Congress in the procedure should help to insure that the person
selected would be broadly acceptable to the people of the Nation.
At this time, I wish to pay my respects to the members of this subcommittee, whose combined effort and scholarship have resulted in
this important measure. Also, I wish to commend the Special Committee on Presidential Inability of the American Bar Association,
and similar committees of State and city bar associations who have
in recent years helped to focus attention and to rally public support
for resolving these problems promptly.
It seems cloar that Senate Joint Resolution 1 represents as formidable a consensus of considered opinion on any proposed amendment to the Constitution as one is likely to find. It may not satisfy
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in every respect the views of all scholars and statesmen who have
studied the problem. For that matter, I doubt that any proposal
could ever fully satisfy everyone in this troublesome area. But, it
seems to me evident. that, as INresident ,Johnson said yesterday, Senate Joint Resolution 1 "would responsibly meet the pressing
need * * * ."
I understand that 47 State legislatures will be in session this year.
Given the opportunity, I believe that many of these State legislatures
will be able to ratify the necessary constitutional amendment if Congress acts without dlelay. I earnestly recommend such action.
Senator BAYMr. Thalk you, very nuch, Mr. Attorney General, for
your statement. I am sur'e that this will add a great deal not only
to the record but to our study of this amendment as we try to go
further to find imperfections which can be improved.
In my haste in trying to get the committee underway, I have
breachedl a bit of committee etiquette by not. making introductions of
my colleagues, the distinguished Senattors from Illinois, Nebraska,
Hawaii, and Maryland. They have all made a contribution and I
am sure they will all want to make a statement, but because of the
press of time on the Attorney General I have moved right ahead.
We may ask a question or two based on this very enlightening
testimony.
First, without objection, I would like to suggest that the very
articulate message sent to Congress by the President yesterday be
submitted into the record at this time.
(The statement of President Johnson, previously referred to
follows:)
[Released by Office of the White House Press Secretary, Jan. 28, 19051
TH&.WHrrE HOUSE.
To the Congress of the United States:
In 1787, Benjamin Franklin remarked near the conclusion of the Constitutional
Convention at Philadelphia, "It * * * astonishes me, sir, to find this system approaching so near to perfection as it does * * *."
One hundred seventy-eight years later the relevance of that Constitution of
1789 to our society of 1905 is remarkable. Yet it is truly astonishing that, over
this span, we have neither perfected the provisions for orderly continuity in the
executive direction of our system nor, as yet, paid the price our continuing inaction
so clearly invites and so recklessly risks.
I refer, of course, to three conspicuous and long-recognized defects In the
Constitution relating to the office of the Presidency:
1. The lack of a constitutional provision assuring the orderly discharge
of the powers and duties of the President-Commander in Chief-in the
event of the disability or incapacity of the incumbent.
2. The lack of a constitutional provision assuring continuity in the office
of the Vice President, an office which itself is provided within our system for
the primary purpose of assuring continuity.
8. The lack of a constitutional provision assuring that the votes of electors
in the electoral college shall without question reflect the expressed will of the
people in the actual election of their President and Vice President.
Over the years, as I have noted, we have escaped the mischief these obvious
omissions invite and permit. Our escape has been more the result of Providence
than of any prudence on our part. For it is not necessary to conjure the nightmare of nuclear holocaust or other national catastrophe to identify these omissions as chasms of chaos into which normal human frailties might plunge
us at any time.
On at least two occasions in our history, and perhaps others, American
Presidents--James Garfield and Woodrow Wilson-have, for prolonged periods.
been rendered Incapable of discharging their Presidential duties. On 16
occasions, in our 80 administrations, the office of Vice President has been vacant
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and over the two perilous decades, since the end of the Second World War, that
vital office has been vacant the equivalent of 1 year out of 4. Finally, over
recent years, complex but concerted campaigns have been openly undertakenfortunately without success, as yet-to subvert the electoral college so that it
would register not the will of the people of individual States but, rather, the
wishes of the electors themselves.
The potential of paralysis, implicit in these conditions, constitutes an indefensible folly for our responsible society in these times. Conimonsense impels,
duty requires us to act, and to act now, without further delay.
Action is in the tradition of our forebears: Since adoption of the Bill of
Rights-the first 10 amendments to our Constitution-9 of the 14 subsequent
amendments have related directly either to the offices of the Presidency and Vice
Presidency or to assuring the responsiveness of our voting processes to the will of
the people. As long ago as 1801, and as recently as 1964, Americans have
amended their Constitution in striving for its greater perfection in these most
sensitive and critical areas.
I believe it is the strong and overriding will of tile people today that we
should act now to eliminate these unhappy possibilities inherent in our system
as it now exists. Likewise, I believe it is the consensus of an overwhelming
majority of the Congress-without thought of partisanship--that effective action
be taken promptly. I am, accordingly, addressing this communication to both
Houses to ask that this prevailing will be translated into action which would
permit the people, through the process of constitutional amendment, to overcome
these omissions so clearly evident in our system.

I. PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
Our Constitution clearly prescribes the order of procedure for assuring continuity in the office of the Presidency in the event of the death of the incumbent.
These provisions have met their tragic tests successfully. Our system, unlike
many others, has never experienced the catastrophe of disputed succession or
the chaos of uncertain command.
Our stability is, nonetheless, more superficial than sure. While we are prepared for the possibility of a President's death, we are all but defenseless against
the probability of a President's incapacity by injury, illness, senility, or other
affliction. A nation bearing the responsibilities we are privileged to bear for our
own security, and the security of the free world, cannot justify the appalling
gamble of entrusting its security to the immobilized hands or uncomprehending
mind of a Commander in Chief unable to command.
On September 29, 1964, the Senate passed Senate Joint Resolution 139, proposing a constitutional amendment to deal with this perplexing question of
Presidential disability as well as the question, which I shall discuss below, of
filling vacancies in the office of Vice President. The same measure has been introduced in this Congress as Senate Joint Resolution 1 and House Joint Resolution 1. The provisions of these measures have been carefully considered and
are the product of many of our finest constitutional and legal minds. Believing,
as I do, that Senate Joint Resolution 1 and House Joint Resolution 1 would
responsibly meet the pressing need I have outlined, I urge the Congress to
approve them forthwith for submission to ratification by the States.

II. VAOANOY IN THE OFFICE OF THE VIC PRESIDENT
Indelible personal experience has impressed upon me the indisputable logic and
imperative necessity of assuring that the second office of our system shall, like
the first office, be at all times occupied by an incumbent who is able and who is
ready to assume the powers and duties of the Chief Executive and Commander
in Chief.
In our history, to this point, the office of the President has never devolved
below the first clearly prescribed step of constitutional succession. In moments
of need, there has always been a Vice President; yet, Vice Presidents are no less
mortal than Presidents. Seven men have died in the office and one has resigned,
in addition to the eight who left the office vacant to succeed to the PXesidency.
We recognized long ago the necessity of assuring automatic succession in the
absence of a Vice President. Various statutes have been enacted at various
times prescribing orders of succession from among either the presiding officers
of the Houses of Congress or the heads of executive departments who, together
comprise the traditional Cabinet of the President. In these times, such orders
of succession are no substitute for an office of succession.
42-688-65--2
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Since the last order of succession was prescribed by the Congress in 1947,
the office of the Vice President has undergone the most significant transformation and enlargement of duties in its history.
Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy have successively expanded the
role of the Vice Pxesident, even as I expect to do in this administration.
Once only an appendage, the office of Vice President is an integral part of the
chain of command and its occupancy on a full-time basis is imperative.
For this reason, I most strongly endorse the objective of both Senate Joint
Resolution 1 and House Joint Resolution 1 in providing that, whenever there is
a vacancy in the office of Vice President, provision shall exist for that office to
be filled with a person qualified to succeed to the Presidency.

III.

REFORM OF THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE SYSTEM

We believe that the people should elect their President and Vice President. One
of the earliest amendments to our Constitution was submitted and ratified in
response to the unhappy experience of an electoral college stalemate which
jeopardized this principle. Today, there lurks, in the electoral college system, the ever-present possibility that electors may substitute their own will for
the will of the people. I believe that possibility should be foreclosed.
Our present system of computing and awarding electoral votes by States is
an essential counterpart of our Federal system and the provisions of our Constitution which recognize and maintain our Nation as a Union of States. It supports the two-party system which has served our Nation well. I believe this system should be retained. But it is imperative that the electoral votes of a State
be cast for those persons who receive the greatest number of votes for President
and Vice President-and for no one else.
At the same time, I believe we should eliminate the omission in our present
system which leaves the continuity of the offices of President and Vice President
unprotected if the persons receiving a majority o? the electoral votes for either
or both of these offices should die after the election in November and before the
inauguration of the President. Electors are now legally free to choose the President without regard to the outcome of the election. I believe that if the President-elect does under these circumstances, our laws should provide that the Vice
President-elect should become President when the new term begins. Conversely,
if death should come to the Vice-President-elect during this interim, I believe
the President-elect should, upon taking office, be required to follow the procedures
otherwise prescribed for filling the unexpired term of the Vice President. If
both should die or become unable to serve in this interim, I believe the Congress
should be made responsible for providing the method of selecting officials for
both positions. I am transmitting herewith a draft amendment to the Constitution to resolve these problems.
Favorable action by the Congress on the measures here recommended will, I
believe, assure the orderly continuity in the Presidency that is imperative to the
success and stability of our system. Action on these measures now will allay
future anxiety among our own people, and among the peoples of the world, in
the event senseless tragedy or unforeseeable disability should strike again at
either or both of the principal Offices of our constitutional system. If we act
now, without undue delay, we shall have moved closer to achieving perfection
of the great constitutional document on which the strength and success of our
system have rested for nearly two centuries.
LYNDON B. JOHNSON.
THn Wnrm HoUsE, ,anuary 28,1965.

Senator BATH. Mr. Attorney General, as you know, the Constitution is the bedrock type of law of our land in which broad generalities
are expressed and laid forth with a minimum of specifics. This was one
of ths difficulties which confronted us in trying to draft legislation in
an area that had great need for at least some specifics. You very correctly pointed to some areas to which we had given a great deal of study.
I wou d like to explore your thoughts in some of these areas, if I may,
to see if it is possible to be more specific in your thinking as to how
we should approach these possible problems.
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For example, the problem of getting a majority vote or two-thirds
vote. Is there specific precedent? Would more detail be needed in
writing the amendment f Would this be the normal interpretation or
must we put additional specifics in to get the right interpretation?
Attorney General KATZENBACII. I think the interpretation I expressed would be the normal interpretation, and I would recommend
that if that is the interpretation intended, which I believe it is, that that
be made clear in any report on the Constitution or any debate on it.
Because it would be what would normally be interpreted and it would
help to have it simply made clear in that form.
Senator BAYH. In the report?
Attorney General KATZENBACH. I would think that would be
perfectly sufficient.
Senator BAY1I. In our opinions, it was, and I am glad to see you
support this contention.
Now, do you feel that the provision for a two-way waiting period is
sufficiently clear, or do you feel that explaining the intent in the report
would be sufficient and would avoid the necessity for additional language?
Attorney General IATZENBACII. I would think it probably would be
sufficient simply to clarify that you are only dealing with the situation
of .the disagreement between the two. That is not clear from the text
of Senate Joint Resolution 1, because you go right into the disagreement situation. All that is said, really, is section 3 and it says if the
President does declare it in writing, the Vice President shall assume
the powers and duties of the office. It does not go on to say until such
time as the President declares that his inability has ceased.
I think that the practice that has grown up on the agreements that
I have mentioned in miy testimony is useful practice and that that
might be explicitly confirmed. I think it could be done either in the
text of Senate Joint Resolution 1 or it could certainly be done in the
report and the legislative history, either way. I do not believe that
particular point is a controversial one. I think that people would
agree that if the President determines his inability has ceased and the
Vice President agrees with that, there should be an immediate resumption by the President of his powers as President.
Senator BAyr. The real difficulty would arise should we have a pos'sible disagreement between the Vice President and the majority of the
Cabinet on the one hand and the President on the other.
Attorney General KATZENBACH. That is right. It might be useful
Mr. Chairman, simply to reaffirm the other practice, either in one ol
the forms or the other, and then get on to what the difficult problem is.
In the anxiety to solve the difficult problem, we should not leave the
easy problem in doubt.
Senator BAYH. In making this difficult problem easier to solve, do
you feel that a time limitation on congressional action as has been
suggested in some legislation and by some scholars would avoid delay?
Would we have a better solution if we put a 10- or 30-day or 2-month
limitation on Congress in which it would have to act?
I notice you said you thought the powers and duties of the Presidency would revert to the Chief Executive if Congress failed to act
immediately.
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Attorney General

KATZENBACH.

I would be reluctant to put a firm

time in a constitutional provision. I can conceive of circumstances
where it ought to be done within 24 or 48 hours. I can conceive of
other circumstances where Congress might wish to have the views of
medical experts, for example, and this might take a few more days.
A good deal of the problems that could occur under section 5 could, I
think, be resolved by Congress itself in promptly providing what it
was going to do in the event of this contingency by its own rules.

Senator BAYIT. By rules or by statute?
Attorney General KATZENBACIH. It would be just effecting-or by
general statute if it were possible, just simply to assure that they have
an interpretation of the word "immediate" and that they are bound
by this. Because under the provisions of section 5, you have a Vice
President who is acting as President and a President who is reasserting his ability to act.
Now, normally, it would always be my predisposition to protect the
Presidency from any form of usurpation or any form of politics. Our
Constitution provided for a 4-year term for a President and I think we
have an obligation-I would feel it personally, certainly, to protect
that. Yet you have here in section 5 a situation where the Vice President presumably is continuing to act until such time as Congress acts.
Congress is enjoined to act immediately. It seemed to me desirable to
give some assurance that Congress would act immediately and you
would not have that situation of his continuing to act. And I think
even beyond that, argument could be made, Mr. Chairman, that the
President simply would resume his office if Congress failed to act immediately. But you would then create a debate: Has the Congress
acted soon enough or not, who is exercising the powers and duties?
If the President were to say, this has gone now before the Congress,
They have had it for c days, they have not voted upon it, they have
not acted immediately and therefore I automatically resume powers
and duties-it is subject to that possible construction and I think
intent with respect to that ought to be clarified.
Senator BAYH. Is there any way we can get around this possibility?
What we are trying to prescribe is for continuity-someone who would
always have charge. And if the Vice President is prohibited from acting unless he gets a majority of the Cabinet, which, of course, is appointed by the President he seeks to replace, would this be a sufficient
safeguard to the President? And if the Vice President could not have
two-thirds of the Congress to support him in addition to the Cabinet,
the President should resume-

Attorney General

KATZENBACH.

I think it certainly could be done

by rules of the House or legislation that in this event, Congress would
reconvene, that they would decide this, there would be, for example,
the possibility of limitation on debate. There has to be a vote on this.
A certain period of time, I think, would serve to clarify the problem
of what "immediately" means and still leave some flexibility to take
care of the sorts of situations that I discussed.
I assume also you would want to clarify by way or intent, perhaps,
Mr. Chairman, what you have just said, that this is the majority of the
Cabinet that the President has nominated. Conceivably, a Vice President exercising the duties could remove all Members ol the Cabinet if
Congress is not in session and he could then exercise the powers and
duties to give recess appointments to his own people.
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I think the intent of this, if I understand it correctly, is that of the
Congress that was sitting and the Cabinet that was sitting at the time
the inability existed.
Senator BAYH. We would not want to have any purge by the Vice
President during a President's inability of the ill President s Cabinet.
By the same token, we would not want it so that if one of the members
of the Cabinet died, he could not be replaced.
Attorney General KATZENBACH. Congress could, of course, by law
provide for that problem.
Senator BAYH. Let me ask one other question and I am sure my colleagues have some of their own.
You referred to the possibility, the necessity of protecting any President from usurpation of his office. The President, by the very nature
of his office, must deal with very difficult problems, very controversial
problems. Have we given him sufficient protection so that he will be
able to stand up and make unpopular decisions that he feels are in the
best interest of the country?
Attorney General IaTZENBACH. I think this is a responsible resolution of that problem here, if, in particular, it is further clarified in the
rules so that there must be quick action with respect to this so that immediately he is given hands and feet in an appropriate legislative
resolution form.
There are, of course, two ways of dealing with section 5 and I am sure
that the committee has considered both. One is to have the Presidentone is the one that is proposed here, where the Vice President continues
to act and the Cabinet supports him until, in effect, Congress declines
to support him by two-thirds. The other solution would be to have
the, which I am sure you have considered at length, would be to have
the President resume the office merely upon his declaration unless a
majority of the Cabinet supported the Vice President and two-thirds
of each House supported him. When that had finished occurring, the
Vice President would resume. Those are the two alternative ways of
handling it.
Now, I suppose the two problems that one is dealing with are the
risk to the country of a period, however short, where a President who
really is unable, nonetheless declares ability, and the problem, how
quick the congressional action could be gotten in that situation and the
risk to the country in that period of time, as against the problem that
you raised, Mr. Chairman, of the usurper, which is the traditional
fear of Vice Presidents in exercising their power, that they would
be so regarded.
Senator BAYH. We have two things we are striving toward.
Attorney General KATZENBACH. We have to balance those two considerations.
Senator BAYH. One is to make sure that there was not, even for a
short period of time, a disabled President acting as President; and
two, in the transfer of the power from the Vice President back to the
President, even under the most controversial situations, to keep the
procedure as simple as possible.
Even if it would mean the Vice President would act for an extra
month, to have it be an original transfer from the President to the
Vice President and then back to the President, if Congress should so
decide is preferable to a situation where it is from the President to

PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY

the Vice President and then the President makes the declaration and
the power is his again, then the Vice President disputes this and the
Congress moves in and it goes back to the Vice President, which would
be very disconcerting. Not only to this country but to others, who.
actually do react to the shocks.
We thought that this way, we have only a minimum of two transfers, one from the President to the Vice President and then, when
Congress refused to support his stand, immediately back to the
President.
Mr. Minority Leader, as a constitutional expert, I am sure you
will have some questions to ask.
Senator DIEmsN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will defer to my
colleagues because when the clock moves up, I must get over to the
floor. I did have one question with respect to section 1, where the
President shall select a Vice President on confirmation by a majority
vote of the Congress. I wonder if it would not be advisable to think
a little about a limitation on that choice and to limit it to Members
of the House and Senate and to the heads of the departments of Government? Then if the President says he is ill and the Vice President
becomes President, he cannot select just anybody to become Vice
President.
Then secondly is the question whether it ought to be done by a
majority vote or a two-thirds vote. We rely on two-thirds in the most
critical matters such as treaties and vetoes and so forth and this is a
highly important one when it comes to the selection of a Vice President, because he may even possibly succeed the President because of
disability or death, resignation or retirement. Then you have this
question whether or not the President could actually select a Vice
President from his own State.
Now, the electors, of course, as we modified it, cannot select two
people from the same State. That was amendment No. 12:
The electors shall meet in their respective States and vote by ballot for
President and Vice President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant

of the same State with themselves.
Now, I would think there is an implication there that they would not
want to have both come from the same State. Yet in the matter that
is before us there is no such interdiction and I would gather that if
this were approved in that fashion, it would make it possible for anybody who came from the same State, if he felt it was good, to get confirmation from the Congress. I just advance that and I think it can be
pursued, Mr. Chairman, a little later.
Senator BAYH. It is certainly a very specific question, Senator. I
am sorry that the minority leader has to leave quickly.
Mr. Attorney General, do you care to give your opinion on those
questions by the minority leader?
Attorney General KATZENBACH. I would think if the choice of the
President were so limited, it would still be a very broad choice. But
I do not think I am persuaded that it should be limited to the Cabinet
or to Members of the House or Senate. I think customarily, throughout our history, at least the presidential candidate of one or the other
party has normally had freehand to choose who his running mate will
be. That free hand may be governed by a variety of considerations
within the party, but his choice within those is normally respected.
I would see no reason not to recognize that practice here.
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I would be reluctant also to support a two-thirds vote in the House
and Senate. I think by and large, what the President under those
circumstances would be counting on would be the support of his own
party within the Senate and the House, and I think it would be un..
fortunate for the country if the opposition party should be able to
exercise a very considerable power in determining who the President
wished as his Vice President. Normally, the opposition party does
not. It is the people in an election who determine that. There would
be a possibility I would think in those circumstances, of an undesirable delay in filling the office. Siippose that the President were to submit a name and failed to muster the two-thirds. I could imagine a
President at that point, rather than submitting another name, saying
"That is my choice for the job and that is whom I am going to leave
there and there will not be any Vice President unless this man is
selected."
Senator BAYH. Of course, if limitations were put on, this would immediately preclude one source from whence many of our Presidents
and Vicw-Presidents come, the Governors of States.
Attorney General KATZENBACIH. I would think it would be in the
interest of ratification not to eliminate the Governors.
Senator BAYH. That is a very good point.
The Senator from Nebraska has been a longtime student of the problem and active member of the full committee. I am certain he has
several questions he would like to ask.
Senator HRUSKA. Before I do ask any questions or make any observations, I want to join our chairman in extending the congratulations to our present witness for the preferment that was visited upon
him yesterday. In due time, we shall officially consider that nomination, but I can predict in advance, Mr. Chairman, that there is
every indication that the reception on that occasion will be very, very
favorable and certainly a very receptive one.
Attorney General KATZENBACH. Thank you, very much, Senator.
Senator IMUsKA. Before I do ask questions, I want to make some
comments and I shall submit a statement later in greater detail, Mr.
Chairman.
There are two principles in which the Senator from Nebraska is
very interested in regard to the amendment that we are considering.
One of them concerns the idea that the Attorney General has already
touched upon, namely, not to clutter the Constitution with procedure
detail. That is a sound constitutional principle. It has, in the main,
been followed and unless there is some very pressing and persuasive
reason why it should be abandoned at this time, it is my purpose and
intention to urge that it be abided by.
The second principle is separation of powers. In section 5 of Senate Joint Resolution 1 which confers upon the Congress the matter of
approval of the Vice President's contention that the President is not
able to resume duties or the President's contention that he is able to
resume duties, we have a transgression and a violation of that doctrine
of separation of powers. There are several objections to this section
on that basis, some which I shall mention later and some which I
would like to propound to our witness.
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I should like, Mr. Attorney General, to direct your attention to
section 3 of Senate Joint Resolution 1, which reads:
If the President declares In writing that he is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice
President as Acting President.
I am wondering, Mr. Attorney General, if, in your opinion, there

is merit to the proposal advanced at. previous hearings that the President should be able to designate the Vice President as an Act ing President for a specific limited'time. This would cover such occasion as
when the President might be en route to a foreign country, or otherwise
outside of reliable communications? The basis for those proposals,
of course, is that there are many decisions that conceivably might be
very, very much needed in a very short period of tim. If it were
possible for the President,, in looking forward to an absence from the
country for 2 weeks or 3 weeks, or any other specific period of time,
would it.
be well to enable him to arm the Vice President with the
powers of Acting President? Have you any observations on that
suggestion which- was made by former Attorney General Brownell
in previous hearings?
Attorney General K]ATZENBACI. I would say first, Senator, that I
would have read section 3, or would read section 3 as really broad
enough to cover that. I would agree with you that it. is possible, although not, likely, that a failure of communications media or a failure
of one kind or another would make it impossible for the President to
Iarticil)ate quickly enough in a decision if lie were in the position you
have indicated. I would think lie could so provide in writing, even
under the language of section 3 as it exists, that he could empower the
Vice President to do that in writing in the event that such and such
occurred. Perhaps that is not cleaIr, but, I would have thought that
section 3 would have permittedd the President to do that if lie found it
desirable to do so.
Senator Ikyii. Let me intervene momentarily. I am certain the
Senate or from Nebraska remembers that the record shows that the
intention of this legislation is to deal with any type of inability,
whether it is from traveling from one nation to ano tier, a breakdown
of communications, capture by the enemy or anything that is imaginable. The inability to perforin the powers and duties of the office, for
any reason is inabl ity under the terms that we are discussion.
Senator HtursKA. Yes, that is true, Mr. Chairman, but that is covered
under section 4. I fully agree with you that if something happened
to the President, then there would be a declaration by the Vice
President., substantiated by the majority of the heads of executive departments. But I am suggesting, wlmathappens under section 3? Can
the President make a 10-day designation of the Vice President as
Acting President under the present, language of section 3? And if
we are going to say, oh, well, we talked about it in subcommittee, we
talked about it in the report, we talked about it on the floor, and therefore, it is in the Constitution when this amendment is adopted, I submit to you that is a very loose way of writing constitutional law and
one with which I would'have very little, if any sympathy. It is section
3 to which I direct your attention, not section 4.
Senator BAY-I. I just wanted to clarify, since we are talking about
different kinds of disability, that we hav all the freedom in the world
F
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of putting this in the constitutional amendment if it is the opinion of
the subcommittee, the committee, or of the Congress. However, I
would point out that this again adds more detail, which the Senator
hiniself is desirous, as am I, of keeping to a minimum.
Senator HRUSKA. Well, if the chairman's desire in that regard
would be asserted in areas where it can be done much more fruitfully,
then I would be persuaded by that argument. However, this is by
way of limitation. It would not take many words. It is not a matter of procedure. It is simply an added authority to the President
to act at a time when he would be absent. It would be for a definite,
specific period, and its limitation would be self-executing. It seems
to me that it would be something that should be very seriously considered by the committee for section 3.
Have you any further comment, Mr. Attorney General, on that
particular point?
Attorney General KATZENIAClY. No; I would certainly have no objection to the substance of what you are saying, that the President
should be able to arrange for the Vice Presiaent to act for a limited
period or in the event of a certain contingency, or something of that
kind, which would be a self-executive provision. I would only reaffirm that I had thought that section 3 would be broad enough to do
that. Perhaps it obviously could be clarified if that was the desire
of the Congvress to so clarify it.
SenatorIThMS-sKA. Well, thank you, very much. That at least raises
the .point and gives us some basis for further discussion in executive
session.
Now, turning to section 5-and I want to say parenthetically that
this Senator certainly finds himself in agreement with the preceding
sections almost without exception. But turning to section 5, I would
like to ask the Attorney General to elaborate a little bit more about
"immediately," as usedin the sentence which says, "Thereupon, Congress will immediately decide the issue." Now, it is all right to depend or to think that one depends upon the good faith of Congress and
say: "Certainly they will not be obstructionists and certainly they will
turn their attention to this very important issue at once,"'but it has
been suggested by scholars in the field that there are such things as
unlimited debate in the Senate. The only limitation is subject to Kule
22, about which we will hear more next month, and the month after
that perhaps. I doubt very much that our feelings of sympathy in
this matter would prevent someone from saying, "let us have hearings
and expert testimony. Let us have a full discussion of this subject,
so that the public may be informed."
Now, do you think that "immediately" will encompass that sort of
thing?
Attorney General KATZENBACII. I would suppose that it was the
intention hero that "immediately" would not encompass that sort of
thing, that the word was used to express the sense of urgency that you
expressed at the outset.
I think it is extremely difficult to know what word you put in unless
you put in a specific time limitation, which I think has some difficulties to it. AsI have said earlier, you might quite legislativel3 want
medical examinations. You might even legislatively want those medical examinations, those opinions, before the Congress, before either

PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY

House, before it acted. That could take a period, at least, of a few
dais.
d frankly, Senator, am at somewhat of a loss to say how it could
be better expressed than the word "immediately," except to repeat
the suggestion that I made, that you could get rid of such things as
unlimited debate by taking care of that in a legislative fashion, by saying "for this particular point, there should be no debate or the debate
should be limited, or the decision shall be made within sach and such
a period of time." I would be reluctant to put that in the Constitution, I believe, although not violently opposed to it.
But I can see reasons why perhaps that should be left to the judgment of Congress, exercising it at a time when the problem was not
before it, providing in advance for this problem and providing for the
most expeditious procedure.
Senator HUSKA. You do suggest that it would be suitable for the
Congress to legislate upon this point?
Attorney &eneral KATZENBACH. I think Congress could legislate
upon when a reference is made to it under this section of the Constitution, the following should take place, and if both I-ouses agree that
this will take place in that way, it will.
Senator HRUSKA. I am sure the words you have just uttered will be
greeted with great joy and anticipation by those who will seek to
define legislatively "immediately" as meaning 90 days. Because if we
are going to have a situation here where we will put a word in the
Constitution and then say "It is competent for the Congress to define
that word anyway it wants to." I say we are making a shambles out
of the Constitution. I doubt very much the Supreme Court would be
apt to say that "immediately" means 90 days or approve that sort of
thing. Would you have any thoughts on that?

Attorney General

KATZENIACII.

I believe that in probability, the

Supreme Court would accept any judgment Congress made on that.
I find it difficult to find any context in which this would go before
the Supreme Court, and I expect they would defer to any judgment
the Congress made.
Senator HRUSKA. That is possible, and then it would be for the
Congress to express, as you say, "immediately" means when we get
good and ready. It may mean 90 days or 60.
You refer to medical examination. Medical examination, certainly,
for some physical ailments would be easy to make. From my know edge of medicine, however, when we get into psychiatric problems, such
as mental or nervous disorders that cannot be accomplished in a day
or two. In fact, it may mean that there will be a passage of considerable time before a psychiatrist or a nervous and mental - specialist can
gather enough observation and data upon which to predicate a judginent and render an opinion.
That is the sort of thing we run into when we do two things. When
we get into procedural details in the constitutional amendment, and
when we violate the separation of powers. You say that it is difficult
to put in words and to put in language something that would be acceptable and workable. I have a solution for it and I shall propound
upon it a little bit later. Briefly it is this: If that power is kept within
the executive department where it belongs, and exercised by the heads
of the executive departments, we immediately dispose of this time ele-

PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY

ment in very satisfactory fashion. If those department heads will not
go along with the Vice President and say that the Preside-at is not able
to proceed then the issue is solved and the President resumes his office.
We have the matter resolved from the standpoint of time.
Would you have any comment on that, Mr. Attorney General?
Attorney General KATZENBAOH. The first point, it seem to me that
about all that you can do iii a constitutional amendment is to put in
such a word as "immediately." If you leave that out entirely and indicate no sense of urgency about this, then it seems to me that whatever would be provided by legislation would take somewhat longer.
On the second point, it seems to me that those who feel that Congress should act on this are adopting a philosophy that says that the
elected representatives of the people would better give the sense of the
people, at least in confirming that executive decision. And it would
prevent at least the possibility, although we have never faced it in our
history at all, the possibility of the coup d'e tat which certainly other
countries have experienced from time to time; the possibility of deposing a President when the Vice President can, through one way or another, wean away a majority of the Cabinet from supporting .the
President.
So I think you accentuate the problem that the chairman raised at
the outset of simply an unpopular President and a Vice President
who seeks to assume the office and can edge the support of the majority
of the Cabinet.
On the separation of powers point, Senator, I don't believe that this
procedure amounts to a violation of that principle as I understand it.
It is already provided in the Constitution that Congress shall decide
this procedure in the event of an inability of both the President and
the Vice President, and as I said at the outset, some scholars have
thought that that language would permit the solution of this problem
before us now simply by legislation, since they do not read the language
in a way, a conservative wa, really, in which I, and I think a majority
of scholars, have read it. So it is already provided that Congress get
into the picture of selection processes in the Constitution.
Senator IuSKA. Mr. Attorney General, if you will pardon the interruption, that is a different situation, is it not? That is a situation
where a policy question is to be decided. There is a vacancy and the
place to decide that question is in a body composed of elected representatives. In the case of disability, the situation is different. There the
policy has been determined already. The policy was determined that
Mr. X was elected President. That is the decisive action taken by the
electorate of this country. The question is only as to fact: Is he capable
of carrying on his duties?
Now, that is not a policy question. It is a factual question. I submit that the contingency to which we refer is not provided for in the
Constitution and that there is a violation of the separation of powers.
Now, in the situation where there would be a coup d'etat by manipulation of the Cabinet, that is a detail that can be taken care of by
legislation under Senate Joint Resolution 6, because we have provision
that the Congress may legislate to see that this decision is made within
the executive branch. Ifit is desirable to say the Vice President may
not fire or discharge the members of the President's Cabinet, that he
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must work with them or such of them as are still alive and capable of
proceeding, Congress may do that.
It, does seem to me that there still is a violation of that separation of
powers doctrine when we get into this particular thing. It puts one of
the branches of Government in a dominant position over the other.
That, of course, is the essence of the violation of that doctrine.
Attorney General KATZENBACIT. I do not quite understand which
branch is dominant over the other, sir.
Senator LIRtISKA. The Congress would be in a dominant position
over the President when they would say, "You are not capable of
carrying on the duties of President.."
Attorney General KATZENnACI. I could take mild issue with that,
if I could,'Senator. As I read section 5, that is not possible. All that
Congress can do is to affirm a decision that has already been made in the
executive branch, because the majority of the Cabinet have already
supported the Vice President. So that the only participation of Conress in this is to say, is really to protect, I suppose, against a coup
d'etat here, to say, "These fellows have tried to take over and we do not
think they ought to." So I do not think they are dominant.
Congress cannot initiate. Congress cannot get rid of the President
here, except on its own process already contained in the Constitution
for impeachment.
Senator IHUVISKA. If they agree with the Vice President, they are
disposing of a President.
Attorney General KATZr.NBACi. They have to agree with not only
the Vice President, but a majority of the'Cabinet.
Senator HRUSKA. And two-thirds of their Members. If they disagree with the Vice President, they are overturning that consensus,
are they not?
Attorney General KA'rzmrnAC1r. Well, you have to have the consensus in the executive branch-at least a consensus of this kind, before it even gets to Congress. Congress cannot even look at the problem unless the majority of the Cabinet supports the Vice President.
Senator BYii. May I enter the colloquy long enough perhaps to
pose a question for the consideration of the Senator from Nebraska
as well as the Attorney General? What commingling powers are we
giving here that are not already provided, as the Attorney General
mentions, in the impeachment proceedings? It is tie same type of
determination that has to be made-either the man is capable of performing or he is not. It seems to me of little consequence whether you
say he is incapable of performing because he is ill or whether you say
he is incapable of performing because he lias done something immoral
or transgressed the laws of the country. It still is the same type of
determination that the Congress has to make.
Senator T-IRUSKA. If the chairman would permit my reply to that
I would respectfully differ from him, because to judge a man guilty of
acts which would be determined as treasonous or against public policy
to the extent that he shall no longer serve as President, that is a policy
question. It is semi- or quasi-judicial, to be sure, but that is a political
and a policy question.
The fact of insufficient mental or physical powers to continue in
office is not a policy question; that, is a faciual question. Those that are
policy in nature should be decided by the Congress. That is where
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they belong. And, of course, the Constitution expressly provides for
impeachment. But where it is not a policy question, then it should
remain within the branch of Government that is involved. We certainly would not want to divorce from the Congress the power of the
Congress to deal with its own Members by giving the President or the
Supreme Court a part in the decision as to whether a certain Member
should stay in the House or in the Senate. That is something for us
to decide. Similarly with reference to a factual determination on the
physical or the mental capabilities of a serving President, it would be a
question for the executive branch to decide.
Senator BAYI. We differ as to what type of determination the Congress is making in the impeachment. I think in addition to being
a policy determination, it is very much a factual determination, toodid the President actually do what he is accused of doing.
Forgive me. Do you have any further questions?
Senator HRUSKA. Perhaps the Attorney General might want to
comment on the observations by the chairman?
Attorney General KATZENBACH. I would think that a question of
this importance Senator, could scarcely be regarded as a purely factual question. There are all kinds of gravest considerations of policy
involved in the determination that Congress would make--the whole
question of the confidence of the country, the confidence of the world.
Senator BAYJI. Are we talking about disability?
Attorney General KATZE-BACH. Disability in that kind of a case.
I would think that was a policy question, admitting the factual basis
of it, but I would think that was a policy question of the highest
order. I would think it would be extremely important to know, in the
event that a Vice President was taking over the offices, that he had the
support in that determination of two-thirds of each House of Congress. I do not see how, just from the point of view of the confidence
of the people of the United States, from the point of view of the confidence of foreign governments in our constitutional processes, I find
it difficult to see how you could really do away with the political
necessity. I mean that in the highest term, meaning, political, of
that kind of confirmation of the President's inability to act.
Senator MIusKA. Mr. Attorney General, if this matter came to a
vote in the Congress, it would take a vote of 67 Senators and then twothirds in the 11ouse, to determine that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. If there were only 63 Senators who would say he is unable to serve, what becomes of your consensus and backing up of the decision made in the Cabinet and by the
Vice President in the eyes of the Nation and the world?
Attorney General KATZENBACH. I think it would be a most unfortunate thing if that were to occur, Senator. But I think that is
inherent in the problem, not in the procedure here.
I would be very surprised at any"Vice President with the political
experience of Vice Presidents that I think has been true in all of our
history who would even propose to do this unless he were absolutely
assured that he was going to have the overwhelming support in the
House and Senate. And I cannot imagine responsible Cabinet officials ever putting the country in that position. If there was that kind
of doubt in the situation that you could not muster a two-thirds vote,
then I do not think that the issue would ever be put. I really do not
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consider that-I consider the process as a safeguard against usurpation, which is what I think it is intended to be. I think it also-I
think the practice would end up, any time it is submitted, with the
Vice President being supported. Because it is such a horrible situation to imagine, for him as well as for the country, that I do not think
it would ever be submitted except in the clearest kind of situation,
where he had in the usual processes of politics the assurance that that
was going to be backed up by a majority or by two-thirds of each
House.
Senator HRusKA. Mr. Chairman, this Senator is deeply gratified
at that expression of confidence in the Cabinet that has just been expressed. I agree with it even more fully than the Attorney General
. ecause I would repose such complete confidence in the Vice
President and the Cabinet that we would stop right there with their
decision. They are people, after all, who have been named by the
President. They are loyal to him; they know him. They are able
to observe him. They would have every sympathy for the man and
with the electorate of this Nation to have that man continue in office.
If he does continue in office that would be the fulfillment of the will
of the Nation. They would give every fair intendment to the President. If there was any doubt, I think they would still resolve it in
favor of the President.
But I say that is the point at which it should stop and not throw it
into the political arena at this end of Pennsylvania Avenue because
there have been situations in our history where there have built up
tremendous personal and political animosities between the leadership
in the Congress and the President or the Vice President. It is in this
fashion that I believe we would violate that doctrine of separation of
powers and good policy.
Have you any comment on the idea of stopping right there with the
Cabinet and its decision jointly with the rice President, taking all
these considerations into your thinking?
Attorney General KATZENBACH. I think that you have eloquently
stated the argument, Senator. I continue to believe that it would be
important that that decision would be affirmed as overwhelmingly as
this contemplates by elected representatives and that we would get
an additional measure of security out of that. I do not say that from
any lack of confidence in the integrity of the Cabinet, or in the decision that they would make. I say it as I said before, because I do
believe that in that kind of a crisis, which thank God, we have never
had in this country and I hope never will, it would be so important
to join ranks on both sides of the aisle and to create that kind of confidence among the public of the United States by their elected representatives joining in this very unpleasant and terribly important
determination so that as we have in the past, this country could indicate that in such a crisis, it can and will unite.
Senator HusX.A. The Attorney General states his position well and
I respect his declaration of it. Ido not quite want to subscribe to it
yet, Mr.Attorney General, except for this observation: I think it is
fine as far as it goes. But I think there is some hazard and danger
in throwing this crisis into the Congress andfinding instead of 67
or 68 Senators going along with the Vice President, there would only
be 64. Then we would have uncertainty, confusion, and perhaps chaos,
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because more than the majority of the Senators and electorate of this
Nation would be of a frame of mind that would not be effectuated.
Attorney General KATZENBACH. May I comment just very briefly on
that?
Senator HRUsKA. Surely.
Attorney General KATZENBACH. If that were the situation and your
proposal that simply the Cabinet acted were the law it is incredible
to me that those 36 Senators would remain silent. I think it would
be well known to the public that those 36 Senators thought that the
Cabinet had acted unwisely, that the President really was able to
act, and that the would create exactly the same kind of situation
in the country as if you had a vote.
Senator HRUSKA. But 64 would be contending, also, that they were
right in saying that the President was unable to act, and they would
not be silent.
Attorney General KATZENBAcH. You would have exactly the same
debate, Senator, whether they voted on it or whether they did not vote
on it. You would have exactly the same kind of grave constitutional
crisis. It almost comes when you talk two-thirds, and it is a customary
figure. On this, it would be my hope that if that situation ever evolvedl,
you would have 100 Senators who would agree. Because it simply
becomes an impossible situation, and if it is a close question and a
difficult one, it is in that situation where I think the Vice President
would not act, the Cabinet would not support him, and they would
want to know that they had the support, whether or not, whatever system it as done under, they would surely want to know they had the
overhelming support of both Houses of Congress if they were determined to act in this totally unprecedented way.
So I think the problem, the difficulty you state is inherent in the
problem and not in the way in which it is resolveJ, and that the way
it is proposed here to resolve it at least has the effect of showing how
united the country would be in the event that that terrible decision had
to be made.
Senator BAYH. May I interject one thought, since you indicated you
were going to something else? I just wanted to state for those of us
who have studied this, as the Senator from Nebraska has, that we differ with him as he very articulately expresses his point of view. But
just to rephrase what the Attorney General said, it is our feeling that
this business of removing the legally elected President of the United
States for any cause is of such a serious nature that we do not want
the Vice President or Cabinet or any other group to have the responsibility for doing it. The final determination, we feel, must be made
by the representatives of the people. If there were some way we could
get the people themselves to make this decision, I would say more
power to this. But we have found no practical way of doing this.
Only when the Congress, as the legally representative boy of the
people, says "Mr. President, you are unable to carry on the powers
and duties that were given to you, this great mandate that was given

to you by the people," are we willing to say that he should step down.
Now, certainly the Senator from Nebraska, feels equally strong
about it and I appreciate his opinion. He states it very well.
Senator HRusKA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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One other point,, 1%Mr.
Attorney General. Wo have raised here, the
possibilities t li-t the Vice President might discharge the heads of the
different executive departments and distort the sitiuttion to a. poilt
where then lie would be in a position to control the tliini with his own
littlewhitelingen.s. Again, I would not want, to attri 1iut to any Vice
President, in all of our history, any such diabolical ctesigns or intent.
The way sect ions 4 and 5 are7 written now, where the decision of the
Vice President must, be sul)porte(l by a majority of ti cabinet, is
there anything in there that would pi'veiit. him, fter he became Acting President., from terminating the service of the heads, of the executive departments and appoint-ing those who mightt by sympathetic with
him? Is dere anything in this language t iat wotild prevent him
from doing itI
Attorney General KATZENIACI. Certainly, if he were discharging
the powers of the Lresidency, le could remove a Cabinet otlicer. There
is no question about that, Senator. He could only effectively a)point
one if Congress happened to be out of session at that time: If that
were true, he could do it. So exercising those powers, it would be
possible, as I read this under the present language--it would be possible to construe this as permitting him to change the Cabinet aln thus
gain SuI)port or to change a menl~er of the Cabinet if it were an almost
evenly divided vote, under those circumstances. I think that really is
an additional argument for the procedures under section 5 that would
permit Congress to pass on this with a two-thirds vote. It is to prevent
that kind of contingency, it seems to me, that section 5 was put in,
among the other purposes that we indicated. And to an extent, the
difficulty of leaving the decision purely to the Cabinet would be really
to open'up that possibility.
Senator BAYII. May I ask the Senator a question, because I think
this is a legitimate question, one with which we had some problemsthe Attorney General and myself.
Senator 1imusicA. All questions the chairman asks are legitimate.
Senator BAYIT. We do not want t.o enable a situation to exist where
the Vice President can indulge himself in a purge. But, by the same
token, I do not think we want to permit a situation to exist whereover an extended period of time while the Vice President is actingthe Vice President is prohibited from replacing a Cabinet member,
should the necessity arise.
Senator HUSKA. That is one of the difficulties inherent in the situation. The Government, in its administration, must proceed-it must
go on. Maybe in that time the change, of one or two members of the
Cabinet would make a difference, if it is a close issue. But I just
wanted the Attorney General's idea. I raise it only because this horrible possibility was raised in the converse. That is why I raise it
certainly not with the thought that anyone chosen for the office oi
Vice President would indulge in any behavior of that kind.
Mr. Attorney General, you have been very kind, and so have you,
Mr. Chairman.- I thank you very much.
Senator BAyii. May I ask a question that I intended to ask before
we got off this "immediately" situation ,
Attorney General KATZENBAVII. Certainly.
Senator BAYH. Looking at this from an interpretative standpoint
it is very difficult, as the Senator knows, and the Attorney General
knows, to find language that will do just exactly what you want with-
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a statute would do this.
maybe "immediately" ini
Attorney General KATZENBAC3I['. I would think mainly tie same
thing.
SeiaItor Bl\i. The Court. is to make the eventual determination.
Attorney General KATZRNBAcm. The Court, might never make it. I
would he really Conithink you have to face, frankly, the fact, that, it,
gress that would make the determination as to what "imediatly",
l1elnt.
I do feel you could have the difficulty on this, Senator, of the President, who is disagreeing with the Vice President, sending itdown and
nothing happening for a period of time, and his saying, 14"ell, under
this provision, it says Coimgress shall--will-imnediately decide the
issue. They have not done so, and itsays, 'otherwise the President
shall resume the powers and duties of the olice' anld so I am going to
resume time powers and duties of the office." You could, in a delayed
sit umi ionl have that dillictlty, as 1 read it.
Now, .1 do not know that, there is %'ewy much mo,)re tlat you ('i do
thaIn to ur'e.n the Congress usilg "immediately" as a whiip to have
Imei deciTe it..
Tli very possibility of that, it. would seem to me,
would help to resolve that situa tion in that way.
Senator B \rn. I wanted to clarify one answer you gave to a question by the Senator from Nebraska.: In his quest ion, he combined the
need to get- expert medical testimony and for Congress to hold hearings to liear from his aids and personal associates of the family, for
example, that can compare how the President is acting now with'how
he acted yesterday or a. month ago. He combined this with the filibuster, which is something that 1 think gets clear out of the "imiediately" situation.
Could you state specifically whether you think, as we use the word
immediatelyly" that this would still permit, Congress to make a reasoned, intelligent judgment? and to take what time as is necessary to
get this evidene-e-to hear this testimony?
Attorney General KArZENIBACi[. I would certainly think that it
would, Senator, and they would have the time under the meaning of
the word "immediately.'1 I think the difficulty is going to be only if
they do not act with the greatest expedition. f think that is what you
aro trying to tell them to do. There is no word that you can use that
completely resolves that problem. I do not know what "immediately"
means, except itmeans as soon as you can darn well do it.
Senator IJLIUSKA. Of course, whamt you, have said indicates that you
do think the word "immediately" wvuld enable the Congress to inquire of members of the family and psychiatrists and physicians and
so forth. Is that true?
Attorney General KTZXmm,\Clt. I would think so.
Senator'HusKA. Would it encompass, also, the matter of the Congress debating the issue?
Attorney General KA'rziE ,ACH. I would think that it could encompas the possibility of debate.
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Senator BAY1I. Reasonable debate?
Senator IRUSKA. 1--ow much debate?

Attorney General KATZENBACH. I cannot answer the question how
much debate would be reasonable. I would think that on this kind
of an issue, the amount of debate that would be required would be
really very, very limited in order to make a judgment.
Senator HRUSKA. That is what we often think here, Mr. Attorney
General. But there are some people who do not agree with us on
occasion.

Attorney General KATZENBACII. I have had experience with that,
Senator. I might, go on to add that. if you, sir, are correct in saying
this is largely a factual issue, then that would be an argument that
would tend to cut down debate, since my experience has been that it
is the policy issues which usually have extended long debate in the
Senate and I-louse.
Senator BAYJI. If this terminates our questioning of the Attorney
General, let us thank you very much for not only making your views
known here, but for subjecting yourself to this cross-examination,
which I feel has been very helpful, and I want to thank you personally
for it.
Senator IIRITSKA. I join in the thanks, sir.
Attorney General KATZENBACII. Thank you sir, I appreciate the
opportunity to be heard.
Senator BI3n. In the effort to enable the Attorney General to resume his normal schedule, I did not ask my colleagues on the subcommittee if they had a statement that they would like to make. The
able Senator from Hawaii who has long labored on this matter as a
member of the subcommittee has some remarks I believe.
STATEMENT OF HON. HIRAM L. FONG, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF HAWAII
Senator Fom. Mr. Chairman, I wish to make a brief statement in
support of Senate Joint Resolution 1 proposing a constitutional
amendment on the related problems of Presidential disability and VicePresidential vacancies.
Two years ago, the tragic assassination of President Kennedy pointed up once again the urgent need to resolve these two critical gaps in
the U.S. Constitution.
First, the Constitution does not say anything about what should
be done when there is no Vice President. No one in America today
doubts that the Vice-Presidency is an office of paramount importance.
The Vice President of the United States today carries very vital functions oZ our Government. Besides his many duties, he is the only man
who is only a heartbeat away from the world's most powerful office.
Yet, on 17 different occasions in our history the Nation has been without a Vice President.
The security of our Nation demands that the office of the Vice President should never be left vacant for long, such as it was between
November 22, 1963, and January 20, 1965.
Second, the Constitution does not say anything about what should
be done when the President becomes disabled, how and who determines his disability, when the disability starts, when it ends, who deter-
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mines his fitness to resume his office, and who should take over during
the period of disability.
In short, there is no orderly constitutional procedure to decide how
the awesome and urgent responsibility of the Presidency should be
carried on.
Third, the Constitution also is unclear as to whether the Vice President would become President, or whether he becomes only the Acting
President, if the President is unable to carry out the duties of his office.
Mr. Chairman, as a member of the subcommittee, I have studied
very carefully all the various proposals submitted by other Senators
during the 88th Congress and in this current session of the 89th Congress. I have considered the testimony submitted to the subcommittee
in previous hearings, including those of the distinguished experts who
have testified. I have read the data collected and have read the research done by the subcommittee's staff.
I believe that any measure to resolve these very complex and perplexing problems must satisfy at least four requirements:
1. It must have the highest and most authoritative legal sanction. It must be embodied in an amendment to the Constitution.
2. It must assure prompt action when required to meet a national crisis.
3. It must conform to the constitutional principle of separation
of powers.
4. It must provide safeguards against usurpation of power.
I believe Senate Joint Resolution I best meets each of these requirements.
Senate Joint Resolution 1 deals with each of the problems of vicepresidential vacancy and presidential inability by constitutional
amendinent rather than by statute.
This proposal provides for the selection of a new Vice President
when the former Vice President succeeds to the Presidency within
30 days of his accession to office; the selection is to be made by the
President, upon confirmation by a majority of both Houses of
Congress present and voting.
This proposal makes clear that when the President is disabled,
the Vice President becomes Acting President for the period of disability. It provides that the President may himself declare his
inability an that if lie does not, the declaration may be made by
the Vice President with written concurrence of a majority of the
Cabinet.
The President may declare his own fitness to resume his powers
and duties, but if his ability is questioned, the Cabinet by majority
vote and the Congress by a two-thirds vote on a concurrent resolution
resolve the dispute.
These provisions of Senate Joint Resolution 1 not only achieve the
goals I outlined earlier, but they are also in consonance with the
most valued principles established by our Founding Fathers in the
Constitution.
They observe the principle of the separation of powers in our
Government.. They effectively maintain the delicate balance of
powers among the three branches of our Government. Most important of all, they insure that our Nation's sovereignty is preserved- in
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the hands of the people through their elected representatives in
the national legislature.
Mr. Chairman, this is the first time since 1956, when a full-scale
congressional study of the problems was conducted, that wide agreement has been reached on these enormously complex constitutional
problems.
Last September a measure similar to Senate Joint Resolution 1
was passed by the Senate by the overwhelming vote of 65 to 0. It was
sent to the House, but Congress adjourned before any further action
could be taken.
Last January, at the call of the American Bar Association, a
dozen of the Nation's leading legal authorities meeting in Washington came up with a consensus. This consensus, subsequently endorsed by. the ABA house of delegates, is essentially embodied in
the provisions of Senate Joint Resolution 1.
' esterday President Johnson heartily endorsed this proposal.
And earlier this month, the Research and Policy Committee of
the Committee for Economic Development released an able study
of these questions. Its recommendations closely parallel the provisions of Senate Joint Resolution 1.
I am most delighted and pleased to cosponsor this proposal
with the distinguished chairman of this subcommittee as sponsor,
and I will commend it highly to the Senate as a meritorious measure
that should be enacted promptly into law.
Senator BAY1T. The Senator from Nebraska might have a statement he would like to make or remarks he may care to make other
than the fine questions he has asked of the Attorney General.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROMAN L. HRUSKA, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF NEBRASKA
Senator HausK,\. Mr. Chairman, agreements devised by the President and his Vice President in past administrations to cope with an
inability crisis are not satisfactory solutions.
It is abundantly clear that, rather than continue these informal
agreements, the only sound app roach is the adoption of a constitutional amendment. This amendment would distinguish the inability
situation from the three other contingencies of permanent nature,
death, resignation, and removal from office, and would recognize that,
in the first instance, the Vice President becomes Acting President
only.
At this point, we encounter the first major difference of opinion.
Some would advocate spelling out the procedure for determining
inability within the language of the proposed amendment. I disagree. The logic of locking into the Constitution those procedures
deemed appropriate today but which, in the light of greater knowledge and experience may be found wanting tomorrow, escapes me.
The preferred course would be for the amendment to authorize the
Congress to establish an appropriate procedure by law. This practice parallels the situation of presidential succession, wherein the
power is delineated by the Constitution but the detail is left for later
determination.
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The purpose of the cosponsors of Senate Joint Resolution 6 is
to add one fundamental limitation to the process. Language which
simply enables the Congress to prescribe by law the method by which
the coinmencenent and termination of any inability shall be determined is open to serious criticism and contains dangerous pitfalls.
Without any limitation upol the method, the Congress might adopt
a procedure that, would violate constitutional doctrines of the most
essential character. Throughout our history, these principles have
been proven wise and of inestimable importance.
I refer primarily to the doctrine of separation of powers. The
maintenance of the three distinct branches of Government, coequal in
character, has long been accepted as one of the most important safeguards for the preservation of the Republic. However, one does not
have to look long to find instances in which this doctrine is threatened. Some of the pending proposals on presidential inability
illustrate how seriously the doctrine can be impaired if care is not
exercised.
This is the rationale behind the limitation contained in Senate
Joint Resolution 6 which provides that the executive branch shall
determine the presence of and termination of the inability of the
President. It is essential that the method ultimately selected shall
have the executive branch determine the commencement and termination of any inability. Stated another way, Congress must be prohibited from prescribing a method which would involve either the
judicial or the legislative branch of the Government. This is a significant limitation, as those who propose it will acknowledge. But
it is an indispensable prohibition if our efforts to resolve the problem
of presidential inability are to be successful.
The determination of presidential inability and its termination is
obviously a factual matter. No policy is involved. The issue is
simply whether a specific individual with certain physical, mental,
or emotional impairments possesses the ability to continue as the
Chief Executive or whether his infirmity is so serious and severe as
to render him incapable of executing the duties of his office.
To inject Congress into the factual question of inability would be
to create a secondary impeachment procedure in which the conduct of
the President would not be the test. Such a determination would be
fraught with uncertainties. It would require no specific charge. It
would not define the proof which is required. It would be a determination of facts with no guidelines against which to measure them.
The impeachment trial of President Andrew Johnson affords a
clear illustration of the danger' presented when Congress is allowed
to perform a judicial function. The intrigue and interplay within
the Congress during the impeachment trial serves as a warning of
clear and present dangers which exist when Congress is called upon
to consider where to place the mantle of the presidential powers.
An additional compelling argument for restricting this authority
to the executive branch is that this determination must be made with
a minimum of delay. In an age of advanced weapons and an accelerated pace in national and international affairs, the luxury of
weeks or even days to assemble a quorum prior to reaching a decision
cannot be afforded. The executive branch is clearly best equipped
to respond promptly as well as effectively in the face of such a crisis.
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Obviously, such a decision must rest c,.- the relevant and reliable
facts regarding the President's physical or mental faculties. It. must
be divorced from any thoughts of political advantage, personal pre..
judice, or other extraneous factors. Those possessing such firsthand
information about the Chief Executive, or most accessible to it on a
personal basis, are found within the executive branch and not else.where.
We must be mindful that the President is chosen by the people of
the entire Nation. It is their wish and their right that he serve as
President for the term for which he was chosen. Every sensible and
sympathetic construction favoring his continued performance of
Presidential duties should be accorded him. Indeed, were error to be
committed, it should be in favor of such a continuation in ollice or,
were it. interrupted by a disability, by his resumption of the office at
the earliest possible moment, upon recovery. The members of the
executive branch are best situated to protect that interest.
From what briefly has been developed, it, is readily apparent that
neither the judiciary nor the legislative branch should be in jected
into the decisionmaking process of declaring Presidential inability or
recovery. As if in confirmation of the point, we have the express sion
of Chief Justice Warren that it would be inadvisable for the Court
or any of its members to assume such a role. Our personal awareness
of the acutely political role pursued by Members of Congress likewise
forbids injection of this branch into that process.
It is for these reasons, Mr. Chairman, that Senate Joint Resolution
6 is offered for your subcommittee's consideration. I look forward to
the opportunity of working with the subcommittee in its notable
effort to devise a sound and acceptable solution to one of the aost,
delicate constitutional issues facing our country today. Events of
the last few weeks argue against further delay.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the chairman's desire to confine these
hearings to as reasonably a short period of time as is possible. It cannot be denied, however, that we are considering a very, very important
subject. I do think that we should not throw everything to the winds
just for the purpose of expediting action on this matter.
Senator BAYTI. And the Senator does not care to do it.
Senator HRUSKA. I know that is not your intention. I should like
to make a brief summary of the position which I had assumed and declared last year and ask permission to file a more extended statement.
Senator BAYTI. May I clarify what I said a moment ago? The reason the Senator from Nebraska was not asked to make a statement earlier was because we discussed this matter, as you recll, and you suggested that in deference to the Attorney General, we forgo our statements. As I remember, what I said was not very concise and specific
at all in presenting the proponents' arguments, because I thought the
Attorney General should have the opportunity to make his statement.
There is no desire on the part of the chairman to limit, the length of
this hearing. Certainly, the reason that we are trying to concentrate
the time which is spent in the hearings by hearing others who might
be in opposition to Senate Resolution 1 is for this very purpose. We
have had a complete array of testimony supporting it and we want to
make absolutely certain that everyone who objects, who has a clarifying thought or alternative solution, has a complete opportunity to be
heard. This could very well be helpful to us.
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Senator HRUSKA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is customary, the chairman realizes and recalls, that we always
defer to members of the Cabinet first before we get into the testimony
by members of the committee and then later by Members of the Senate
at large.
Mr. Chairman, I should like to say that the hearings of this committee last year and this year and the wide public discussion of this subject, climaxed by the President's message which the Congress received
yesterday-all of these things augur well for prompt and favorable
action on a much-needed constitutional amendment. The Senator
from Nebraska would like to say that by and large, he is in agreement
with Senate Joint Resolution 1. Certainly I am in full agreement
with sections 1 and 2.
Section 3, provides that "if the President declares in writing that he
isunable to discharge the powers and duties of his office such powers
and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as acting President." In that regard, I shall just make the suggestion that the comnittee consider some language-it can be very concisely stated, I am
sure-which would enable the President to provide for a brief and
limited transfer of Presidential powers to the Vice President as acting
President during periods of the President's absence from the country, or otherwise out of realiable communication. I shall not press
the point any further than to make that suggestion.
It is fortified somewhat by the statement made by former Attorney
General Herbert Brownell a year or two ago before this subcommittee.
Sections 4 and 5, however, are subject to two observations. The
first is that section 5 violates the doctrine of separation of powers,
as I understand it. Second, it details procedures in a way which is
better left for legislation by Congress.
In regard to the separation of powers, section 5 provides that in
disagreement between the President on the one hand andthe judgment of the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet on the
other, Congress will then decide the issue by a two-thirds vote and
will do it immediately. I shall not at this time go into the question
of what "immediately" means and what difficulties would be encountered in regard to construing "immediately." That has been
pretty well covered. But I do suggest that it is customary for the
Congress to proceed by way of hearings. They would want evidence.
They would be entitled to it. They.would be entitled to have members of the Cabinet come before it to express their opinions and their
report on observations of the President's condition, health, and so
on. Certainly there would be debate in the Senate and in the House
as well. When we say "debate," then of course, ,we might get into
some difficulty as to the length of that debate.
It is my suggestion, that the Cabinet should decide the factual
issue as to whether or not their appraisal of the situation is correct or whether the President, in saying "I am once again able to
resume the duties of the Presidency," is right.
There are several points to be made on this question. One is, as
I have already said, that it is a factual issue rather than a policy.
issue. The policy issue has already been decided in the preceding
election. They want Mr. X as President of this country. Every
fair intendment should be given to see that the continuance of that
man in office should not be subverted.
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Who is the best informed to resolve and decide this factual question? It would be those who are close to the President. Those who
see him, talk to him, and observe him. Those who have had a chance
to talk to his physicians and to members of his family.
This factual issue should be resolved by those who are loyal to the
President and sympathetic to him. It should be at the hands of
peol)le who would give him every fair intendment for his continuation of service as President. If doubt exists, they should resolve it
in favor of the President. But if there is a flagrant case of disability,
then certainly they should act and I feel confident would act firmly.
There is one other tremendous advantage that Senate Joint Resolution 6 would have over the provisions of section 5 of Senate Joint
Resolution No. 1. That is that the Cabinet could act expeditiously
without being so hurried in their decision that they would,sacrifice
substance and merit for a decision.
If they do not act and do not support the Vice President, then, of
course, the issue is automatically resolved. The President resumes
the discharge of the duties of his office.
Mr. Chairman, there has been a great deal of public discussion
of this amendment. I want to congratulate the chairman for the
fashion in which he has held these hearings this year and last year.
The hearings and the fine fashion in which lie arranged them contributed greatly to the public discussion of this problem, which is
so wholesome and so healthy. I should like to place in the record
at this point some of the printed reactions to these proceedings.
One is a New York Times editorial of January 5, 1965, which
comments on the report of the Committee for Economic Development under the chairmanship of Marion B. Folsom. That report is
a splendid report. It is very thoughtful and very thorough. I quote
only briefly:
The group proposed some revisions In the Bayh amendment, most Importantly a shift in the main burden of responsibility for declaring a President's disability from the Vice President to the members of the Cabinet.
This would be an improvement.

That was from the New York Times article.
There was another one in the Washington Post, an editorial entitled "An Achilles Heel ?" There they dwell in particular upon this
matter of time:
What does the word "Immediately" mean? Would it require both Houses
of Congress to vote without debating the issue? Would it permit any filibustering in the Senate?

Then they go on into the matter of saying would it be wise to
prescribe a 10-day period or maybe a 15- or 30-day period, whatever
it may be? In that respect this editorial is a very enlightening one.
There was another one in the Washington Post on January 8, Mr.
Chairman, which I would like included. An article appeared in
the Quarterly of the American Interprofessional Institute, entitled
"The Year We Had No President" written by Richard H. Hansen,
who is the author of a book by that same title and a great student
of this problem.
I should like to ask unanimous consent that these documents be incorporated into the record at the conclusion of my remarks and
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that I then be given permission to file the statement which will be
more definitive and more particular as I have described before.
Senator BAYIT. Without objection, the material will certainly be
included.
(The documents referred to follow:)
[From the Washington Post]
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION AGAIN

Improvements in the law regarding Presidential succession and Presidential
disability will be one of the most urgent tasks of the present Congress. Fortunately, Senator Bayh is again pressing for action on his proposed constitutional
amendment and hearings are promised in both Houses. President Johnson will
have recommendations on the problem. For the first time there appears to be
a consensus as to the nature of the changes to be sought.
The Research and Policy Committee of the Committee for Economic Development has released an able study of the subject which looks in the same direction
as the Bayh amendment. In addition this group headed by Marion B. Folsom
lays down some general principles that will help to guide the debate. There must
be no break in the exercise of the Presidential power. No doubt should be permitted to arise as to who holds the office. The procedures for transfer of the
power should be fast, efficient, and easily understood. No sharp shift in policy
or change of party should be involved.
The heart of all the plans being currently discussed is replacement of the Vice
President as soon as the office becomes vacant. The CED report notes that
eight Vice Presidents have become President, seven have died in office and one
resigned. The office has been vacant a total of more than 37 years since it was
created. The CED report endorses the Bayh resolution passed by the Senate
last year authorizing the President to nominate a Vice President whenever a
vacancy occurs, although it suggests confirmation by a joint session of Congress
rather than by the two Houses acting separately, as the resolution provides.
In dealing with Presidential disability, the CED favors a more extensive departure from the Bayh amendment. Like the Bayh resolution, the CED would
permit the Vice President to determine that the President was disabled (if the
President did not declare his own disability) with the concurrence of a majority
of the Cabinet. But on the termination of disability Senator Bayh would bring
the Vice President, the Cabinet and Congress into the picture, if necessary.
The CED would leave the matter entirely to the Cabinet and the President.
No doubt either plan would work satisfactorily. The CED favors a decision
by the Cabinet alone because of its strong belief that there should never be any
question as to who holds the Presidential power. The point Is vital, but the
CED report seems to reflect a misreading of the plan approved by the Senate.
It would permit the President to resume his powers and duties when he proclaimed an end of his disability, unless his recovery should be challenged by the
Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet. In that event Congress would
"immediately decide the issue." As we understand the language there would be
no hiatus In which the authority would dangle somewhere between the two.
Upon a challenge by the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet, authority
would remain with the Vice President until a vote in Congress had been taken.
This is a point that will need clarification beyond any possibility of confusion.
When that has been done, we hope there will be very broad support for the version
that emerges. The country cannot afford to risk any confusion whatever as to
how the Presidential office will be filled or to allow any time lapse that might
expose the country to national disaster.
[From the New York Timesi
LINE OF SUCCESSION

"Only In the White House can you finally know the full weight of this
office," President Johnson told Congress last week In his state of the Union
message. It Is. a sentiment that each of his predecessors would affirm.
Because the responsibilities of the Presidency are so enormous, the rather
casual, ramshackle arrangements the American people tolerate to cover Presidential death or disability are shocking. For more than 13 months, the
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United States has been without a Vice President. Until Hubert H. Humphrey
is sworn in on January 20, it will continue to be without a fully qualified,
popularly chosen, potential successor for its highest office.
With President Johnson's backing, Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana has reintroduced his proposed constitutional amendments for correcting the deficiencies in the present machinery. It is encouraging that Chairman Emanuel Celler,
after disgracefully shilly-shallying on this issue last year out of a mistaken
deference to Speaker McCormack's sensibilities, has announced that he will
make it the House Judiciary Committee's first order of business. The Senate
unanimously adopted the Bayh amendment last September but the House took
no action.
The amendment provides that whenever there is a Vice-Presidential vacancy,
the President shall nominate a Vice President to take office upon confirmation by
majority vote of both Houses of Congress. If the President were to become disabled and could not communicate that fact in writing, the Vice President would
take over temporarily as Acting President if he notified Congress and had the
concurrence of a majority of the Cabinet. The President could reclaim his
powers immediately upon his recovery.
If disagreement developed over whether he had recovered, Congress would
decide. Except for this flual provision, the disability arrangement is identical
with that worked out by President Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon in
1958 and adopted by each of their successors.
A unit of the Committee for Economic Development, under the chairmanship of
Marion B. Folsom, former Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, has Just
released a thoughtful study of this succession-and-disability problem-one that
merits careful congressional consideration. The group proposes some revisions
in the Bayh amendment, most importantly a shift in the main burden of responsibility for declaring a President's disability from the Vice President to
the members of the Cabinet. This would be an improvement.
We also strongly endorse the committee's suggestion that Congress repeal the
1947 Succession Act, which interposed the Speaker of the House and the President pro tern of the Senate ahead of the Cabinet in the line of succession. Even
If the amendment is ratified, this Succession Act could still be critically important
If, for example, a President and a Vice President happened to be assassinated at
the same time.
The overwhelming argument against the present law lies in the simple fact
that, for 8 of the 18 years since it was adopted, Congress has been controlled by
the political party opposed to the President. To add to the death of a Chief
Executive the further disrupting effect of a change in party control of the White
House makes no sense. This is the year for Congress to put the line of succession
in better order.
[From the Washington Post, .Tan. 28, 19651
AN ACHILLES' HEEL?
The proposed constitutional amendment on presidential succession and disability merits the high priority it has been given by the Senate and House Judiciary Committees. Since the Senate passed the resolution by a vote of 65 to 0
last year, Senator Bayh, its chief sponsor, hopes to conclude the new hearings
in 1 day-Friday. Chairman Celler of the House Judiciary Committee will begin
hearings on February 9. If action is similarly prompt on the floors of the Senate
and House, the proposed amendment can be sent to the States for ratification
within 2 or 3 months.
Much work has been done on the resolution sponsored by many Members of
both Houses, the American Bar Association, and other groups. Some questions
about Its meaning remain, however, and these will doubtless be the chief points
of interest In the forthcoming hearings. For example, the resolution provides
that if the President should declare his disability at an end and the Acting
President (the Vice President) should disagree, with the concurrence of a majority of the Cabinet, the issue should be "Immediately" decided by Congress.
What does the word "immediately" mean? Would It require both Houses
of Congress to vote without debating the Issue? Would It permit any filibustering
in the Senate? Representative McCulloch has suggested an amendment to this
provision which would require Congress to vote within 10 days. But 10 days of
debate on such an issue, with feeling mounting on both sides, might be calamitous.
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We agree with Mr. McCulloch's feeling that the provision ought to be more specific, but his particular remedy might be worse than the current vagueness.
The chief question that arises is whether or not Senators would be permitted
to filibuster the issue and thus indefinitely prevent the President from regaining
his powers. This loophole ought to be closed. In our opinion, the question of
restoring the President's powers ought to be made nondebatable (since the facts
would doubtless be well known from the President's declaration and the Vice
President's written report to Congress) or the period of debate should be specifically limited.
We do not assume that the Presidential power would be in limbo if such a
dispute arose between the President and Vice President. The powers of the
Presidency would be in the hands of the Vice President and would remain there,
if the Vice President and 'the Cabinet thought the President still disabled, until
a vote in Congress could be taken. But there should be no possibility of filibusterIng against the decision of so momentous an issue. One of the chief reasons for
enactment of the proposed amendment is elimination of the uncertainty resulting
from a Presidential illness. The elimination of uncertainty requires elimination
of the filibuster as an instrument of obstruction in such eases.
[From the Quarterly of the American Interprofessional Institute]
THE YEAR WE HAD NO PRESIDENT
(Richard H. Hansen, Lawyer, Lincoln, Nebr.)
"Five U.S. Army warrant officers, members of the White House Army Signal
Agency, have a unique assignment. They are entrusted with a large leather pouch,
with a double lock. This pouch contains all the supersecret messages and codes
to put the Nation's key emergency plans into effect. These are the plans which
only the President can initiate.
"They are not plans for declaring war. They are plans to meet any military
challenge to the security of the United States and its allies. The pouch contains
the coded key to unleash our retaliatory forces, if we are attacked."
On the President's desk sits a telephone with a direct hot line to the Armed
Forces Control Center. A few words by the President into the mouthpiece and
the Nation's retaliatory forces are on their way.
What would have happened if Lyndon Johnson had had a disabling heart attack on November 22 and the Communists had chosen that moment to make a
nuclear strike? True, Kennedy had a private agreement with Johnson to cover
the contingency of Kennedy's incapacity, but there was no law on the books to
cover either an incapacity by Kennedy or Johnson or both.
The majority of Americans, at least until November 22, have been too prone
to subscribe to the comforting fallacy that the Vice President automatically takes
over as a substitute President; we have been indifferent to the problem because
it seems so basic that we have taken for granted that there is statutory provision for such contingencies. But there is no provision in the Constitution or
laws of the United States for determining when a President or Vice President
is disabled. President Eisenhower initiated the idea of a written informal
agreement with Nixon to cover a presidential inability; John F. Kennedy made
a similar agreement with Lyndon Johnson in August 1961, but we never knew
whether it was oral or in writing. We do know that the present agreement on
presidential inability between President Johnson and Speaker McCormack, the
second in line, is purely verbal. So there has been a "regression" on even the
private agreements.
American, history from 1881 to November 22, 1963, illustrates the potential
for catastrophe in this dangerous gap in our law. In considering the cases
of Presidents Garfield, Cleveland, and Wilson, I ask you to consider what would
happen if similar incidents should occur today.
Next to John F. Kennedy and Theodore Roosevelt (who invented those damned
hikes) James A. Garfield was the country's youngest President. He was barely
50 when he took office in 1881. It was one of the sad quirks of history that he
had one of the shortest terms of any President-a mere 7 months, for he was
shot on July 2, 1881, and died 90 days later. During this last month of his
illness ho had hallucinations and was completely out of his mind. The only
presidential act he was able to perform was the signing of the extradition paper.
For 90 days the operations of the executive branch were paralyzed. And the
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Cabinet did not ask Vice President Chester Arthur to take over and act as
President during this time, for reasons I will discuss in a few minutes.
Grover Clevelind was operated on for cancer of the Jaw in July 1893. Only one
Cabinet member knew of the impending surgery, which took place on the yacht
Oncida, as it sailed out to sea. The President was placed In a chair, which was
strapped to the mast to prevent unnecessary motion during the operation. Cleveland couldn't even sign his name for a month afterward and the public didn't
know of the operation until 7 years later-and neither did Vice President
Stevenson.
Woodrow Wilson was stricken in September 1919 at the height of his light
for the League of Nations. Ie never fully recovered. For several months he
was completely bedridden and when spring came and he went for rides In a
White House limousine, he had to be propped up so he wouldn't fall over when
the car turned corners. Vice President Thomas R. Marshall was never asked
to take the reins of government temporarily.
Why haven't the Vice Presidents temporarily assumed the office at such critical
periods? There are two reasons: One is a legal argument which has been used
as a smokescreen to cover up the real and more practical, political reason. The
strange part about it is that the legal argument doesn't hold water when closely
examine(], although it has been blandly accepted since 1840.
The year 1840 was the year President William Ienry Harrison died after 1
month in office. The question arose as to whether Vice President Tyler became
President in his own right, or whether he merely became Acting Ircsident. The
query would have been academic except for the fact that Tyler's archenemy in
politics, Henry Clay, implied that "Acting President" Tyler had fewer powers
than the regularly elected Harrison. Clay wanted Tyler to l)e another "Clay
pigeon." Tyler, who was Harry Truman's great-great-granduncle was not about
to take orders from anyone, especially Clay. Of course, constitutional history
proves that an Acting President would have the same powers as a regularly
chosen President. But as Henry Adams says, "practical politics consists in ignoring the facts." Besides. in 1840 that constitutional history wasn't readily
available to Tyler. Libraries were few, the records of the convention had not
been pal)lislled.
Tyler, like Truman, acted quickly. He promptly asserted that he had become
President on the death of Harrison. Thus he established the Tyler precedent
which has been followed by seven Vice Presidents when a President died. This
deviation from the original Intent of the Constitution would be of theoretical
Interest, but for the fact that the Tyler precedent has been used, in a different
situation-when the President is incapacitated-used as smokescreen to prevent
the Vice President from acting as President.
Now let's look at the real reasons why Vice Presidents Arthur, Stevenson, and
Marshall were not asked to step In and act as President until their Chiefs
recovered.
Arthur belonged to a different faction of the Republican Party than Garfield,
and Arthur was nominated for Vice President solely to placate that faction. After
Garfield and Arthur were Inaugurated, Garfield got Into a hot political battle
with two New York bosses, Conkling and Platt, and the country witnessed the
strange spectacle of Arthur, the Vice President, making speeches for the bosses,
in opposition to the President with whom he was supposed to serve. Is it any
wonder that the reform Cabinet of Garfield refused to ask Arthur to serve? They
were afraid he would scuttle Garfield's whole program, especially the passage of
the Civil Service Act which Garfield had given priority. It is more than Interesting to note, however, that after Garfield died, and Arthur became President,
Arthur rose to the occasion, and It was he who engineered the passage of the
Civil Service Act and signed it into law.
Cleveland's Vice President, Adlai Stevenson, also represented a different wing
of the party. Cleveland was a New York gold standard Democrat, while Stevenson was an Illinois silverite. Stevenson became Vice President for the same
reason that Arthur had been nominated, as a gesture to placate the opposition
wing. Cleveland fell ill Just after he had called Congress Into a special session
to consider repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act, which Stevenson favored.
Cleveland, under the circumstances, wasn't about to advise Stevenson of his
Illness. The vote was close anyway.
Woodrow Wilson considered his Vice President, Thomas R. Marshall, a small
caliber man. The Hoosier, Marshall, was Wilson's second choice for the post.
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However, Iarshall was an advocate of the league and had Wilson let the man
from Indiana take over the Presidency during the critical period of the fight
for the league, history might well have been different. As it is, Marshall's sole
bulwark against oblivion is his remark that "what this country needs Is a good
5-cent cigar." What is the answer to this problem?
MEMOS ONLY A PARTIAL STOPGAP SOLUTION

Both Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy realized this. Both Presidents
realized that there were serious deficiencies in the memorandum. It was General
Eisenhower who pointed out to me one of the most serious weaknesses in this
type of agreement. le emphasized the point several times In an interview at
Gettysburg in June 1961.
"The whole strength of the agreement," said Eisenhower, "depends upon good
will between the President and Vice President." Good will-and the history just
outlined shows that there is often ill will between the two officers. Good will is
not the basis for the selection of a vice-presidential candidate; geography is the
determinant. The marriage of our President and Vice President is one of political convenience, not compatibility.
Eisenhower might also have pointed out another very serious weakness in these
memorandum agreements-they do not solve the problem of removing the veil of
secrecy which traditionally surrounds Presidential illnesses. For instance, there
is no legal requirement that these memoranda themselves be made public. Only
a handful of people have ever seen the originals of the two memoranda on disability. Publicly, they are evidenced only by White House news releases. This
is not a reflection on Eisenhower or Kennedy, since the arrangements are purely
personal as the law now stands. Eisenhower tried repeatedly to get Congress to
pass legislation on the subject. Nor would any intelligent person suggest that
these understandings are anything other than what they purport to be. But
isn't it a strange anomaly when our law requires publication in the Federal
Register of a Presidential proclamation concerning the government of the tiny
insular possession, Palmyra Island, but not of a document determining succession
to the Presidency of the entire Nation?
These are only a few of the weaknesses of the memorandum method. Other
dangerous gaps are discussed in the book, and I wouldn't want to discourage you
from looking for them there.
Our Congressmen and even President Eisenhower in his proposals to the
Congress, were greatly concerned over what method should be used to determine
Presidential disability and there were almost as many ideas as there wore people.
This is the problem to which the American Bar Association conference on January 20-21 addressed Itself. Strangely enough, they all overlooked a very obvious first step: before worrying about the method for Congress to enact we must
make certain Congress has the power to enact any method.
The ambiguous wording of the Constitution raises a question concerning the
power of Congress to pass statutes on the subject. It would be amusing, if it
were not so tragic, to see legislators in the Congress arguing about the various
methods for determining disability when there is considerable doubt as to
whether they have the power to adopt any method at all. This is the first problem to be met nationally; a clarification, by constitutional amendment, of the
power of Congress in this regard, with a qualifying safety clause limiting Congress
to a method compatible with the maintenance of the three separate branches of
Government, thus prohibiting the legislative branch from using a disability procedure as a handy alternative to impeachment of the President.
Then a panel would have to be established by statute to make the actual
determination of when a Presidential disability exists or terminates. This Is
one of several suggestions that have been advanced.
On January 22, 1964, I stood at the grave of John F. Kennedy in Arlington
National Cemetery. In June of 1961 I had consulted with Ted Sorensen and
others on the Kennedy-Johnson memorandum and the contingency of a disability
on the part of President Kennedy seemed remote Indeed. At his graveside, I
reflected on the fact that I held a briefcase containing the recommendations just
presented to the American Bar Association's Conference on Presidential Inability.
In my heart was .a prayer and a dedication that President Kennedy's death must
not be a meaningless event, but that one of the many ramifications might be in-
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petus to the drive for a needed constitutional amendment to Insure the United
States of America against another year without a President.
With your help and interest we will make that prayer a reality.

Senator BAY1Av.
I am very faniiliar with the editorials, as well as the
article by Mr. llansen. In fact, Mr. Hansen was a member of the
American Bar Association consensus group which met for 2 full days
last year at this time, doing veoman service in arriving at, the consensus of the. conflicting thoughts. I wotild be the first to say that.
articles such as the fine e(itorials in the Post and the Times, which I
have rea(, have made substantial contri bution to discussions like those
we are participating in here and will continue to participate in,
where we have divergent views exl)resse(, particularly as they are
expressed as articulately as my friend from Nebraska expresses his.
Setiator I Ivsi,\. The dma irinan is kind.
Senator IAYT. I would like to point out the primary obstacle this
subconimittee lis been faced with and the Nat ion has been faced with
for almost. 200 years now, as far as finling a solu ion to this l)rol)lem.
It, is certainly something to l)e taken into consideration as we discuss
and deliberate u)on the merits of any quest ion; that is, the problem
has not been solved. We have been con lfronte( with these shortcomings.
Why has it not been solved The question has been askel repeatedly.
The answer is not. that Congress has not studied it, that Congress has
not made proposals. Quite to the contrary. The answer is, as 1 have
seen it, that we have had so many different pro)osals and at refusal or
relhmwtance on the part of the l)rposers to sit Cown and work out. an
agreement which we admit is not )erfect,, but which is better than no
solution at,all.
That, I think, is why we have had so much discussion on Senate
Joint. Resolution 1. It is not because I have had anything to do with
it, lut, because many people have taken a lot of time, have given and
taken in an effort to reach a solution. We have had 13 proposals l)effore
the Senate last year, as the Senator knows. Of this, now, we have 75
Members supporting this resolution. I do not think there is one of
them, certainly not myself as the primary sl!onsor, who will say this is
perfect. But I think it is the best we are going to get and I think it is
far better than no solution at all.
I know the Senator realizes the need for give and take in the legislative process, yet the goal must be gotten to in the best way we possil)ly
can. I felt compelled to make this statement to the Senator. If lie
wants equal time, lie may fire away.
Senator IIRusKA. I have already had equal time, Mr. Chairman.
We understand the process of legislation, I am sure.
I do feel that this time the Congress will speak on the subject, make
a determination anong the various views and sul)mit the amendment
to the States for ratification. In loyalty to the practices I feel important, I do feel a necessity in presenting this view. I thank the
chairman for his tolerance.
Senator BAYY. You present your views very well.
The Senator from Iowa has been more than patient.
Senator Miller, we are glad to have you with us as a man who has
expressed a great deal of interest in this, and in fact, a man who has a
measure before this subcommittee.
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STATEMENT OF HON. SACK MILLER, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF IOWA
MILLR. NIay I say that my patience was matched by mn in
Senator
terest
in the fine colloquy between the chairman and the Senator from
Nebraska.
Mr. (lmirnan, I share the concern of all our colleagues over the need
for a Presidential succession law. It was for this reason that I supported the mieastire which passed the Senate last year, and I want it
understood, Mr. Chairman, that if that is the choice before the Senate
this year, I would propose to support it again.
Unfortunately, the problem of what to do in the case of the disa)ility of the President also exists. That has recently been taken care
of, I understand, by an arrangement between President Johnson and
Vice President Humphrey. But there is considerable support for the
idea that. this should be taken care of by law. Just how to do it has
led to a great amount of controversy, and this controversy had a bearing on the failure of the House to act on a Senate-passed measure last
year. I hope that the committee will take careful note of the fact that
21 Representati ves have intro(liced 28 different alternative 1)roposals
on this (lisal)ility problem this year.
It seems to mne that the first order of business is the problemm of
Presidential succession. I say this because the disability l)roblem has
been taken ca re of by the arrangement to which I have referred, granted
that it only relates to the present incumbents.
So I have introduced my bill, Senate Joint Resolution 15, which
relates solely to succession, believing as I do that the two Houses
could readily agreo on this point, whereas to couple with a succession
bill, as we did Tast year, the disability matter might lead to further
delay in acting on this important matter.
Uder my bill, in the event of a vacancy in the office of Vice President, either'because of the death of the Vice President or his succession
to the Presidency, the President would nominate a Vice President of
the same party affiliation as that of the President. The nominee would
take office only upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses
of Congress in joint session. Thus, my bill meets head on this problem
of possible future controversy in the event the Congress is controlled
by one l)arty and the office of the Presidency is controlled by another
party.
This problem could have arisen during the terms of both President
Eisenhower and President Truman. I would hope that there would
be a. general agreement on this approach to the succession problem.
In the event my bill is not acted on by this committee, it might see
fit to fragment Senate Joint Resolutlon 1 into two parts or two
separate bills, one dealing solely with succession, the other dealing
with disability.
I think we should bear in mind that it is not going to help the
country at all if the Senate passes a bill and the Iouse does not. I
think we would be better oT if both Houses passed a succession bill
this year and the disability problem, if it were not treated in both
Houses, were taken care of at a later time.
Thank you.
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Senator B.Yii. I want to thank the Senator for his ver , good statemient, as well as his interest in the matter. If I might make one or
two observations and lperllit my colleague to comment on them, I
think those of us in the Senate last year should bear at least our share
of the responsibility for the House's refusal to act. As you will recall,
we were involved in a little "discussion" on the matter of civil rights.
It was not until the very waning hours of the session that we got the
measure over to the House and the House Judiciary Committee, )articularly, was involved, with respect to the other body-Nvas involved
in some rather controversial matters such as school prayer and reapl)ortionment, as well as presidential succession.
I think the Senator should know, probably already knows, that the
Speaker of the House in this session has stated his sul)l)ort for Senate
Joint Resolution 1, and the chairman of the Judiciary Committee
has introduced a similar act and the ranking minority member, Representative McCulloch, has introduced a similar measure. Ile has put
on it it time limit, giving 10 days in which to act.
I only mention this because I think that the Senator's concern over
the neewl not to pick imp the enemies of one par t and bestow them along
with the enemies of the other is a very real concern. I do not share
his opinion that this is going to be a" roadblock this time, but I do
feel that if we do run into tilis roadblock, we should be prepared to
decide to go two separate ways.
It is my feeling that the problems are closely related and if we can
get them together, we have one constitutional amendment on two situilar subjects, rather than two amendments.
Senator MILLER. I might say I recognize the controversy over this
succession as well as the disabilityy treatment, that prevailed in the last
session of the Congress over in the House. But I think it would not. do
any harm if two bills came out of this committee and two bills went
over to the House, one on succession and one on disability. If there
is no particular controversy over there, then both of them will pass
without any difficulty. I do not see that there is going to be any particular functional l)rol)lem about getting these two separatee hills
passed in the sAme session of Congress, referred to the, various legislatures, and acted on. They can both be. relatively short.
ilut I invite the attention of the chairman to the fact that there are
28 different alternative proposals on this disability question. And
granted that the Speaker may be inclined to support. let. us say, the
till Senate Joint Resolution 1 when it. comes over to 'the hIouse, this
certainly does not guarantee that that is what. is going to happen in
the House, as we witnessed just the other (lay in tlie, case of the Coinmodity Credit Corporation deficiency appropriation. I think this
problem is too deep and important to the people of the United States
to run any risks. I do not see any risks at all by having two bills.
But I cert ainly see a risk if we have just one. That is the main thesis
that I am presenting here.
As I say, if this is the choice that will be before the. Senate umpoi
passage, I would propose to support, this legislation, as I did last. year.
I share the chairman's appreia tion for the tremendous amount of
work that has gone into Senate Joint Resolution 1. But we have to
think of the other body, and because of so many alternative proposals
now pending over there, I think we could not do any harm by fragment ing this into two bills.
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Senator BAY1r. We certainly appreciate your thoughts. I would
like to ask a. question of you isa-n astute attorney. As you realize,
we have tried to keep these constitutional amendments as short as we
caii. I woul like to ask yon a question on the need for the inclusion
of the wording in your bill which says that he sliall be at member of
the same political party as the Presi(ent.. Frolm tile 1)nlct.ical staldpoint, I think that is what we want to accomplish. I think any President would ioninate such a Vice President.
Senator MImLLR. I certainly do, Mr. Chairman, because I think it
would be most unfortunate if atPresident of one party genuinely
wished to nominate a member of his own party, as I woihl be conident that most of them would do exce)t under most unusual circumustances, and found that perhaps the Congress would object to the
fact. that there ought to be a ?resident of the other party. We do not
know what developments may exist. But. if we have clearly nailed
down in the Constitution that, there is no choice in the matter, there
cannot be any controversy in a joint session of Congress over whether
or not this nominee shall be a member of the Presideit's party or some
other party, then there is no room for argument. about it. and you get
oil witi-you may have a difficulty over the nominee himself, )but the
problem of which party he belongs to will be completely eliminated.
We have seen some tough times, Nlien you have a member of one
party in time Presidency and a member of tme other l)arty patrols one
or both Houses of the Congress. This could particularly happen in
an off year, when the party that controls the Presidency has lost the
battle in the Congress So I suggest we eliminate that, problem once
and for all by spelling it out clearT in the law.
Senator I1AYIi. I am1not too certain, ini all fairness, as one of the
st-rongest supporters of Senate Joint Resolution 1, that we do eliminate
it entirely.
Senator Mimua.
Here, again, Mr. Chairman, this cannot do any
halrm. It cannot do any harm at all.
Senator BAYU. Granted. The one possibility that. I can envision
that could happen, in Senate Joint Resolution 1 or in Senate Joint
Resolution 15, is that with one party controlling the Congress, another
party having the Presidency, there is always a likelihood, even if we
say, "who shall be of the same political party as the President," that
they just do not get around to nominating a Vice President.
1 ti ink we are relying on a situation in which we have reasonable
men, and an expression of public opinion. I think the Senator is relying on it in his amendment. We have to have public opinion that
ina time of crisis is just not going to tolerate any political chicanerygood faith in the Members of Congress is what I am talking about.
Senator MILLER. May I say I agree with you that public opinion,
after a certain amount of time, would not tolerate it. -But I think we
could make the same argument about public opinion with respect to a
disability problem. Let uts just not leave it to controversy or to
chance. A mere phrase could avoid a knockdown between Members
of the two I-ouses. I do not consider it quite excess when we are
touching on something as deeply serious as this. If it is a foregone
conclusion when the Members of the two Houses go over there for a
joint session to act on a nomination, it is a foregone conclusion because it is a matter of constitutional law that that nominee simply
42-088--6I5---4
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has to be a member of the same party as the one which controls the
Presidency at least that is one less thing to argue about.
Senator IBAYH. Thank you.
Senator Hruska, do you have any comments on that?
Senator HRUSKA. &O. I have not. The position of the Senator
from Iowa has been very well stated and has a lot to be said for it.
There are some countervailing points which I am sure will be discussed by the subcommittee.
But we are grateful for your opinions, Senator Miller. Thank you
for coining.
Senator MILLER. Thank you, sir.
Senator BAYIH. We shall proceed now with further witnesses of the
committee, because a couple of them have planes to catch.
Senator BAYIH. A staff member, Mr. Sharp, of one of the distinguished members of the subcommittee, Senator Dodd, would like to
read Senator Dodd's statement. I shall zsk his indulgence, since some
of these witnesses have planes to catch, to allow them to proceed here
and he can read the statement in later.
The next witness will be Marion Folsom.
Without objection, I shall ask Mr. Folsom to be the next witness.
He is the former Secretarv of Health, Education, and Welfare. At
present, he is chairman of the Committee for Improvement of Management in Government, Committee for Economic Development. le has
made a considerable contribution in this area.
I want to thank Mr. Folsom for his part in the committee's deliberation and compliment the coimnittee for throwing the great influence
that it has throughout the country behind the need to find a solution
for this problem.
Mr. Folsom, we are appreciative of your being with us today.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARION B. FOLSOM, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE
FOR IMPROVEMENT OF MANAGEMENT IN GOVERNMENT, COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Mr. FOLSOM. Mr. Chairman and members of the Senate Judiciary
Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, your invitation to testify on the vital subject of a constitutional amendment designed to
solve the problem of presidential succession and inability is much
appreciated, both by me personally and-I am certain-by my fellow
trustees of the Committee for Economic Development, and by all
members of the CED's Committee for Improvement of Management in
Government.
This is the first occasion, so far as I recall, on which any representative of CED has appeared before this subcommittee of the Senate.
Perhaps it is appropriate at this time to outline briefly CED's interests,
activities, and composition.
The Committee for Economic Development was established in 1942.
It has been actively engaged over the intervening years in the development of national policy positions best suited to encourage the economic
well-being of the United States and of' the free world. Policy statements on such matters as taxation, Federal expenditures, foreign trade
and monetary management have been issued frequently and distributed
widely. Many of these have received a favorable reception, on their
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merits, in the business community, in university faculties, and in other
influential circles, leading eventually to broad public acceptance of
their basic principles.
The Committee for Economic Development consists of 200 trustees
representing a broad spectrum of business and university leadership in
the United States. Its several subcommittees are supported in their
work by advisory groups of the best scholarly minds in the Nation.
About 2 years ago, several top officials of the Kennedy administration and former officials of the Federal Government approached me
and others active in CED, proposing that we apply the same approaches to improvement of our governmental institutions that have
been used in formulating national economic policies in the public
interest.. With financial support from Carnegie Corp. and several
other foundations, CED has established the Committee for Improvement, of Management in Government. The 25 CED trustees with most
experience in Government were appointed to it, and 10 additional
members were added from outside CED to provide the broadest possible balance for our work.
Four of our thirty-five members had served as heads of Cabinet De1)artments, five had been Assistant or Under Secretaries, thirteen
chairmen or members of Federal regulatory or advisory commissions,
and thirteen were former bureau chiefs or'directors, or special assistants to the President or to Cabinet members.
You might say one was a former Senator, Senator Benton.
Our committee's work has benefited greatly from the counsel of our
advisory board, men with wide experience in governmental affairs, as
wvell as in university and business circles. These 15 advisers are listed
on page 6 of the document I think you have before you.
The Committee for Improvement of Management in Government
regards the subject of Presidential succession and inability as one
commanding highest priority. We recognize and commend the constructive work done by you, Mr. Chairman, and your colleagues of the
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, in
drafting and gaining Senate approval for a constitutional amendment which-if finally adopted-would do much to correct serious
deficiencies in our present constitutional system. The thought and effort devoted to these problems are a great service to the Nation.
The second policy statement issued by our committee deals with these
matters in some depth, and I am pleased to submit copies of that statement for your examination. Our committee has deliberated at length
on every facet of this complex series of issues, in consultation with our
advisers.
We have also had the benefit of Mr. Brownell's Committee of the
American Bar Association. They met with us and his staff met with
us extensively in our discussions.
Both the Committee for Improvement of Management in Government and the CED Research and Policy Committee have approved
the policy positions set forth in this document. Of some 60 members
of these 2 committees, only 2 have expressed reservations and 1 has
dissented, in footnotes contained in the document. The members of
the two committees are listed on pages 5 and 6 of the policy statement.
I emphasize the strength of our concensus because there are some
distinct differences between positions taken by CED and the provisions
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of tile proposed constitutional amendment as it was approved by the
Senate ill its last session.
We 10 agree, wholeheartedly, that. any vacancy in tile Office of
Vice Presidfent should be promptly filled,'through nomination by the
President. and with congressional] confirnat ion.
We also concur, of course, on authority for the Vice President to act
as President in situations where both !"resident and Vice President
are in agreement on the need.
We regard clarification of other situations, involving presidential
inability, as a-n immediate imperative-as Members of tile Senate do,
also-but we believe that certain modifications of the proposal, as
approved by the Senate last year, would prevent possible amnbiguity
and confusion in future situations that, might coneeival)ly arise. It
may be well to identify, in quite specific terms, tie points at which
we depart in any substantial way from the previouss thinking of this
committee.

First, we believe that congressional confirmation of a Presidential
nomination to fill a vacancy in tie Vice-Presidency should be through
a joint session of the two ITouses, requiring approval by a majority
of all Senators and Representatives present and voting.
I understand that was along the line that the Senator from Iowa
was just suggesting in his amendment-fa joint session.
We favor this method, as opposed either to confirmation by the Senate alone, or to approval by the two Houses acting separately', for three
primary reasons: (1) The'joint session corresponds to voting strength,
State by State, in the electoral college; (2) action-pro or con-would
be more expeditious than could be expected through separate consideration by the two Houses or under normal Senate procedures; and
(3) the Senate and the House of Representatives might be in disagreenulnt, with unfortunate effects. We acknowledge that formal action
in joint session would require establishment of rules of procedure for
that body but this would seem to be a relatively simple problem.
Second, we believe that the initiative in determination of an indecdared presidential inability should lie with tile Cabinet and not with
tile Vice President. In otfier words, we feel that such determination
should be by the Cabinet, the Vice President concurring, as was provi ded in the amendment as passed by the Senate last year. Our reasoning rests upon repeated experienc : for example, during the Garfield
and Wilson illnesses, showing that the Vice President is likely to be
most reluctant to proclaim the Nation's need for him to assume the
presidential powers and duties, no matter how urgent or obvious
the necessity, so long as the President lives.
The Vice President should never be forced to accept authority under
conditions permitting unfair charges of usurpation against him, nor
should his natural feelings of deference and loyalty to a disabled Chief
Executive be allowed to absolve him from hIs proper responsibility.
The Committee for Improvement of Management in Government has
taken a strong position on this point, perhaps because four of us were
members of the Cabinet during one or more of President Eisenhower's
several periodsE of illness.
If Members of the Congress were to visualize clearly the realities
in cases of this kind, we believe they would conclude, as we have, that
initiative should rest with the Cabinet, and not with the Vice President.
Further, we oppose creation of any alternative group as a substitute
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for the Cabinet, in determination of presidential inability, on grounds
fully exl)lored in our policy statement. The Cabinet is best situated,
through the intimate knowledge its members have of major issues of
state and by reason of their day-to-day association with the President,
both to judge presidential imbility aind to assess the urgencies in the
national sit uat-ion at any moment.
Third, we are much concerned that the Nation avoid any possibility
of doubt, dispute, or delay concerning termination of any conceivable
presidential inability. 'That is why we urge that this matter also be
decided by the Cabinet, subject only to presidential concurrence. The
a amendment proposed last year opens-in our view-opportunity for
confusion and dispute over who may hold legitimate authority to
exercise tle powers and duties of the Presidency in some future time
of trial and trouble.
Tlhe principle of separation of powers among the three branches of
government appears to us to 1)e eminently sound. We cannot agree
that, it is wise to place a conceivable future difference of opinion'between President and Vice President over the termination of a presidential inability before the Congress for decision, especially if the restilt is to delend upon two-third majorities in both Houses.
This subject deseres renewed attention and closest scrutiny. Under the language previously l)roposed, it would be possible for a
President to terminate his own disal)ility, against the judgment of the
Vice President supported by the entire Cabinet and a unanimous vote
of the Senate, if only one-third of the House of Rel)resentatives were
to agree with the Presi(ient. We may hope that no such disagreement
would ever occur but some better arrangement than this should be made
for the l)ossibility, however remote it may now seem to be. We
strongly reaffirm the merits of Cabinet decision on this delicate matter,
subject only to presidential concurrece.
Finally, although corrective action would not require a. constitutional amendnient, our committee strongly prefers the terms of the
1886 statute on presidential succession, as opposed to those of the
1947 statute. If early provision is made for filling vice-presidential
vacancies, the need for revision of the present arrangement would be
lessened but it would still exist. The reasons for this position are
noted in our policy statement and they bear great weight. One fact,
alone should be decisive here: For 8 of the past 18 years, the Speaker
of the House has been of the political party in opposition to that of the
President. Surely, we do not wish to permit a change in the partisan
coniplexion of the executive branch through some accident of death or
disa ability.
In summary, I would emphasize the criteria used by our committee
in arriving at its choices among the various possible alternatives.
They were: (1) Continuity in the exercise of Presidential powers
and duties; (2) legitimacy and public acceptability; (3) certainty,
leaving no doubt who-and who alone-may exercise these powers:
(4) stability in policy; (5) speed and simplicity in procedures used
to determine the issues; and (6) preservation of the separation of
powers.
Above all, we hone and trust that the best and wisest, remedy may
be fomd for each defect in our resent system. The Constitution is
not easily amended, nor should it bp. The process requires the kind of
careful deliberation being given in this case.
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I would conclude by quoting a key paragraph in our CED policy
statement:
The urgency of national action, to resolve the doubts and uncertainties clouding
Presidential suc(ession and inability, cannot be overly stressed. Failure to correct the deficiencies will subject the Nation to risks and hazards that are avoidable. Prompt action is imperative.

In view of the discussions between the Senator from Nebraska and
the Attorney General, I would just like to call your attention to one
passage from our statement, about the question of bringing Congress
into the picture. It begins with the words, "The disadvantage of a
Senate-approved arrangement goes too far"
Senator ky it. Could you tell me what page it is on?
Mr. FOLSOM. That is on page 31 in the middle of tile page. It ends
with the sentence:
Given a Congres with a hostile two-thirds majority such as existed during
the Presidency of Andrew Johnson, it could be used to deprive the President
of his powers and duties, without resorting to the circumscribed inipeachinent
procedures.

In summary, our main concern-I light say that if the committee
finds that they get better agreement on your resolution without any
change, we certainly feel that.you should go ahead and pass the legislation as it is without any changes. But we do feel, as indicated in our
statement, that we think it would improve with these three somewhat
minor ditferences. In some ways, it could be very easily changed, but
on the other
hand, we think they are quite important.
The first is that. we think to authorize Congress to decide this dispute
really alters the constitutional separation of powers. By proved ng
this to Congress, we think you aie apt to get into a period of indecision
and confusion where the people would not know who was going to be
President. As the Senator from Nebraska indicated, this might last
quite awhile.
We also think that you should lodge authority in the Vice President
to declare Presidential disability.
In other words, the initiative should be, we feel, in the majority of
the Cabinet. to bring it up, with the Vice President concurring, rather
than leave it to the initiative of the Vice President.
Now, it might be that your amendment would not forestall that, but
we think it would be nmre clearly stated if you say, as we do in our
suggestion, that it is to be brought about by the Cabinet, approved
by a majority of the Cabinet, with the Vice President concurring,
rather than the Vice President with the majority of the Cabinet concurring. That is at question of changing the wording. Maybe you
exp erts can say whether it is necessary to make that change or not.
But anyhow, we feel it is very important that some action be taken
in this session of Congress, and1 we have been very much impressed
with the favorable comments which we received in the press throughout the country on this subject. We have had very wide comments
in the news releases on our statement, and we have had many editorials,
some of which support our position and some of which do not. But
it shows that the people of the country are very much concerned about
this issue right now.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator BAY11. Thank you, Mr. Folsom.
May I ask a question or two, pleaseV
Mr. FoIsom. Surely.
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Senator BAYJI. In that portion dealing with disability, there seems
to be a little difference between who should have the initiative. In
the wording, it says:
The authority to decide that Presidential Inability exists should be placed in
the hands of the Cabinet, In consultation with the Vice President or other successor. Any such decision should be by a majority vote of the Cabinet, the
Vice President concurring.

Then it goes on to say:
Upon the initiative of any member or of the Vice President.

Now, how do you reconcile that?
Mr. FoLsoM. What we meant to say there was that in the case of a
question, if the Presidency, if there is some question about the Presidential ability to carry on, it would be brought before the Cabinet.
The Cabinet members can bring it up or the Vice President can bring
it up, but we say we ought to have a majority of the Cabinet, with the
Vice President concurring. In other words, we do not want to leave
the initiative entirely with the Vice President. If he wants to bring
it up, fine, but we also want to have an opportunity for the Cabinet
to bring it up, because we do find in past practice that the Vice President never wanted to bring it up. We do not want to put that burden
on the Vice President. We think it is more apt to be done if the Cabinet member were to bring it up, because it is a very difficult position
for the Vice President to be put in.
Senator BAYII. He could be very reluctant.
Mr. FOLSOM. That has been the situation in the past. We do not
want him not to bring it up, but we say it the other way around, that
the Cabinet ought to bring it up.
Senator BAYH. I do not think there is any further need for me to
explore your opinion on the congressional activity in the disability
problem.
Mr. FOLSOM. I was interested to see the Senator from Nebraska
agreed pretty much with our position on this.
Senator BAYH. Not that we shall not fully consider your contentions, because I think they are well taken. I detect the fine hand of
the Senator from Nebraska in some of this. He is certainly very much
in agreement with you.
I would say that I do not think that Senate Joint Resolution 1 provides in the language-and if you think otherwise, I would like to
know-that the language provides confusion as to who is President.
This we tried to go to great extremes to provide for, who is President.
rhe question goes to the !,gitimacy of the person who does have the
power at that time. It is our feeling that no matter which system
you use, it is possible to conjure up the situation in which the public
is going to be very confused about the legitimacy of the person possessing the power.
Mr. FOLSOm. Our proposal, though, was any discussion going on in
the Cabinet, where it gets before the decision is made whois going to
be President. There is bound to be confusion there as to who the
President is actually going to be.
Senator BAYH. I think if I know anything about my colleagues,
there is liable'to be a lot of discussion and debate on any activity that
would be taken within the confines of the Cabinet. This would be
public and very confusing. Nevertheless, I do not want to duplicate
the other colloquy that we have had here.
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One other item or two in explanation. The alter-native group other
than the Cabinet, which is included in the consensus opinion or Senate
Joint Resolution 1, was arrived at after a couple of all-night, all-day
sessions with the American Bar Association group. We felt that this
would give us a possible safeguard if for some inconceivable reason
now, later experiences indicated the Cabinet could not deal with this
matter that Congress without going through the whole rigmarole of
the constitutional change, would unquestionably have the authority to
say that some other group needs to be taken into consideration.
I just wanted to explain this, not to resolve the argument.
Mr. FOLSO31. Our committee felt that the members of the Cabinet
were in a better position to judge the situation than almost any other
group you could pick.
Senator BAYIL. As I say, I agree wholeheartedly with you, and I
cannot conceive of any eventuality where any other group would be
called upon. But there was some feeling that this would provide a
safeguard in the event something did come up which would be a part
Of it.
The possibility of a joint session was considered at some length by
the committee, and again, this is a matter of compromise entering
into the picture. We ultimately arrived at the individual session determination of the new Vice President.
One of the deciding factors there was that there are no provisions,
to our knowledge, for calling them into joint session on any particular
day. We contemplated a rather vigorous, time-consuming discussion
on the establishment of rules. You pass over this rather lightly and
do not anticipate the problem. But if this were the first time a joint
session was ever called, the establishment of rules, could be debated
between the two Houses at that time, and it might be very time
consuming.
Mr. FOLSON. That would be provided for ahead of time. Would
you not make you're provisions ahead of time for a joint session?
Senator BAYH. We could.
Mr. Foi.so.r. That would be part of our proposal, that you should
make all provision for this and not wait until the emergency arises.
Senator BAY11. You would suggest now that we have legislation to
establish the rules for a joint session which could be provided for in
the Constitution?
Mr. FoLso i. Yes; we feel that this is an unusual situation, and we
do not see why you should not have an unusual method of handling it.
Also, as we point out, we think it is a little more representative to take
the two together. It would be just the same as the electoral college.
Senator BAYI. A point well taken.
Mr. FoLso-,%. Also, it would be more expeditious, because you would
have one vote.
Then you do have the possibility of one House voting one way, one
another, in the individual session, and you would be in an awful spot.
Senator BAYI. Here again, you must rely on reasonable men and
public pressure.
Mr. FoLsorf. We also feel, with all due respect to the Senate, that
with the House, with the whole House having to be elected every 2
years, they are in a little closer touch with the people at that time
than the Senate might be.
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Senator BAYIT. Then it is conceivable that, the House might be of the
opposing party, which would add a complicating factor. You could
come up with all sorts of things.
Mr. FOLSOl. That is why we looked into-you will notice in our
document, we considered the various alternatives and we finally agreed
on this. Another group of people might agree on some other thing.
But we do feel the important thing is to get action and we would not
quarrel at all.
Seantor BAYJI. I tlink your suggestion that they should be considered in advance is a good one and that we follow this approach,
because the rule is not as Simple as discussing parliamentary procedure.
For instance, they could get into the question of requiring the Members
of Congress to vote en bloc, as they are required to under the electoral
system ?
Mr. FoLso.N. Our point was-just take the majority of the joint
session.
Senator BAY11. Senator Hruska?
Senator HRUSKA. Mr. Folsom, we are grateful for your coming here.
Needless to say, the Senator from Nebraska thinks your report is of
high quality and of great merit. I would suggest there has not been
direction by the hand of this Senator in the formation of this report.
I wish I had been privileged to appear before the committee in some
of your discussions. But I do not know that I could have contributed
much, ,in view of the general approach that your committee eventually
adopted.
It seems to me this discussion of a joint session and rules for it
lends added strength to the approach that is used in Senate Joint
Resolution No. 6, which says that all these procedural matters-this
matter of what rule and what parliamentary procedure should be
'used-are left to legislation by Congress. The merit in this case is,
that if actual practice would show that the separate sessions of each
House would be an impracticable situation, then we could change it
by statute.
On the other hand, if we try a joint session and find it to be unworkable, then we could legislate and not go through this process of
amending the Constitution.
Do you see some merit to that suggestion, Mr. Folsom?
Mr. FOLSOM. Yes; I do see some merit in it.
Senator HRuSKA. Had the committee considered at all the exact language of Senate Joint Resolution No. 6 or its predecessor?
Mr. FOLSOM. We studied it, of course, read it, but it is not within our
province, we think, to get into the actual wording of this. We were
concerned only with policy questions, and we did not want to get
involved in detailed language of legislation. We do not think we are
competent to do that.
Senator HRUSKA. I appreciate that, and you did make these general
recommendations. They, as well as the arguments you make, are
very helpful.
I was particularly impressed by the suggestion that the initiative
should be taken by other than the Vice President. He is in a very
delicate situation.
Mr. FOLSOM. Those of us who went through the Eisenhower experience, I think, would all agree to that. I just cannot imagine a position where a Vice President would want to come right out and say he
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will take over, any more than I would in a business concern. In fact,
one of the arguments one of our businessmen made--most of our
people are business people who have had quite a lot of experience in
Government, so they have experience from both angles. One of them
said that he could not imagine a situation in a corporation where, if
a president became disabled, one of the vice presidents would step up
and say, "I ought to take over." It would not be done, and we think
the Vice President would be in the same situation.
I know in our experience in the Eisenhower administration, it would
be very, very difficult to expect. You cannot imagine the Vice President coming up and saying, "I do not think the President can carry
on and I do not think lie should be President."
Senator ITR1SKA. Certainly, if the consensus of the Cabinet members
was, that the Vice President should be in charge, the edge would be
taken off that delicate situation.
Mr. FoLso[. What would happen would be that two or three of the
Cabinet members would go to the Vice President and say, "We do not
think the President should carry on; we do not think he is in shape;
we are going to take a vote, and' if the majority of us vote that way,
you are going to take over."
Senator HRUSKA. Thank you, Mr. Folsom.
I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator BAYL. I would like to make one reference to the conference
held here last spring, again under the auspices of the American Bar
Association. I was very interested to learn President Eisenhower's
opinion of this business of who should take the issue. He came out
with the flat statement that he thought the Vice President could not
escape this authority, that constitutionally it was his, that lie thought
no one else should have it, it was his and he should have to exercise

it. But if we thought someone else should be, we thought we ought
to go along and give the Cabinet ratifying or confirming authority.
I do not think I am misinterpreting his statement.
Mr. FoLso-r. History does not bear it out. We have had plenty of
cases where the Vice President should have taken it and did not.
Senator BAYR. I am not saying that I disagree with you, understand, but I wanted to get President Eisenhower's statement in the
record. I think perhaps history might have been different if Congress had prescribed a constitutional formula by which the Vice President coulddo this, so that it was clear that such a step was not a figment of his own contriving.
Mr. FOLsOM. We bring that out in our statement, that it would make
quite a difference.
Senator BAH. Mr. Folsom, I appreciate very much your joining us
and again want to reiterate what I said earlier, that I think your
study has made a great contribution in this area.
Mr. FoLsom. I was very glad to have the opportunity to present
my views.
Senator HRTJSKA. I should like to add to that that I would like to
cong atulate and commend the Committee on Economic Development
for making the effort in this field. I think it would be helpful to us
in Congress if that practice were not only continued, but in selected
cases, expanded and given greater depth.
Mr. FOLSOM. Our first statement we issued was on the improvement of executive management in Federal Government. I think you
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have probably seen that statement. We are now working on a statement on the budgetary process, which is going to keep us busy for
quite a while.
Thank you.
Senator BYiv. Thank you very much.
I ask that the conclusions reached by the Committee on Economic
I)evelopment relating to it solution to this matter and two pertinent
charts regarding the replacement provisions be included in the record.
(The conclusion and charts follow:)
6. CONCLUSIONS

The urgency of national action to resolve the doubts and uncertainties clouding
Presidential succession and inability cannot be overly stressed. Failure to correct the deficiencies will subject the Nation to risks and hazards that are avoidable. Prompt action is imperative.
This Committee has carefully measured the various alternatives for solution
against certain criteria--continuity, legitimacy, certainty, stability, speed, simplicity, and preservation of the separation of powers fundamental to our constitutional system.
The United States of America must have one person wielding the powers and
duties of the Presidency at all times. Conversely, it cannot tolerate any period
of confusion in which two men compete for the exercise of Presidential authority.
Our first major recommendation, therefore, is that the Constitution be amended
to provide that any vacancy in the office of Vice President be filled. We suggest
giving the President authority to nominate a Vice President, subject to approval
by joint session of Congress.
Those persons in line of succession after the Vice President must be familiar
with day-to-day Presidential activities. No other officers can match the preparation of the Vice President and leading Cabinet members for sudden elevation to
the Presidency. This Committee, therefore, recommends that the line of succession beyond the Vice President be revised, placing the chief Cabinet officers next
in line, as under the statute of 1886.
We recognize that solution of the problem of Presidential "Inability" poses
problems, but there is one point on which accepted interpretations of the present
Constitution should remain unchallenged. The word "inability" should continue
to be understood to include every situation where the President, for whatever
reason, is unable to exercise the powers and duties of his office. The preponderance of legal authority now holds that the President would retain his title and
"office" in case of an established disability, while the Vice President (or whoever may be first in line of succession) would automatically assume his powers
and duties. Clear language on this should be placed in the Constitution.
We would not change these basic concepts as applicable to situations where
the President, recognizing his own inability, calls upon the Vice President to exercise the Presidential powers and duties. Similarly, they apply to those situations where the President is unable to communicate his own obvious inability
and where there may be need for instantaneous action in the national interest.
Beyond these situations, however, there is need for clarification.
This Committee's second major recommendation is that authority to decide
that Presidential inability exists should be placed In the hands of the Cabinet
in consultation with the Vice President or other successor. Any such decision
should be by majority vote of the Cabinet, the Vice President concurring, upon
the initiative of any member or of the Vice President. Termination of Presidential inability would follow the same procedure, except that Presidentialrather than Vice-Presidential---concurrence would be required. This proposal
would also require constitutional revision; but a single amendment might include this provision with the other changes recommended.
When these two major proposals are adopted, the United States will always
have one person-and only one person-exercising the powers and duties of the
Presidency.
We regard these as the best choices among all proposed alternatives. We concede that some variations on these solutions would improve our present situation;
but we are confident that no other alterations would meet the Nation's basic
needs as well.
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Instances when the United States has been without a Vice President
Vice President

Termination of office

Term for which elected

Length of time office vacant

1812-Mar. 3, 1813 ------ 0
George Clinton ----------- Died Apr. 20,1812 --------- Mar 4, 1809--Mar. 3, 1813 -------Apr. 20,
2
Nov* 23 1814-Mar. 3, 1817-----Elbridge Gerry ----------- Died Nov. 23,1814 -------- Mar. 4, 1813-Mar. 3, 1817 ------0
3, 1833 --,1832-Mlar.
28
Dec.
1833.---I
3,
John C. Calhoun ---------- Resigned Dec. 28, 1832, to Mar. 4, 1829-Mar.
take seat in Senate.
3
-----3,
1845
6,1841-1Mar.
Apr.
----3,
1845
4,
1841-Mar.
Mar.
as
Presioffice
of
Took oath
John Tyler -------------dent, Apr. 6, 1841.
2
....
3,18.3
10,1850-Mar.
July
-----3,185.3
5,189-Mar.
'Mar.
as
Presiof
office
oath
Took
Millard Fillmore --------dent, July 10,1850.
3
-----3,
1857
1953--Mar.
18,
Apr.
1857
3,
1853-Mar.
4,
Mar.
--------18,
1853
Apr.
Died
--------King
William R.
Apr. 15, 1865-Mar. 3,169 ------ 3
Andrew Johnson --------- Took oath of office as Prsi- Mar. 4, 1865--Mar. 3, 1869 ------dent, Apr. 15,1865.
----- 1
Henry Wilson ------------ Died Nov. 22, 1875 -------- Mar. 4, 1873-Mar. 3,1875 ---- Nov. 22,1875-Mar. 3, 1877-----3
Sept. 20, 1881-Mar. 3, 1885
Took oath of office as Presi- Mar. 4, 1881-Mar. 3, 185 ---Chester A. Arthur --------dent, Sept. 20, 1881.
Thomas A. Hendricks ---- Died Nov. 25, 1885-------- Mar. 4, 1885--Mar. 3, 1,89 ----- Nov. 25, 1885-Mar. 3, 1889------ 3
Mar. 4, 1897--Mar. 3, 1901 ----- Nov. 21, 1899--Mar. 3, 1901 ----- 1
Garret A. Ilobart --------- Died Nov. 21, 1899 ---------Took oath of office as Presi- Mar. 4, 1901-Mar. 3, 19)5 ---- Sept. 14, 1901-Mar. 3, 1905 ------ 3
Theodore Roosevelt-------dent, Sept. 14, 1901.
James S. Sherman -------- Died Oct. 30, 1912--------- Mar. 4, 1909-Mar. 3, 1913----- Oct. .30, 1912--Mar. 3, 1913 ------- 0
1
Calvin Coolidge---------- Took oath of office as Presi- Mar. 4, 1921-Mar. 3, 1925 ----- Aug. 3, 1923-Mar. 3, 1925 ------dent, Aug. 3,19"23.
3
I
------20,1949
1945--Jan.
Apr.
12,
---20,
1949
1945--Jan.
Jan.
20,
as
Prcsi
office
of
oath
Took
Harry S. Truman ---.......
1945.
Apr.
dcit,oath
11
office
as Presi- Jan. 20,1961-Jan. 20, 1965 ---- Nov. 22,1963-Jan. 20,1965
of 12,
Took
-.
LyndonB. Johnson
dent, Nov. 22, 1963.
Total period of vacancy ------------------------------

----------------------------------

-----------------------------------

Source: Adapted from table prepared by History and General Research Division, Library of Congress.

President

Day

Years Months
10
3
2

12 1 James Madison.
Do.
9
4 Andrew Jackson.

11

0

7

23

10
10
3
5
3
3
5
4
7
9
1
3

William 11. Harrison, died

Apr. 4, 1841.
I Zachary
Taylor, died July

9.18.sm.
14 Franklin Pierce.
17 Abraham Lincoln, died
Apr. 15,1865.
10 Flysses S. Grant.
13 James A. Garlield, died
Sept. 19. 1881.
7 Grover Cleveland.
11 William McKinley.
18 William McKinley, died
Sept. 14, 1901.
5 William II. Taft.
2 Warren G. Hoarding, died
Aug. 2, 19,23.
8 Franklin D. Roosevelt,
12, 1945. died
died Apr.
F. Kennedy,
29 John
Nov. 22, 1963.
12
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Occasions on which the President and the Speaker of the House of Representatires or the President pro tempore of the Senate were of opposite parties,
186.4-1964
President and party
44th Cong., 1875-77.

Speaker and party

President pro
tempore and party

Ulysses S. Grant, Republican.

Michael C. Kerr, Demo- Thomas W. Ferry, Repubcrat.
lican.
Samuel J. Randall, Democrat.
45th Cong., 1877-79. Rutherford B. Hayes, Re- -----.
do-------------------Do.
publican.
46th Cong., 1879-81 .- do
-------------------------do -------------------Allen G. Thurman, Democrat.
48th Cong., 1883-85. Chester A. Arthur, Ro- John G. Carlisle, Demo- George F. Edmunds, Republican.
crat.
publican.
4Pti Cong., 1885-87. Grover Cleveland, Demo- -----.
do ------------------John Sherman, Republican.
crat.
50th Cong., 1887-89-.... do ------------- ------ ----.
do -------------------John 3. Ingalls, Republican.
52d Cong., 1891-93.- Benjamin Harrison, Re- Charles F. Crisp, Demo- Charles F. Monderson, Relical.
crat.
publican.
54th Cong., 1895-97. Grover Cleveland, Demo- Thomas B. Reed, Repub- William P. Frye, Repubcrat.
lican.
lican.
62d Cong., 1911-13-- William 1. Taft Repub- Champ Clark, Democrat-.
Do.
lican.
Charles Curtis, Republican.
Augustus 0. Bacon, Republican.
Jacob 1H. Gallinger, Republican.
Henry Cabot Lodge, Republican.
Frank B. Brandegee, Republican.
66th Cong., 1919-21- Woodrow Wilson, Demo- Frederick 1I. Giliett, He- Albert B. Cummins, Recrat.
publican.
publican.
72d Cong., 1931-,33.. Ilerbert C. Hoover, Re- John Nance Garner, )e- George 11. Moses, Repubpublican.
mocrat.
lican.
80th Cong., 1947-49. ilarry S. Truman, )emo- Joseph Martin, Jr., Re- Arthur Vandenberg, Recrat.
publican.
publican.
84th Cong., 1955-57. Dwight 1). Eisenhower, San Rayburn, Democrat. Walter F. George, Demotepublican.
crat.
85th Cong., 1957-59do ------------------------- do -------------------Carl Hlayden, Democrat.
86th Cong., 1959-61- ---do -------------------- ---do----------------Do.
Source: Encyclopaedia Britannica.
1774-1961.

Compiled from Biographical Directory of the American Congress,

Senator BAYII. I would like now to call Ierbert Brownell, former
Attorney General of the United States, leading member of the bar
of New York. I understand that he is presently president of the
New York City bar.
May I say lie has made a great contribution in this give-and-take situation which has resulted in coining very close to the solution of this
problemm and awakening the awareness of the need for this type of
egislat ion all over the country.
Mr. Brownell, it is a privilege to have you before this committee.
STATEMENT OF HERBERT BROWNELL, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION

Mr. BROwNELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator 1Hruska. I am
appearing this morning as the chairnlan of the American Bar Association's Committee on Presidential Inability and Vice-Presidential
Vacancy.

I wonder if I might have the approval of the subcommittee

to hand up, without reading it, a statement of Iewis F. Powell, Jr.,
who is the president of the American Bar Association, in support of
Senate Joint Resolution 1?
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Without objection, that will be adImitted at this
Mr. l'owell has been extremely useful ini helping solve this

Senator lBlAYu.

time.

l)roblem.

M[r. BlioW~NEii.

ie is very unhappy that he could not be here this

morning to represent the American Bar Association, but he was unavoidalby detained elsewhere.
(The prepared statement of Mr. Powell referred to follow :)
STATEMENT

BY

LEWIS

F. POWELL, J1. PRESIDENT OF TIE
ASSOCIATION, WASIIINOTON, D.C.

AMEICAN

B1AR

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, my name is Lewis F. Powell,
Jr. I am president of the American Bar Association and practice law in
Richmond, Va. I had the privilege on June 11, 1963, and on February 24, 196-1,
of testifying before this distinguished subcommittee on the subject of Presidential
inability, and I appreciate your invitation to appear here today-again as a
representative of the American Bar Association-to discuss further the inability
problem and also the related question of filling the vacancy in the office of Vice
President.
The American Bar Association has been interested in the subject of Presidential inability for many years. In 1960 the association's committee on jurisprudence and law reform studied the problem and recommended adoption of a
constitutional amendment such as that proposed currently by Senate Joint Resolution 35. The language of Senate Journal Resolution 35 stemmed initially froint
the New York State Bar Association and the proposal embodied in that Senate
Joint resolution has been considered a sound one. It was considered a good proposal because it was concise, clear, and easily understoood. It would have solved
the constitutional question arising in the event of the President's inability to
discharge the powers and duties of his office. It would have left the appropriate
procedures to Congress for final determination.
In 1962 the American Bar Association reaffirmed its position calling for a
constitutional amendment such as Senate Joint Resolution 35. In addition, it
endorsed a proposed congressional statute as a stop-gap measure.
In 1963, under the chairmanship of the late Senator Kefauver, hearings were
held on Presidential inability by this subcommittee. Senate Joint Resolution 35
was reported favorably that year by the subcommittee. The death of President
Kennedy directed the entire Nation's attention to the vacancy in the Vice-Presidency and to the difficult questions which might have faced the Nation had the
President been disabled seriously. As in past years when crisis has occurred in
the Presidential office, the American people became acutely aware of the iiportance of maintaining uninterrupted continuity in Executive leadership.
Congressional leaders, constitutional scholars, and many others are in coiplete agreement that something must be done to eliminate the possibility of
chaos in the event of the President's disability. It is also considered highly
desirable that the office of Vice President be filled at all times. Unfortunately,
no action has been taken by Congress because of the many differing views. In an
attempt to develop a consensus among several distinguished lawyers most knowledgeable on this subject, the American Bar Association convened a conference on
Presidential inability and succession on January 20-21, 1964.
Attending the conference in Washington were: Herbert Brownell, president,
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, and a former Attorney General
of the United States; John D. Feerick, attorney, New York; Paul A. Freund,
professor of law, Harvard University; Jonathan C. Gibson, chairman, Standing
Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform, American Bar Association; Richard II. Ilansen, attorney, Lincoln, Nebr.; James C. Kirby, Jr., associate professor
of law, Vanderbilt University, and a former chief counsel to the Subcommittee
on Constitutional Amendments, Senate Judiciary Commnittee; Ross L. Malone,
past president of the American Bar Association, and a former Deputy Attorney
General of the United States; Charles B. Nutting, dean of the National Law
Center; Walter E. Craig, president, American Bar Association; Sylvester C.
Smith, Jr., past president, American Bar Association; Martin Taylor, chairman,
Committee on Federal Constitution, New York State Bar Association; Edward L.
Wright, chairman, House of Delegates, American Bar Association, and myself.
The 2-day deliberations of this highly distinguished group were intense and
thorough. Proposals of this and past Congresses were reviewed in detail. Al-
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though there was not absolute agreement by each conferee on all points of the
final consensus, there was general agreement on the statement. On the question
of action to be taken in the event of the President's inability, it was the consensus
of the conference that1. Agreements between the President and Vice President or person next in
line of succession provide a partial solution, but not an acceptable permanent
solution of the problem.
2. An amendment to the Constitution of the United States should be
adopted to resolve the problems which would arise in the event of the inability of the President to discharge the powers and duties of his office.
3. The amendment should provide that in the event of the inability of
the President the powers and duties, but not tle office, shall devolve upon
the Vice President or person next in line of succession for the duration of
the inability of the President or until expiration of his term of office.
4. The amendment should provide that the inability of the President may
be established by declaration in writing of the President. In the event that
the President does not make known his inability, it may be established by
action of the Vice President or person next in line of succession with the
concurrence of a majority of the Cabinet or by action of such other body
as the Congress may by law provide.
5. The amendment should provide that the ability of the President to resume the powers and duties of his office shall be established by his declaration
in writing. In the event that the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet
or such other body as Congress may by law provide shall not concur in the
declaration of the President, the continuing inability of the President may
then be determined by the vote of two-thirds of the elected Members of
each House of the Congress. On the related question of Presidential succession it was the consensus that1. The Constitution should be amended to provide that in the event
of the death, resignation, or removal of the President, the Vice President
or the person next in line of succession shall succeed to the office for
the unexpired term.
2. It is highly desirable that the office of Vice President be filled at
all times. An amendment to the Constitution should be adopted providing that when a vacancy occurs in the office of Vice President, the
President shall nominate a person who, upon approval by a majority
of the elected Members of Congress meeting in joint session, shall then
become Vice President for the unexpired term.
The consensus was reviewed thoroughly by the association's committee on
jurisprudence and law reform. The committee members agreed unanimously in
recommending favorably the consensus to the association's house of delegates
on February 17, 1964. The house of delegates adopted a resolution recommending
that the Constitution of the United States be amended in accordance with the
principles of the consensus.
As the problems of Presidential inability and succession have already been
the subject of extensive hearings and study by this subcommittee, and as you
will have further testimony from eminent scholars and experts, it is unnecessary
for me to make any comprehensive statement on the history of these problems
or on the manifest need for appropriate solutions.
My purpose will be merely to present some of the reasons which led to the
principal conclusions in the consensus report.
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The first five sections of the consensus, relating to Presidential inability, are
as follows:
"1. Agreements between the President and Vice President or person next in line
of succession provide a partial solution, but not an acceptable permanent solution
of the problem.
"2. An ainendminent to the Constitution of the United States should be adopted
to resolve the problems which would arise in the event of the inability of the
President to discharge the powers and duties of his office.
"3. The amendment should provide that in the event of the inability of the
President, the powers and duties, but not the Office, shall devolve upon the Vice
President or person next in line of succession for the duration of the inability
of the President or until expiration of his term of Office.
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"4. The amendment should provide that the inability of the President many be
established by declaration lit writing of the President. In the event that the
President does not make known his inability, it may be established by action
of the Vice President or person next in line of succession with the concurrence
of a majority of the Cabinet or by action of such other body as the Congress
may by law provide.
"5. The amendment should provide that the ability of the President to resume
the powers and duties of his office shall be established by his declaration in writlug. In the event that the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet or such
other body as Congress may by law provide shall not concur it the declaration
of the President, the continuing inability of the President may then be determined
by the vote of two-thirds of the elected Members of each House of the Congress."
The first conclusion in the consensus requires no comment. It makes the
obvious point that agreements between the President and Vice President, while
desirable under the circumstances, are not an acceptable permanent solution of
the inability problems.
The second consensus conclusion is an important one; namely, that an amendient to the Constitution should be adopted to resolve these problems. It is true
that scholars differ us to whether a constitutional amendment is necessary, as
many believe that the Congress now has the requisite authority to act. But a
question of tills magnitude and lmliortml(e should not be resolved on a balancing
of opinions. It would be unviNNe to follow a course which could leave the status
of the Presidency subject to doubt aind possible litigation, especially when another
course is available. We are concerned here with the very fundamentals of our
Government-the Office of President and the exercise and continuity of Executive
power. These should be dealt with by ali amendment to the Constitution itself.
The next three paragraplhs of the consensus (3. 4. and 5) deal in principle with
the provisions of sich an amendment to the Constitution. It should be made
perfectly clear that in the event of the inability of the President the powers and
duties, but not time Office, shall devolve upon tile Vice President or person next
in line of succession, and such powers and duties shall so devolve for the duration
of the inability of the President or until the expiration of his term of Olfice. Al
examination of tile sixth clause of section 1 of article II of the Constitution (set
forth iii the footnote below ') will indicate why suh a provision is necessary.
Certain of the ambiguities of this clause have always been a source of difficulty
and doubt. When John Tyler succeeded ill 1841 to the Office of President upion
tile death of William Ienry Harrison, lie set a precedent which has since been
followed without question.
But such a precedent is of little value lii
the event of the inability-rather than
death-of an Incumbent President. The two notable instances of inability, with
which this subcommittee is fully familiar, were in the cases of Presidents Garfield
and Wilson. For some 80 days preceding Garfield's death, and for perhaps a
year during Wilson's Illness, there was a virtual void in executive leadersil).
The Vice Presidents then in office were unwilling to assume the powers and
duties of the President because of grave questions both as to their rights and as
to tile
consequences of such assumption.
It hardly need be said that In the current age, In which our country's responsbilitles and danger are incomparably greater, we cannot afford to run the risk
of another Garfield or Wilson situation. This awesome possibility was In the
mind of every thoughtful person when the news was first flashed oi November 22,
that President Kennedy had been badly wounded.
In view of this recent and profoundly shocking experience, there is now widespread agreement that the constitutional amendment should at least clarify all
doubts as to the development of the powers and duties. There Is somewhat less
agreement as to whether other provisions should be included in the constitutional
amendment itself or should be left to legislation by Congress implementing the
amendment.
Various proposals have been made and many of these have merit.
The consensus report, following a careful review of alternatives by tile conferees,
concluded that it was desirable for the amendment to be self-Implementing on
the basic points.
"It Case of the Renmoval of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or
Inability to disclarge time Powers and Duties of the said Office. tile
Same shall devolve oKi
the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal. 1)path,
Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what oillcer
shmll then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be
removed, or a President shall be elected."
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The specific questions relate to determination of the fact of inability, when it
commences and when it ends. In some instances, especially involving possible
mental inability, these could be difficult and delicate questions.
The consensus report suggests that the amendment itself deal with these
event that the President does not make known his
questions as follows: In tile
own Inability by a declaration in writing, it may be established by action of the
Vice President (or person next in line of succession), with the concurrence of
a majority of the Cabinet or by action of such other body as the Congress may
by law provide.
It will be noted that this recommended procedure leaves the responsibility, in
the absence of further action by the Congress, in the executive branch of the
Government. The conferees were strongly of the opinion that this is compatible
with the separation of powers doctrine of the Constitution.'
This procedure also has important practical advantages. It would enable
prompt action by the persons closest to the President, and presumably most
familiar with his condition. It would also tend to assure continuity and the least
disruption of the functioning of the executive branch.
It is possible, of course, to have an independent commission make the decision
rather than the Cabinet. This possibility was considered carefully by the conferees, and i consensus was reached (for the reasons indicated above) that action
by the Vice President with the concurrence of a majority of the Cabinet has
significant advantages over other methods proposed.
In the interests of providing flexibility for the future, the amendment would
authorize the Congress to establish a different procedure If this were deemed
desirable in light of subsequent experience.
The determination of when inability ends may be even more difficult than
determining its commencement. If there is general agreement that the President
has recovered, and lie so declares in writing, there is no problem. But in the
event the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet (or such other body as
the Congress may provide) should not agree with the President, the proposed
amendment would then require that the question be determined by the vote of
two-thirds of the elected Members of each House of Congress. It will be noted
that if the President has declared in writing his ability to resume the powers and
duties of his office, it is presumed that lie is right. Thus, it would require the
vote of two-thirds of the Members of each House of Congress to overrule such
a Presidential declaration.
Obviously, vital principles of government are involved. The independence of
the executive branch must be preserved, and a President who has regained his
health should liot be harassed by a possibly hostile Congress. Yet, there must
be a means to protect the country from the situation (however remote) where a
disabled President seeks to resume office. It Is believed that the recommendation provides appropriate safeguards for and a proper balancing of the interests
which are involved.'
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION
In the past. the American Bar Association has concerned itself primarily with
the problem of Presidential inability. But in the discussions of the January conference. it became apparent that the subject of Presidential succession was of
equal importance and also merited solution by constitutional amendment. Th,"
consensus contains the following recommendations, both of which have now been
en(lorsed by the American Bar Association:
"(a) 'rhe Constitution should be amended to provide that in the event of the
death, resignation or removal of the President, the Vice President or the person
next in line of succession shall succeed to the office for the unexpired term.
"(b) It i; fiighly desirable that tile office of Vice President be filled at all
ines. An amendment to the Constitution should be adopted providing that
when a vacancy occurs in the office of Vice President, tilePresident shall nominate a person who,upon approval by a majority of the elected Members of Congress meeting in joint session, shall then become Vice President for the unexpired
term."
2 It I,believed that this particular proposal Is similar to that specified in 8.J. Res. 1
pending before this subcommittee and is also an approach previously endorsed by Attorneys

Genern I Brownell and Rogers.
-'rhe President may" he removed by impeachment "for treason, bribery, or other high
crime- and misdemeanors" (see. 4 of art. II). The Senate tries impeachments, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of the Members present necessary for conviction (clause 3 of
art. I). But impeachment is hardly an appropriate proceeding In which to determine
physical or mental inability.

42-68S-65-- 5

62

PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY

The first recommendation merely confirms long-established precedent, namely,
that in the event of the death, resignation, or removal of the President, the Vice
President (or the person next in line of succession) succeeds to the office of the
President for the unexpired portion of the current term.
The second recommendation would provide, by constitutional amendment,
for the prompt filling of the office of Vice President in the event it should for
any cause become vacant. It would provide, quite simply, that when a vacancy
occurs in the Vice-Presidency, the President shall nominate a person who,
upon the approval by a majority of the elected Members of Congress meeting
in joint session, shall become Vice President for the unexpired term.
It is true that this procedure would give the President the power to choose
his potential successor. But with the safeguard of congressional approval,
it is believed that this is sound in theory and in conformity with current
nominating practice. It is desirable that the President and Vice President
enjoy harmonious relations and mutual confidence. The importance of this
compatibility is recognized in the modern practice of both major parties inI
according the presidential candidate the privilege of choosing his running
mate subject to convention approval. In the proposed amendment, the President
would choose his Vice President subject to congressional approval.
Various other plans have been proposed, and several of these were considered
by the conferees and also by the American Bar Association committee. It
has been suggested that the electoral college be reconvened to fill the vacancy.
But the electoral college today performs functions which are largely, if not
wholly, ministerial. Unless there were a major revision in the electoral college
system, it is unlikely that a decision by it would command the requisite respect and support of the people. Moreover, the prompt filling of such a vacancy
is desirable, and the reconvening of the electoral college might well involve
significant delay.
It has also been suggested that a special election to fill the office of Vice
President would be desirable. Here again, there could be a serious question
of delay. A special election by the people would be a new and drastic departure
from our historic system of quadrennial presidential elections and would introduce various complications into our political structure.
In considering any proposal on this subject, it is well to keep In mind that
the office of Vice President has indeed become one of the most important
positions in our country. The days are long past when it was largely honorary
and of little importance in itself. For more than a decade the Vice President
has borne specific and important responsibilities in the executive branch of
Government. In addition, he has to a large extent shared and participated
in the executive functioning of our Government, so that, in the event of
tragedy, there would be no break in the informed exercise of executive authority.
As stated in the 1964 report of the American Bar Association's Committee
on Jurisprudence and Law Reform:
"This committee concurs in the view of the Washington conference that it
is highly desirable that the office of Vice President be filled at all times. We
regard it as essential in this atomic age that there always be a presidential
successor who would be fully conversant with domestic and world affairs and
who would be prepared to step into the higher office on short notice and to
assume its full responsibilities with a minimum of interruption of the conduct
of affairs of state."
CONCLUSION

The vital need is for action which will solve these grave problems of Presidential inability and succession. Discussions of these problems have recurred
down through the years, especially following events in history which dramatized
the need for solutions. But even the interest aroused by the illnesses of President Eisenhower was not sufficient to bring about action. There has been a
resurgence of interest and, indeed, deep concern since the assassination of Presi(lent Kennedy and, once more, responsible voices throughout America are calling
for appropriate action. There has been little disagreement as to the need. The
difficulty has been in obtaining a consensus as to how best to meet the need.
Many proposals have been made and many of these have undoubted merit.
But surely the time has come when reasonable men must agree on one workable method. It is not necessary, as the Washington conferees agreed, that we
find a solution free from all reasonable objection. It is unlikely that such a
solution will ever be found, as the problems are inherently complex and difficult.
It is the hope and strong recommendation of the American Bar Association,
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which we know is shared by this subcommittee, that past differences be reconciled and that a solution be initiated by this session of the Congress. We urge,
that the solution be in the form of a proposed constitutional amendment; such
as, Senate Joint Resolution 1. We believe that Senate Joint Resolution 1,
which is supported by the American Bar Association and a considerable body
of the most knowledgeable scholars in the field-including more than twothirds of the Members of the Senate-contains provisions which are sound and
reasonable and consistent with the basic framework of our Government.
We respectfully commend this proposal to this subcommittee and urge that the
Congress act promptly so that it may reach the State legislatures as soon as
possible. Most State legislatures meet this year but many adjourn before
summer. If a proposed amendment is sent to the States for ratification this
spring, it is possible that the amendment could be ratified this year. We
encourage early action, for that reason.

Mr. BitOWNELL. I have been appearing before this committee and
the House Judiciary Committee on this subject for the last 10 years
so I have not prepared any written statement of views because I think
they are already recorded in the record.
I do want to express my great satisfaction, though, at the able way
in which this subcommittee and the corresponding group in the House
have alerted the Nation to the dangers that are inherent in the present
situation, leaving this critical constitutional problem unsolved. I
think that the constructive work that has been done here in the development of a concise plan for amending the Constitution has been outstanding.
I would like to report that, as the result of our work in the American
Bar Association, we have seen, over the past few months, an increasing public support for this solution. I think it is evidenced here by
the testimony of my colleague in the Eisenhower Cabinet-Marion
Folsom here--as showing the attitude of a nonlegal group, the Committee for Economic Development, in support of the principles which
are embodied in this resolution. I think I can say that that interest
and anxiety is nationwide.
I would like to call attention-I am sure members of the subcommittee are already familiar with the fact that time is of the
essence in this matter because, in the odd-numbered years, such as
1965, practically all of the State legislatures are in session and, in the
even-numbered years, only limited sessions are held in a number of
States. So if the time schedule which is envisioned by these prompt
hearings in the Senate and the House, starting next week, can result
in action early in the session, it might save several months, if not
more than a year, in getting this constitutional amendment actually
enacted. Because I feel quite sure, from the response we have had
from our State bar associations, that there is enough sentiment
throughout the country for a solution of this problem that, once it is
submitted to the States by the Congress, there will be very prompt
action in the State capitals.
If there are any questions that the chairman or members of this
subcommittee would like to pose, I shall be glad to try to answer
them.
Senator BAYM. There have been several suggestions made already
this morning that I would like to get your opinion on.
iThe
preference for a joint session, compared to an individual session, with the problems of rules and one thing or another. The
American Bar Association, as I understand it, is in support of the
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individual Houses acting on this. After hearing Mr. Folsom, would
you care to comment on this?
Mr. BROWNELL. You are correct in your statement that the American Bar Associatioon prefers the present language of the Senate Joint
Resolution 1 in this regard, which would call for the separate meetings
of the House and the Senate. We did that in the belief that it
would speed the consideration of the matter and- eliminate some
procedural difficulties that might arise. That, I think, was the main
thought that we had in mind in preferring this method. It is more
usual and would be a little more orthodox, I thilk, when you look
back over our constitutional history.
Senator BAY1I. I certainly do not want to put words in your mouth
at all but would you say it is fair to feel that public opinion, plus
the good faith of the Members of the Congress, would prevent the
possibility of a Senate filibuster, for example, or one House being in
control oi the opposite political party to the President?
Mr. BROWNELL. I listened to some of the questions and answers
earlier in the session this morning, any number of which seem to revolve around that question, that Congress, with any participation at
all, might be counted on to drag its feet. But I think that that is
perhaps unrealistic because we must picture the kind of a situation
that would be involved if this question ever arose. It would be a
national crisis and not only the eyes of the United States but of the
world would be focused on this particular thing.
I think our public officials always rise to their best heights at a
time of crisis of that kind and, therefore, I would think with the
overwhelming backing of public opinion for a solution of any crisis
to having an orderly government, the Congress could be counted
f a S
upon, without any question, to do its part.
Senator BAYH. Would the same thing apply as far as Senator
Miller's feeling that we need to specify that the appointment of the
eventual successor to the office of Vice President must be a member of
the political party of the President?
Mr. BROWNELL. I am sure of that; yes. I think the same thing would
apply. I think that public opinion vould not only demand quick acton, but the commonsense of the Members of the Congress would make
them realize that they could not perform their constitutional functions
unless they had a strong executive branch prepared to meet all emergencies.
Senator BAYIT. In Senator Hruska's very persuasive discussion and
analysis of Senate Joint Resolution 1, in section 1, it was his feeling
that perhaps there should be some reference to a temporary disposition
of this power to the Vice President.
Mr. BROWNELL. In section 3 is that?
Senator IHRUSKA. Section 3.
Senator BAYIT. Yes, s,-ction 3. Do you see any great objection to
this? The Attorney Ge~iral seemed to think that this was taken for
granted. I just wanted your feeling about what you thought.
Mr. BRowNmLL. I did testify in favor of making it clear, as I think
you mentioned this morning, Senator Hruska, that I thought that kind
of disability should be-considered in the language of the amendment.
In my opinion, the present language does cover that kind of a situation,

PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY

and it would give the Preiident the authority to have the limited period
for the type of situation that Senator Hruska envisions there.
For example, when the President is going to, maybe, undergo an
operation or something of that sort and he does not know how long
he will be under the ether, or he is on his way to a foreign country and
his communications with the White House and the Capitol are very
uncertain-something of that sort-I think the present language is
adequate to cover that type of emergency. In my judgment, that was
taken into consideration Whefi't~i iang(e was formulated.
Senator HRUS§.K Would the Senator y
olrlu e
Senator B0i. Yes.
Senator HRUSKA. Mr. Brownell, would you'
sider, therefore, if
one, he
the Presj 6 ent was undertaking a ti'ip r proposed tb.undertake
would declare his ipalil~ty tA discharge the power or duties of his
office for 10 days -4ie could do that wit-the safe assun tion that there
would be an automatic t~rminaiionjitl 10 dy under t e language as
it pesently exidtsdy
r. BROWNELL. It
nioh,he c9fild do so. I doubt that he
would want to do it iy ite at way because of all the jincertainties
that would be involvd 4nd the full .6wer thAt you girt him in the
amendmentito star tl"atei'sngw me~dyto.come back anl assume the
powers and duties o the office>, S
would&'n
-t be necessary for him
to put that time limit t on, butf h'e chose to do so, I thinlt the present
language of Octiong 3 and
4 is broadeib
h to allow hi/to do so.
Senator HmRUsiX. If Sbmefhi',sh'Aould ajpen to extn, the necessity beyond the 10 days, one o two things would happen. If he were
capable of extending it, he wold do' so; if if6t, sectmo/ 4 would come
7
1
into tl.
I o recall your testimony ast yea,- ahd I felt wfili this assurance,
there would, be a great deal Of comfort given to members of the coinmittee and Cbngress. Thank you, sir.
.7
Senator BAYh-, As a member of the Cabiliet, I would like to have
your opinion on tl'problem of who sh6iuld take the initiative. This
seemed to be a note of difference, in which the Committee on Economic
Development report varies from the senatorial resolution and the one
of the American bar consensus.
Mr. BROWNELL. In. my opinion, the Committee on Economic Development p point of view, as expressed here this morning, is based on
a misapprehension. I have testified before, and I still believe that
either the Cabinet members or the Vice President could take the initiative here, so long as the constitutional requirements of joint action are
met.
Senator BAYIT. Do you have any feeling concerning the history, as
Mr. Folsom pointed out, of showing great reluctance? . Do you feel the
statement I made is right or wrong? I may be in error so far as what
the establishment in the Constitution by an amendment of the formula
would do to future action.
Mr. BROWNELL. Well, I think that you expressed yourself very well
on that. The reluctance of the Vice President to act in the past has
been due to the fact that he was afraid that lie would be considered by
the public to be usurping the office. There was no guidance from the
Congress in the matter. There was nothing in the Constitution and
there was substantial belief throughout the country and among legal
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scholars that if the Vice President took over, he would in fact displace
the President for the balance of the term, that he would be the President, and that the President could not come back, even though he
entirely recovered. You have, of course, cured that difficulty in the
language of Senate Joint Resolution 1, where you provide that the Vice
President would come in only as Acting President for the period of
disability. So that roadblock which was shown at the time of the Garfield-Arthur incident and the Wilson-Marshall situation, and the participation of Lansing, that would disappear. Thlat would be cured
under this constitutional amendment.
I believe that with that roadblock cured, this language is adequate
and sufficient, but that as a matter of practice, either the Vice President
or the members of the Cabinet could take the initiative in bringing
about the situation which this amendment envisions.
Senator BAY1I. Is there anything more that could be done to walk
that narrow line? Indeed it is a fine one, in which I think the Senator
from Nebraska and myself find agreement. On one side of which we
want to prevent the Vice President, upon assuming the powers and
duties, from purging the members of the Cabinet. On the other hand,
we want him, if there is an extended illness, to carry out the powers and
duties; namely, to replace a Cabinet member if there is one who, for
some reason or other, needs to be replaced.
Is there language that can guarantee this?
Mr. BROWNELL. Insofar as language can do so. I know, and I am
sure both of you do know that the men who are involved here, both in
the executive branch and the congressional branch, in time of crisis
will act not as rogues and rascals, but as patriotic Americans, as they
always do and have done in time of crisis, that this will be an orderly
procedure, and, so far as language allows it is entirely adequate.
Senator BAYTI. One other question, and I am sure the distinguished
Senator from Nebraska would like to ask you several. We have gone
into some depth in trying to explore the possible weakness of the
many approaches; namely, the time limitation and the need to act
quickly in the time of disability, and yet the need to act judiciously.
The American Bar Association has supported the use of "immediately,"
as the best word we could find. Would you care to explore that with
us in your thinking? You heard the colloquy that transpired here.
Mr. B'RowELL. I would be glad to try that. I would like to try,
by way of preface, perhaps, to paint the picture that would be involved
there.
You have very wisely provided, it seems to me, that the President
can resume the i)owers and duties of his office at any time that he so
certifies that lie is able to do so. This will take care of well over 90
percent of the situation, so we are talking about here, in section 5,
where the congressional participation comes in, the most unusual
situation. Nevertheless, I think you are wise in tackling the problem
and providing for a solution. But itwould be a most extraordinary
situation.
Now the President, under those circumstances, would not, be likely
to try to resume the duties of the office unless lie was pretty sure that
he had public sul)l)ort, that lie had congressional support, that lie had
the support, of a majority or practically all the members of his Cabinet.
It, would be such a reclkless thing for him otherwise. It would only
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be in a situation of this type where he was mentally unbalanced or
something of that sort, which would be very obvious to everyone when
you consider the white heat of publicity that beats upon the White
House. In that kind of a situation, it follows almost automatically
that there would be strong insistence on the part of the public and the
leaders in the Congress to see that he did not come back. Therefore,
I do not visualize long hassles involved in this, even if this, unusual
situation did arise.
I think that there would be overwhelming opinion one way or the
other that would demand immediate action.
For a particular solution that is in here, the language, "immediate,"
we in the American Bar Association do support the language of the
present Senate Joint Resolution 1, and we believe that this principle
should be kept in mind.
The reason we believe it is because there is a principle that has stood
us in good stead throughout our history, that when you are writing a
Constitution, as Senator Hruska has said, I think, you should keep out
the details, keep out the administrative procedures, look for the long
future, rely on the stability and patriotism of your public officials.
So with all those principles in mind, I think this is an admirable
solution of the problem.
Senator BAYH. I would like at this time to ask consent to have the
statement of the American Bar Association put into the record.
(The document referred to follows:)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE STANDING COMMITTrPEE ON JURISPRUDENCE
AND LAW REFORM, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION

(As adopted by the house of delegates, February 17, 1964)
RECOMMENDATIONS
The house of delegates adopted the following recommendations of the standing
committee on jurisprudence and law reform:

I
Be it resolved, That the American Bar Association recommends that the Constitution of the United States be amended In accordance with the principles set
forth in the consensus of the special conference convened by the American Bar
Association in Washington, D.C., January 21,1964, as follows:
This clause does not set forth how or when it may be determined that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of the office. nor does it
make clear whether the "Office" or the powers and duties of "said Office" devolve on the Vice President In the event of the President's death, resignation, or
inability. The debates of the Constitutional Convention and the State ratifying
conventions offer no conclusive answer to these questions, although they tend
to suggest that the Founding Fathers meant that the Vice President should
succeed to the power and duties only and not the office of President.
In 1841 at the death of President Harrison, Vice President Tyler took the oath
and assumed the Office of the Presidency. This established a precedent which
has been followed by seven Vice Presidents since Tyler. While this practice
of the Vice President assuming the Office of President has worked to establish
a smooth continuity in our executive branch after the death of the President,
it has done nothing to clarify the situation when the President has become too
ill
or disabled to act as our Chief Executive.
When President Garfield was shot and when President Wilson was gravely
ill, their Vice Presidents were reluctant to carry out the powers and duties of
the Office, and for extended periods of time the Nation had no Chief Executive
capable of fulfilling the important functions of the Office. The reluctance of
these Vice Presidents to assume the powers and duties of the Office can be
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attributed to the lack of a clear provision In the Constitution or statutes which
established their right to do so, and to the fear that their assumption of the
powers and duties of the Office would have made them the President and would
have prevented the return of the elected President at the termination of his
disability.
President Eisenhower, President Kennedy, and, it is reported, President Johnson, have sought to clarify the problem by entering Into agreements with their
statutory successors, establishing a procedure by which the successor would temporarily assume the powers and duties of the Office in the event of the inability
of the President. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, in 1I61l, expressed tilt,
opinion that article 2, section 1, clause 6, authorizes the Vice President to act
as President in the event of the President's inability "until the disability be
removed ;" and authorizes the Vice President to decide whether the Presidential
inability exists if the President is unable to do so and emolmwers tie President to
determine when his inability has ended. lie noted that Attorneys General Herbert Brownell, Jr., and William P. Rogers had expressed the same views on the
identical questions in unpublished opinions. (42 Op. Atty. Gen. No. 5 (Aug. 2.
1961).)
But neither tile agreements nor the official opinions referred to have served
to remove tile concern of constitutional lawyers, legislators, educators, journalists, and the public over the vagueness and ambiguity of article 2, section 1.
clause 6, regarding Presidential inability and succession. President Eisenhower's
three illnesses and President Kennedy's assassination have focused attention oi1
tie desirability of removing all doubts regarding a matter so important ill assuring that there will be an unfailing continuity in the office of the Chief Executive. This focus of attention has produced a number of legislative proposals
designed to provide a statutory or constitutional solution to the problem.
The president of the American Bar Association convened a special conference
o0n January 20 and 21 to consider the merits of the various proposals dealing with
Presidential inability and succession. This conference issued a consensus report
recommending that the Constitution be amended as set forth ill the above
recommendation.
The first and perhaps the most important of these proposals calls for a specific
provision that in the event of the disability of the President his pow lS and
duties. but not the Office, should devolve upon the Vice President, thus rviloving
tile ambiguity and uncertainty that in the past have been deterrents to tie ;-.,,orelse of the powers and duties of the office by the Vice President during periods
of Presidential inability.
As we noted in our report In 1960, various suggestions have been na(de as to
the methods of ascertainmnent of Presidential inability, including determination
by the President or by the Vice President or by the Cabinet, or both, or by an
al)pointed commission. or by reference to the courts. Another question which has
received much attention Is how much should be included il the constitutional
anendiment and how much should be left to legislation by Congress implementing
the anlendnent. Il our opinion any one of several inethods would provide a
suitable solution. The vital need is for the selection of some one workable inethod
that will meet with sufficient general agreement to comnnd the supl)ort necessary for tile passage of a constitutional amendment.
(1) In the event of the inability of the President, the powers and duties. but
not the office, shall devolve upon the Vice President or person next in line of
succession for the duration of the inability of the President or until exl)iration
of his terml of office;
(2) The inability of the President may be established by declaration in writing
of tie President. Il tile event that the President does not make known his
inability, it may be established by action of tile Vice President or person nlext ill
line of succession with the concurrence of a majority of tile Cabinet or by action
of such other body as the Congress may by law provide;
(3) The ability of the President to restune the powers and duties of his office
shall be established by his declaration in writing. In the event ilit the Vice
President and a majority of the Cabinet or such other body as Congress may by
law provide sillhl not concur 4n the declaration of the President, the count inning
disability of the President may then be determined by the vote of two-thirds of
the elected Members of each House of the Congress;
(4) In the event of the death. resignation. or removal of the President, the
Vieo President or the person next in line of succession
Shall
succeed to the office
for the unexpired term ; and
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(5) When a vacancy occurs in the office of the Vice President the President
shall nominate a person who, upon approval by a majority of the elected Menbers of Congress meeting in joint session, shall then become Vice President for
the unexpired term.
II
Be it further resolved, That the American Bar Association reaffirm, in principle,
the support of the need for interim statutory clarification of the problem after
the constitutional proposals have been submitted by Congress for action by
the State legislatures, such legislation to provide a remedy while the constitutional proposals are under consideration.
III
Be it furtlicr resolved, That, in view of the manifest need for a prompt solution
by constitutional amendment of the problems of Presidential succession and inability, the American Bar Association urges that State and local bar organizations
support by all appropriate means an amendment to the Constitution of the
United States in accordance with the principles set forth in the recommendations
of the committee on jurisprudence and law reform.
REPORT ON PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY AND SUCCESSION

This supplemental report is submitted at the request of Mr. Walter E. Craig,
president of the American Bar Association, to give the further views of the
standing committee on Jurisprudence and law reform on Presidential inability
and succession.
Jn 1960, this committee and the house of delegates considered the problem
of providing for the temporary replacement of the President when that officer
is unable to carry out the powers and duties of his office. At that time an
amendment to the Constitution was recommended which would have established
a method of determining the beginning and the end of the President's inability
and which would have given the Vice President the mandate to carry out the
powers and duties of the office of President during the period of the inability.
The 1962 committee and association action reaffirmed the request for a constitutional amendment and endorsed specific legislation designed to provide
for the case of the President who becomes unable to fulfill the powers and
duties of his office; and, in 1963, the committee continued to urge that an appropriate constitutional amendment, or legislation, or both, be adopted to deal
with the problem.
The problem is a result of the wording of the sixth clause of section 1 of
article II of the Constitution which provides:
"In case of the removal of the President from Office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said Office, the same
shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by law provide for
the case of removal, death, resignation, )r inability, both of the President and
Vice President, declaring what officer shall then act as President, and such officer
shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed, or a President shall be
elected."
The proposal for the determination of inability by an appointed commission
rather than by the Vice President is grounded upon the theory that the Vice
President may be confronted with a conflict of interest in a situation where
he is called upon to be a judge in his own case in making a determination whether
he shall succeed, even temporarily, to the highest office in the land. The fears
in this regard have not been borne out by our history, for Vice Presidnets
confronted with the problem have been reluctant to assume the duties of the
Office in the fact of disability of the President. The Cabinet, composed of men
appointed by the President and bound to him by political or personal ties or
both. may also be hesitant to act to displace, even temporarily, the Chief
Executive.
The solution recommended by the conference providing that inability may be
established by action of the Vice President or, If there be no Vice President,
the person next in line of succession with the concurrence of a majority of the
Cabinet or by action of such other body as the Congress may by law provide,
has considerable appeal. Under this plan the duty of taking the initiative is
imposed upon the Vice President with the Cabinet or an appointed commission
sharing the responsibility for the final decision. Since the Vice President, under
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the prevailing Interpretation of the present provisions of the Constitution as
illustrated by the opinions of three recent occupants of the position of Attorney
General, now has the sole duty of determining inability where the President
himself makes no declaration, the conference proposal tends to reduce the
responsibility of the Vice President and to require that he share it with others.
The conference proposed amendment would be self-executing in giving this
authority to the Cabinet, although the provision that Congress may by legislation
substitute an appointed commission for the Cabinet affords a desirable degree
of flexibility.
The next problem is how a President who has recovered from his disability
may resume the powers and duties of the office. Under the constitutional amendment proposed by this committee in 1960 and approved by the house of delegates,
this would be determined by such legislation as Congress may from time to time
enact. The conference proposal would make the consittutional amendment selfexecuting, providing in general terms how the problem is to be resolved. The
first provision of the conference proposal is that the ability of the President
to resume his office shall be established by his declartion in .writing. This is
in accord with what seems to be the prevailing view under the present language
of the Constitution-a view supported by Messrs. Brownell, Rogers, and Kennedy.
The conference proposal goes further, specifying that in the event the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet or such other body as Congress may by law
provide shall not concur in the declaration of the President announcing his
recovery, the issue may then be determined by Congress.
The last conference proposal calls for filling the office of Vice President in
the event it should for any cause become vacant. It calls for a constitutional
amendment providing that when a vacancy occurs in the Vice Presidency the
President shall nominate a person who, upon the approval of Congress shall
serve as Vice President for the unexpired term. While come might object to
this solution since it gives the President the power to choose his potential successor, this is not a departure from modern political practice. At the present
time it is the presidential candidate who actually chooses his running mate subject to convention approval; just as here the President would choose his second
in command subject to congressional approval. However, several other plans
have been put forward: (1) requiring the election by Corgress of the new Vice
President, (2) reconvening the electoral college to fill the vacancy, and (3)
the calling of a special election to choose the successor.
A special election by the people would be out of keeping with the present sys.
tem of quadrennial presidential elections and would introduce complications
into the political scene. Election by Congress would have desirable features,
but Congress may be at times dominated by a political party opposed to the
President and in such event would be likely to name a member of its own party
as Vice President, giving the Nation a President and a Vice President of different political parties. The selection of a new Vice President by the electoral
college would probably overcome the last mentioned difficulty, but the electoral
college now performs almost wholly ministerial functions. It does not necessarily command the respect and regard of a majority- of the people and is
regarded by many as a political anachronism.
This committee concurs in the view of the conference that it is highly desirable
that the office of Vice President be filled at all times. We regard it as essential
in this atomic age that there always be available a presidential successor who
would be fully conversant with domestic and world affairs and Who would be
prepared to step into the higher office on short notice and to assume full responsibilities with a minimum of interruption of the conduct of affairs in state.
The committee has two incidental suggestions for changes in the language of
the consensus report. First, the reference to "the Cabinet" should be changed
where it first appears to read "the Cabinet composed of the heads of the departments of the executive branch of the Government," the purpose being to incorporate a more specific description of the Cabinet than appears at any place in the
Constitution as it is now worded. Second, where the term "the President or
person next in line of succession" appears for the first time it should be changed
to read "the Vice President or, if there be no Vice President, the person next in
line of succession," this suggestion being made for the purpose of greater
certainty.
In the light of the January 21, 1964, consensus report of the special conference,
the committee has reviewed the 1960 proposal of. the association for.a constitutional amendment to give Congress the power of establishing a method of tem-
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porarily replacing the President during a period of inability, and the 1962 association recommendation calling for legislation specifically designed to solve the
problem. We find the conference consensus to be in general harmony with our
earlier recommendations on inability, and we concur in the additional conference
recommendation that the office or Vice President be filled at all times. We have
accordingly made the recommendations above concerning amendment of The
Constitution in the manner proposed In the conference consensus report.
JONATHAN C. GIBSON, Chairman.
CHARLES J. BLOwi,
HUGH N. CLAYTON,
RIOHARD E. H. JULIEN,

ALOYSrUS F. PowIM,
WELDON B. WHITE,
Louis C. WYMAN.

Senator BAYH. SenatorrHruska, do you have any questions to ask?
Senator HRusK4.' ot too many, Mr. Chairmanilut thank you very
much.
In the situatfibn of a joint session-br separate sessions of the Housesthere are two 'situations presented. One would be undi~r section 2,
where they elect a Vice President. The other would be aNvote on the
issue of termination of disabil ty. Do you think that it might be feasible to hate a joint's'ession for he firslpurpose, i'hasmuch as that would
require po debate, 4ut simply vote. TLis would allow in one session
the tru electoral voting streOiOh f each 'tafe to b4 expresse instead
of havi g the operation spllt ito two parts?
Mr. fBROWNELt. I ,canenviion tWiat situation.. tlink mechanically,
it couI easily be'done. "
mechi'nica..y.
Senator Hnuat
(presiding). There vould be no rules' t adopt,
would there, if they were precribed in adyancel
I
Mr. BROWNELL. Well, I suppose-you/cld adopt, special yules, but
you would not necessarily do so.
h---tinkthat the dtermin g factor
there, probably, in our thinking'ig this, that weli the Constitution
was originally adopted, the-separate Hours oPCongress,/based upon
the differing. methods 6f representation, one basically1 epresenting
population, the, other basically representing the State< was meant to
be a very genuine factor in our national thinking. ,So that any proposals that are submitted to the Congress, I thinkit is almost inherent
in our system that thal differing basis on whjckthe two Houses of Congress are elected should be kept-in- mind*."" I think that supports the
idea of the separate sessions. I think that those factors should be
considered in voting upon this question as well as others.
Senator HRUSKA. Pursuing just a little further the matter of what
"immediately" means, it has-been suggested that if they do not do it
immediately, the President will step in any say, "aha, they did not
do it immediately, let me take charge.'
Is there that possibility, Mr. Brownell I Might he not have some
different idea as to what "immediately" means than Congress in its
judgment?
Mr. BROWNELL. My reading of the amendment would lead to a dif'

ferent conclusion. Let me call your attention to the language there
of the last sentence:
If the Congress determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of the office, the Vice
President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President. Otherwise,
the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office.
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-1 think that, conltemnpiates5 qiiit
clearly 11111t the Vice President
would ('O-)t( 11111 during thtl deba te.
Setiittoi' I IILusir.. It- says "titltii5('*'' Wiat. (does "ot 1terwise"
Ilteaii ? D oes it imenu4thatt, t lie vote has
1
c1(ollie 2121 it, is int of. t ile t'qulire(1 two-thid ma118ttjor'ity, or. doe's it mewan that, thiey have niot (10110
it ittiuwdiately ?
111r. BalowN-,Ft~.
I (10 not- qpirr1 with il faet t11at, Ct "i1111t10'diately" raises tilho quest ion which youl very pro)perly raised thuis 111l-1
122g. 1 rely not oui it litw vei ilt erjpret at ioul o f t ie Wordl "i112211('(iatteiy,
1
iWit onl thle force of p)hii 0opinion
to) se t hat tils difhelit. quiestion

of ordlerly governmutenit is settled withiin it very p)romptt I11110 i)period.
Senator I IIIISKA. Of ('Oi1'5eSP We ('211 215511tt2(', 21( .1 tink priop~erly
s0, thlant thle nlormlti prlocedure would ho for till Mlenaers of Congress
to ito possessed of good faith1. Bit I call your alttetion resJpecthilly
to thet sit til1tionl-witeo it is ai wold( crisis, and1( thereftore, Yout assmi111 we shall act thus and so. Well, We h11a i'isis here ilint resuilted iii over 20J0,000) 1)e01)e gathering o21 thle Mail of this Nai on's
Capit 'i,

Ilot.witlstanhi

g tile Iitt thait there wits de~lliberate

tliscuis-

sioll, extenldinlg Over' severald mlouiths, of the issue.
NAir. IhtoWNErr1. 18eC00 il1)illt-.
Am I not 'orr'ct, however, ill sayig thtat, the Sentate rules will
allow limitation of debate with two-thirds vote, so tihat if youl got tile
tw~o-thiirds vote t hat is calle
1 f1or' tere in tile, section, YOU get thie twothirds vote for limit at ion of thle debatee? Is that Ilot correct.?
Seitator HilUSKA. That is cor'rect-. If you 1121( two-thirds vote for
0t1tat il1pose, it W1ould lhe, 1)lt nlot without SomeI pl~iminarUy. Ai11(
of ('oi11'se, you get, inlto tilito paestion of wiheth1er1 the prelimtiinary
maneu101vers leading to that wou'd
1(1e
('110ithiii
thle olefitiitioui of "jut1iediately." Because you tttke it ttot ion to take ili) a1 report,, or make
a motion to take up this matter; then you have to have cloture oit
that,. Then you go to thte next step and so 011. So we do get into
so1me 1'2tiiitiis.
.Mr. BR10WNE'LT. My owViI eXperiellCe, Sena1tor, pe-SOllal experience

in this matter, grew out. of tile crisis that. -wats involved in P~resident
Eisenhiower's heart, attack. Of course, like anyone else, I followed
tite Critical situlationl whlich dleveloptedliat the time of President Ki'ennedy's assassination.
In btothl of these itstatices-the one., ats I sity,
I call1 speak from personal experiencee on-the public wats inisistenti
that there be immllediate or'derly transfer of power and thle Memtbers of Congress overwhelmingly took that same p)ositioni.

I believe onl the basis of that recent experience with which we are
all familiar, we can count. on atrepetition of that, kind of pubtIlic op~inionl
and that patriotic Spirit, atiiotig thte Memlbers of botit Houses.
Senator IIUSKA. What is your judgment or comment on the doctrine of separation of powers being violated by reference of tile matter
to Congress, Mr. Brownell?
Mr. BI~owN,;r.,rA. 1, as you perlials you maliy recall, stru-lggled with this
partietilair item in thle proposed constitutional amendment, for a cotnsidorable period of time. At one time, I even proposed, when this
untsual, situation arose, that we should rely on the power of Congress
under the im peachtment proceire. But in thie ensuing debate over
tile years, and tile vrery splendid analyses thiat appeared in the lawv
journials frotni tunie to tinto by constitutional experts, I came to the
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cOnl(C1sioi tliat ill
Ihis o1e areal, there wol(l he greater Confidence on
ie l)art of tle public ihat the right solution "had been reached if
(Xoigress hid
lis
1111111 itit
ho
ot, to iniiiite itto pass upon a
seVere (lisliute within ile execliive branch. It, provides safegulards
against cabls, against charges, however ridiculous they iiiight be,
I lintt, cert t l)ub]ic officials wit hin lihe exectil ire branch were acting for
l)ersomil selfish gitins rather than for the pibliC interest.. Somie
scholars lha\ve recalled i our history the llayes-Tilden situation, not
t disability situation but. o1e of equal critical nature so far as tle

orderly fiction of the Government was concerned, and there it was
necessary fort lie Congress to step in as a last resort.
So 1 have Come to the conc lusion that, this limited function for
Congress in this one particular case is not lhe kind of violation of
the doctrine of separation of powers, which should give us great, concern.

I am a great lbliever, as I think my public statements will show, that
this isone of the most important pillars of our Government, this
separation of powers into three branches. It is only in an unusual
situation, with well-deliiied limitations, as are contained in this proposal, that I would want. to see any trespassing, even on the edges, of
tie supl)ort of that principle of Government.
Senator 1-IRUSKA. )id11our committee consider the l)ossibility-not
1)erhaps the greater likeflhood or lesser likelihood by far-of having
the Senate vot e not by a 68 vote in favor and :12 aga inst the l)roposit ion
that the President is nimble to resume his tiese? ' SIpose it wvas only
(14
or 65? We would have one view here and another view there by such
a narrow
niargin that confusion, chaos, and uncertainty would b~e built
into the minds of the pulhlic. Was that, discussed and considered, find
if so,have you any conlnent on it.?
Mr. Brow NmET. It,
was discuss d and considered at great length.

I

think you are quite right in bringing it into full discussionn here this
morning.
Our opinion is that if there is that munch dissension and uncertainty

and chaos, it,
will be reflected throughout the country at; large. It
wotild be,an absolutely unprecedented situation, and it would arise even
hough the vote was not, taken in the Congress, that the crisis would be
I here )efore the vote was taken, that tle vote itself would not add to
it.

Do I make myeslf clear on that?
Senator ITI1tTSKA. Yes, you do, and it.
is a matter of taking the thing
il lalance.

Again, as you very rightly point out, perhaps in 90 percent of the
cases, as'we goo through the next 500 years or so, very likely it will
never reach the point we consider. It is only in that extreme use.
Yet we put. this tiing into teibasic document of our Government, so
we do like to inq uire into it.
Thank you, Mr. Brownell, for coming.
Mr. IIRXWLL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your patience.
Senator BAY1I. It certainly does not require "patience to listen to
this colloquy at all. It is a very fine contribution.

Mr. Brownell, I want to thank you again. Again I want to make it
very clear that we are deeply grateful, not, only to you, but also to the
American Bar Association, for what they have' done to move its
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further along the road to what we hope is finding in the near future
the best, possible solution to these problems.
''lhank you very much.
Senator IlJIUSKA. Mr. Chairman, Re)resentative Curt in, of Pennsylvania, has sent. word that he is desirous of ilt roduiing a statement.
into the record of these jwroceedings. 1 ask uinimous consent, that
leave he granted him for ti at purpose.
Senator BAYl.
It is certainy Vhat we shall (10.
1 thought for the beitit of those who might be interested in the
rest, of tihe proceedings , those of you who have been with us so long, it
istho intention of the Chair to go ahead is long us there is a witness
who desir s to discuss andl present his views on this muatt er.
1 hl)0 the
delay of yourh1 unch hours will not he a problem.
Mr. Sharp), counsel with Senator I)oddl, has asked for leave to inlco'l)oralt ti hstaement,
t
of Senator 1)odd into the record.
I woull then, following Mr. Sharp, ask Chief Justice Musnianno
if he would give us his views.
It is my understanding that Mr. Martin Taylor is, was, and I think
will be here.
Also, I would like to ask any of the witnesses who might, be next in
line when Congressman Curt in arrives if they will be so kind Is to let,
him make his brief statement so that he may return to the IH)ou1se.
Mr. Sharp, we shall hear Senator 1)odd's views at this time.
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS 3. DODD, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF CONNECTICUT, AS PRESENTED BY DEAN SHARP
Mr. SlImR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Dodd would have liked very much to be here this morning.,
and he expresses his regrets 'that he could not, but he was unexpectedtly
called out of town. This is his statement that lie would like submitted:
Mr.Chairman, first, I want to congratulate you for your able leadership in our search for a solution to the problems of presidential inability and filling vacancies in the office of Vice President.
I am pleased to be one of the cosponsors of this resolution as I was
of the same proposal passed by the Senat e last.year.
The language contained in article II, section 1, clause 5 of the Constitution does not clearly define presidential inability, nor does it say
who shall decide whether or not such inability exists.
It is also vague regarding whether the office of the President or only
his powers are to be assumed by the Vice President.
These constitutional problems demand constitutional solutions, and
I am of the opinion that Senate Joint Resolution 1 is a sound constitutional solution.
I do not believe it. is necessary to dwell on the details or mechanics
of the proposed constitutional amendment, but I would like to describe
briefly what it will do.
It would permit the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet to
determine the inability of a President, if, and I want to emphasize the
word "if," the President refused or was unable to affirm his inability.
It would perinit the President to choose a Vice President subject to
approval by a majority of Congress.
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These provisions reflect a broad consensus of opinion as to what, is
needed. Over the years iutich study and deliberation have been devoted
to it large and varied number of proposed solutions to the questions of
residential inability and succession.
I feel thal, the time for study is long )ast. Of course, there may be
technical changes in theprolosed amendment. Nevertheless, it is now
time for plroml)t, action, as an impressive majority of my colleagues,
and fellow Americans will agree.
Nono of us need to I) reininded of the serious illnesses of President
Eisenhower, or the tragic death of 1Presidlent Kennedy with the result.ing vacancy in the Vice-lh'esidency, to realize ourNation's welfare
and security demand act io now.
We do hatve a l)resideut and a Vice President now, and they are both
healthy, active 111011. But I hope tle present favorable situatiion will
not encourage Congress and the States to put offia decision on this any
longer.
[he security and( welfare of this Nation is not the only thing that
is involved here. The entire free world looks to us for that leadership
which only a fully functioning President and Vice President can give.
Let each one of us act to help make this proposed amendment a part
of the Constitution as quickly as it can be done.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator BAYvi. Thank you very much, Mr. Sharp. 'We appreciate
Senator )odd's longtime interest in and able assistance in this matter.
Senator BAYn. I see that Congressman Curtin has arrived.
Congressman Curtin, will you come forward, pleaseI
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLARD S. CURTIN, A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE EIGHTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Representative CuiTiN. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I very much appreciate this opportunity you have given
me to appear this afternoon. I shall not take much of your time except to say that I have, for a very long period, been interested in this
disability problem. As a matter of fact when I first came to the
Congress, I introduced a resolution. I think 1958 was my first one, and
I have reintroduced such a resolution in subsequent Congresses. The
last one was introduced by me on January 6 of this year,-Hlouse Resolution 129.
Without further ado, I have a statement prepared which I should
like to have introduced into the record in full.
Senator BAYH. That will be so ordered.
(The statement referred to follows:)
STATEMENT OF HoN. WIZARD S. CURTAIN
Mr. Chairman an-d members of the subcommittee, I much appreciate this
opportunity to be heard in reference to this very serious question of Presidential
disability, on which congressional action is long overdue.

Numerous authorities who have devoted a great deal of time to analyses of
the processes under which our Government operates have been struck by the fact
that our Constitution is silent on specific procedures to be followed in the event
of a President's becoming gravely incapacitated during his term of office. This is
a matter of longstanding interest to distinguished scholars who have undertaken
studies of our unique kind of representative democracy.

People in and out of
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Government, and notably Members of the Congrems, over the years have questioned this apparent flaw in our Republic's structure.
Of course, the law does spell out the line of suvessioll to a Chief EXecut lve iII
the event of death. But it is mute with respect to a manner and niitlod of determining the ability or inability of itPresident of tile
United States to discharge
the powers and utles of his otlice in instances where a critical illness or it disability of pK)ssible long-term duration may arise. Indeed, a President. confronted
by such misfortune of circumstance has no clear-cut instructions to whicl lie ill
look for guilalce under the language of our Constitut ion or of exist lig laws.
Article 11, section 1, of tile
Constitution provides that the Vice President shall
exercise tie powers and duties of the President In event of the dent It,
resignat ion,
or disability of the Chief Executive, or his removal from office. To take care of
further contingencies, i series of so-calledi succession acts were enacted by the
Congress. The act of 1886 established a line of succession starting with the Secretary of State ant going through the order of executive departments. Oil
July 18, 11)47, a new law was enacted to bring the Speaker of the House and tite
President pro temiore of the Senate i line of succession ahead of the Cabinet
members. The p)hilosophy behind this action of 1947 changing the line of succession was that the spirit of the Constitution intended clearly that the Chief Execltlve should be til elected official
rather than an appointive one. With this
conclusion of reasoning, I fully concur.
But the knotty question remains: "Who Is vested with certain, sure authority
to arrive at it determination of when is a President not able to discharge thle
powers and duties of his office?" Tie answer Is: "No one, under existing
processes."
I became interested in this problem soon after becoming a Member of tile
Congress, and lursuant thereto, I introduced a resolution for itconstitutional
amendment in the 85th Congress, and I have reintroduced the measure, with
certain mtodifications, in each succeeding Congress. The last resolution that I so
introduced wis oilJinuary (1, 19(65, and is House Joint Resolution 129.
This resolution would establish a unit to be known as tilePresidential Illability Commission. The Commission would have the responsibility and anthority to relieve the President or Acting President of the United States uponn
a determination that lie is not able to discharge p~roesrly tile lMwers
and duties of the office of President, and after any such action, to restore the
President or Acting President to tie assuml)tion of such powers and duties upon
a determination within tie same term of oflce that lie is able to discharge
properly the powers and duties of the office of President."
Tile aforementioned Presidential Iiablilly Commission would be collposed of
eight members, is follows: First, the Chief Justice of the United States, who
would 4erve as Chairman of the Comnission, anti who would have no vote in the
proceedings of the Commission except in the case of a tie; second, the senior
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of tile United States; third, time Secretary
of State; fourth, the Secretary of ti Treasury ; fifth, the Speaker of tile
House
of Representatives sixth, the minority leader in the Hiouse of Representatives:
seventh, the majority leader in the Senate; eighth, the minority leader il tile
Senate.
Five numbers of the Commission would constitute a quorum. Members of the
Commission would serve ns such without comnpensatlon. Any two members of the
Comnilssion could cause the Chairman to convene the group without delay by
communicating ii writing to him, stating that they have sufl(ient cause to believe
that tilt,
Presldent is unable to discharge properly the powers aind duties of the
office. Tie Commission is then directed to seek competent medical advice as to
the condition of the President and his ability to discharge properly said powers
and duties. Should the Commission subsequently determine presidential inability, it is bound to then notify the House of Representat ives and the Senate-If
Congress is then in session-the President andlteiindividual next in line of succession to the Presidency. Thereupon, the Presidential powers all( duties would
devolve upon the individual next in line of succession. The same series of steps
is established for the President's reassumlng the powers and duties of the office
if tile
Commission determines that the disability no longer exists.
I have examined with much interest various otler resolutions which have been
introduced oti this same subject. They provide various methods of handling tile
problem, and they all have much mnerit. Any one of the methods proposed by tile
various Members of the Senate or of tile
House would serve to reiledy an ilperfectlon that for most of our national life has distressed authorities and scholars
of American Government. In tills day of challenge and stress, it Is strongly
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advisable that. the Congress (larify beyond any doubt or uneertainty t I provision
of the Conlstitution with respect to the exeutiol of tile duties of tile President in
lit event, of dlsahbility.

Senator Bt-ii. We appreciate your interest, Congressnan Cartin.
The interest of the 11ouse, of CouriIso, is of equal importfnllce to that of
tlhe Semiate and I wanit, to comp1liment, you on your interest and the
iiit-erest of the chatirmain and the randkinig minority member on the
I louse judiciary Coliljittee. They are going to hold hearings in the
utuure, till([ I trust you will have opportunity then to express your
views to their.
Representative uirtN. 1 certainly shall. I think this is a matter
that is long overdtle ill legislate ion, m(d 1 tm delighted to be able to do
something about, it, at this tilhe.
Thalnk you very much.
Senator BAYIl. (ur

, xt witness will be Juistice Miismalno of the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Justice Musmanno lias had a very
dist-inguished and illustrious career. lie was a. member of the War
Crimes Court in Nuremberg. He has written a boolk, "lProposed
Amendments to the Constitution," and was appointed by President
Kennedy to the Commission on International Rules of Judicial Plrocedulie.

Justice Musmtianno, we are very happy to have you with us.
STATEMENT OF JUSTICE MICHAEL MUSMANNO, OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Justice MUSMANNO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I subscribe to what was stated by our Attorney General Katzenbach in his formal statement this morning. What'I have to say, Mr.
Chairman, will be in the spirit which you have many times indi'aited
that you would like to get the views of those who have given specific
study to this problem .
I have lived with the subject of proposed amendments to the Constitution practically all my adult life. With that kind of a background, I would saiy that the Senate Joint Resolution I is an exce)tionally well-drawn amendment on one of the most vital sul)jects n
our whole structure of Government. If it is adopted )y Congress and
ratified by three-fourths of the States, it will be a strel;gthen ing, revitalizing addition to the dignity, )owver, and democracy-assurance provisions of the organic law of our land.
I have proposeda constitutional amendment on this subject. It
bears the designations Senate Joint Resolution 34, Ihouse Joint Resolution 118, Hotuse Joint Resolution 154, and House Joint Resolution
220.
My proposed phm provided-I am changing the tense, fr. Chairman. When I wrote out my statement, I had it in the present tense,
"l)rovides." In an instant I shall tell why I changed
the tense.
My proposed plan provided that the House and Senate Judiciary
will form a permanent commission which will, on a two-thirds vote,
decide Presidential disability and recovery when the P3resident's health
or circumstantial capacity to conduct his office is called into question.
I did not know until 5 iintes ago of the President's view on this sub42-088,-- 65---
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ject, and I have now here the statement which he sent to Congress,
and naturally and most enthusiastically I accept what the President
says, namelybelieving, as I do, that Senate Joint Resolution 1 and House Joint Resolution 1
would responsibly meet the pressing need I have outlined, I urge the Congress
to approve them forthwith for submission to ratification by the States.

I therefore withdraw from my proposed amendment the plan that
Presidential inability be decided by the combined Judiciary Committees of the House and Senate of the Congress.
I do have another feature to which I shall address myself if the
chairnian will permit me.
I could not help but note in the statement of the President the use
of a word which might answer the problem which the Senator from
Nebraska 0ed, namely, whether "immediately" indicates sufficient
celerity. TIhe word "immediately," if I may humbly expound on that
for just a moment, always depends upon surrounding circumstances.
But the word "forthwith," which the President uses, means almost
instantaneously. Therefore, I would respectfully suggest that in
section 5, the word "immediately" be changed to "forthwith."
I do not think that anyone could possibly misunderstand what is
the intent of that constitutional amendment; namely, that Congress
must proceed without any delay whatsoever to decide the issue--that
is to say forthwith.
The Senator from Nebraska also suggested that possibly section 3
might be clarified a little bit more. ie feared that this would be
confining the contingency indicated to illness of the President. And
of course, as the Chairman recalls, he spoke of the possibility and, I
presume, probability that the President would be making many trips
abroad and that some provision should be made in the event it became
necessary for someone to discharge the duties of his office while he
was away.

May aYsuggest that section 3 could be amended to read and I have
three suggestions and I shall give them in order. "If the President
declares in writing that because of illness or any exceptional circumstance, to be determined solely by the President, he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office," and so on. However, since
brevity should be the cardinal rule of constitutional language, we
can make that shorter, because "exceptional circumstances" would
certainly include illness. Therefore, I would have it read:
"If the President declares in writing that because of exceptional
circumstances, to be determined solely by the President, he is unable
to discharge the powers and duties," and so on.
That would cover every possible, conceivable, contingency where
the Presidential power would need to be delegated to the Vice President. Since, however, section 3 is now written in the present tense
alone, and it indicates or suggests it is only when the President is
presently unable to discharge his duties, thereby inferring or implying
he is already ill-he is already under the effects of an operation-I
think we should have it the future tense as well. So that eventually,
this is the way I would humbly suggest that section 3 might read:
If the President declares in writing that be is or will be unable because of
exceptional circumstances, to be determined solely by the President, to discharge
the powers and duties of his office, such powers and duties shall be discharged
by the Vice President as Acting President.
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Mr. Chairman, the Cabinet determination of alleged presidential
inability is excellent because the men who compose the Cabinet will
unquestionably always be men of noteworthy ability, patriotic devotion, and supreme loyalty to the President. Their fidelity to the
Commander in Chief would never permit them to treat other than
with the utmost conscientious gravity the concept of depriving their
leader, even temporarily, of the powers solemnly entrusted to iim by
the people. At the same time, their profound sense of responsibility
to the welfare of the country would not allow them to treat lightly
a situation which might suggest or indicate that the hand at thehelhn
has temporarily lost its strength to wisely guide the Ship of State.
Now, if you have my l)repaivd statement, the following two paragraphs on page 2 I am eliminating, because, as I indicated before, I
am withdrawhg from my proposal the proposition that the question of
disability be decided by the combined House and Senate Judiciary
Committees of the Congress. But my proposed constitutional amendment, Mr. Chairman, does have a particular feature which is not included in any of the measures which I have studied have and so far
been submitted in the present session of Congress.
The Senator from Iowa indicated that there are 28 different measures before the House on this subject and, of course, we know there
are several before the Senate. None of them treats of the powers
of the Vice President.
I believe that the time has come to bestow, on the Vice President of
the United States, duties, powers, and functions in consonance with
the majesty, dignity, and vital character of his office. We, of course,
know that Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy conferred, on their
Vice Presidents, assignments of moment so that the Vice Presidents
attended Cabinet meetings, became members of various executive
councils, and embarked on long journeys in behalf of the United
States. But all these activities, impressive and undoubtedly beneficial
to the Nation as they were, were performed without constitutional
authority. Under the Constitution the Vice President has only one
duty to discharge before tragedy oi one kind or another calls him to
the Presidential chair itself. That duty is to preside over the Senate,
where he can neither speak nor vote except in a tie--a rarity so exceptional as to be practically de minimis. In 8 years, Vice President
Nixon voted only eight times; that is, on the average of only once a
year.
The vast potentialities of a Vice President, trained, equipped, and
prepared at all times, to take over the most important civil office in
the world, should not be confined to a task which needs fulfillment no
more often than on the average of once a year. Nor is this type of
utilization of power and ability in keeping with what is expected of a
substitute chief officer in any other field of endeavor. In no sphere of
activity-military, civil, commercial, industrial, or fraternal-is a
substitute chief officer held in comparative nonactivity until the momentous event which transforms him into the supreme leader of the
enterprise.
I have served in both the Army and the Navy and I know from
personal experience and observation that the vice commander of an
army, division, or regiment has duties which are indispensable to the
success of a military offensive or defensive, entirely apart from his
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availability for suprenle 'onini1d, should the fortunes of Will- project
him into I hat position. The vice commander renders continuous and
unCeasing assistance to his superior and is so intimately associated
Willi what, his chief is doing tiat, inthe event of emergency, he asstlnlis comn1111d without it br)elk ill tile continuity o1 operation.
'he executive ollicer of at.
ship has momentous zlilt ies indiselnsably
utilized in the navigation, maintenaee, and aggressive and d(leensive
operation of the vessel, entirely tltirt, from taking over command
should(the eap~ta in be stricken.
Tie Vice )I'esident of an iidiust trial corl)oration is lot, a stranger to
the oflico and plants of the coinptiny uiitil le is summoned to direct
the d(estillies of tile entire industrial enterprise, lie wN'orks by the
side of the l)resident of the railroad or steel coutipany or the automobile
liri at till times anti this is qualified, at every and any moment, to
uindertike, with U)-to-date competence, the responsibilities of the
president, should le be called upon to do so.
We, of course, know that the present Vice President is too much
of an activist, too dedicated to the great humanitarian, peace-assuring
prog ram of his Commander in Chief, too absorbed in all the problems
of tie Nation, too determined to use the boundless eneries with which
providence has Sul)plied him, to spend considerable time inertly
anchored in it,nonvoting operation to which lie may not contribute the
encyclopedic knowledge always at his comninand w%'here lie may not,
utilze the mastery of ex)ressin which is his and where his wslomn
mna1y not. be energetically employed in attacking the vast. problems
whIh face the Nation. The present, Vice P resident is too vital it
mnai, mentally and physically, to lose time marking t into. Newspaper
accounts indicate heNwill have many important, jos operforN beynd
the Senate Chamlber but. they tre'not suggested inthe Constitution,
they are not authorized by the Constitution, and the Constitution will
not, breathe legally binding force into those worthy acts when accoiplished, as they will, of course, be accomplished, with all the greaf.
skill and sincerity tie worhi knows lie processes.
I know that your ('0mm ittee, Mr. Chairman, is primarily coneerned
at this tim, with Presdenti inalilitv and filing of va cancies in the
office of Vice President but; since the Vice-Presidlency is the very office
around which your constitutional amnmeint re ves, I would like
to sugn\st, that this is the ideal time to consider aid r'eevalnte the
entire oilice of the Vice Presidency of the United States.
Amending the Constitution is a very serious matter and the number
of amendmnits should be held down to an irreduible mininium.
Sooner or liter, I am positive, and I was never more certain of a future
e vent than in this, Congress will need to take up the matter of extendtng greater powers to the Vice President, providing him with an
establishment of his own, and making provision for an official residence. Why not. do this now, instead of returning to its consideration
a year or tw;,(o
from now, thus increasing the number of constitutional
amnendmnients and at the same time losing the advantage of the constitutional achievements of which the Vice President is capable?
IT'nder my proposed constitutional amendment, the Vice-Presidency
is transferred from the legislative department of the Government to
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thc executiv-e.
ils (uties shall be those which the President assigns
to illil. It isall suillmed 11)in one sentenCe-section 1, which reads:
'The Vice lPresent shall assist the President and the President shall assign
to 11r Vive President such duties as he sees lit.

The Senate, of course, as I provide in section 5, shall elect. its own
P resi dcli it,
and President pro tempore from thi Senate. The Presi(lent
of the Senate will retain all his senatorial powers, relinquishing the
chair to the President pro tempore when he particil)ateg in debate.
We all lknow that the office of Vice President, which was once a
niere appenidage to the Goverlnient, is now an office of colossal significalce, merit, andl honor. When the l)resent Vice President was sworn
ill as Vice President, the entire Senate applauded his promotion from
the ranks of the Senate. Yet, John C. Calhoun resigned the VicePresidency to become a candidate for Senator. Aaron Burr, while
Vice President, became a candidate for Governor of New York. John
Adams, while Vice President, said:
gentlemen, I do not know whether the framers of the Constitution had In
view the two kings of Sparta or the two consuls of Rome when they formed it;

oie to have all the power while lie hehl It,
and the other to be nothing * * *.
I feel great difficulty how to act. I am possessed of two separate powers; the
one in esse and the other in posse. I am Vice President. Illthis I ant nothIng, but I may be everything.

Regardless of the slight nierit assigned to the Vice-Presidential
office during the first 50 or 60 years of our Nation's life, we all know
how it looms agains the horizon of our national greatness today.
John Adams' allusion to the two consuls of Rome was interesting,
but it,
imist, be remembered that the Roman consul second in rank, instea d of being nothing, had ext ensive powers.
We have here the extraordinary case where the office has outgrown
the temple of the Constitution, so that. the occupant must work outside
in tie cold and the wet of unconstitutional authority.
I respectfully submit that the roof and the walls of the Constitution be extended to fully enclose the lowers which we know should and
must be inherent in the Vice-Presidency. Thus the Vice President
will be enabled to toil untrainmneledly, with all his wonderful energies
and talents, in projecting forward at all times, at the side of the President, the beautiful destiny of this beloved and great Nation of ours.
Senator BAYH1. Mr. Justice, thank you very much for your profound
statement. As you know, getting two-thirds of the Senate, plus twothirds of the House, in support of anything, let alone a constitutional
amendment, is not easy.
Justice MUSMANNO. I know.
Senator BAY. For this reason, it might be the judgment of the subcommittee that the ultimate solution to all executive weaknesses or
iml)erfections cannot be accomplished in one constitutional amendment. In your discussion of disability, you feel that "forthwith"
would be bet ter terminology than immediatelyly?
Justice MUSMANNO.

Yes.

Senator BAYI!. You seem to indicate that "forthwith" would indicate congressional action almost in the blinking of an eye.
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Justice IXhTRMNANNO. I believe that, the action must be fast, Mr.
Chairman. I know that ini the military they very rarely use the word
"ininediately." You tire supposed to be acting forthw.Nith, as soon as
the order is given.
Senator B ,,n. We got into the colloquv this mlorning-I think
you heard most of it-in which we were discussing "iinnediately."
In the use of "forthwith," let. us assume the need for Congress to
make this determination. Upon the need arising, what. activities
would be permitted as you, in your judicial knowledge, interpret, the
word "forthwith"?
.Just ice MUSMANNO. It would mean that the Congress should forthwith be convened and forthwith consider the subject, at ihand-ot
long deliberations as to when they should meet; not the long list of
committees to e appointed, but without any delay whatsoever-with
celerity that is demanding.
Seniltor BY1,. Would this permit the calling of medical witnesses, the consultation with members of the Cabinet, close l)ersonal
associates, and with staff members of the President?
Justice MUSMANNO. We would assume that by this time, Mr. Chairthere would have been medical examinations, medical rel)orts,
an,1
and tie Cabinet members would have undoubtedly have exl)ressed
themselves.
Senator BAwmr. They would have had to sulport this move or the
President could not have brought it to pass. I he only way section 5
could ever be brought into use is for a majority of the Cabinet to
have agreed with the Vice President that the President is unable to
perform and that the President does in fact. wish to contest this
joint decision by the Vice President and the Cabinet.
Justice MTTSMANNo. That is right.
Senator BAYh. You would say "forthwith" would still permit a
compilation of sufficient evidence upon which Congress could make
a determination?
Justice MITSMANNO. Oh, yes.
Senator BAYi. And a reasonable amount of discussion, debate
on the subject, in the Congress?
Justice MUSMANNO. Yes. The word "immediately" is always Interpreted in view of surrounding circumstances, and it is more flexible. It would allow the individual who is commanding thle operation to call a meeting next week or 2 weeks from now for the sake
of convenience of the Members of Congress. "Forthwith," I think,
would exclude that kind of consideration of convenience.
We have before us in the word "forthwith" the ringing of a bell,
of an alarm bell, that something must be done at once. "Forthwith"
is at synonym of "at once." I do not think that "at once" could be
place in the category of "immediately." I think "at once" comattention which youi do not, get in the word "limmands a, celerity
mediately."
On the subject, Mr. Chairman, with regard to the possibility of a
coup d'etat by a Vice President, because that was mentimed, it
occurred to me that that could never happen. The suggestion was
made, the fear was voiced that the Vice President could, by dismising members of the Cabinet,, thereby mold the situation to satisfy
his own will.
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Well, the Vice President has no power to act as a president until
the Cabinet would already have acted.
It is only a-fter the Cabinet, by itmajority vote, has decided that he
should act'ls President, that, lie has aliy po 'oWr
whatsoever.
Seuiator l.kyl. 1 think the thing we are concerned about, Justice
Musnino, is suppose the Cabinet should vote and not be unanimous,
lien the Vice President, upon assuniing the powers and duties of the
Ohice, should promptly, for one reason or another, replace those who
(lid not vote with the majority. So, event if his position should
change, his position would 6e lore solid with the new Cabinet than
when he took over.
,just-ico MuTs.%rNNO. I would think in a situation like that, Mr.
Chairman, constitutional uiiorality would le the compass of the conscientious discharge of the duties on the )art.of the Vice 11 resi(lent
and the members of the Cabinet. I have enough faith ill our system
of governmentt, and in the men that would be appointed, that, the
interest of the people would not be jettisoned for l)ohtical exl)e(hiency.
Senator 11xvii. I agree. I am not concerned tiat ihe Cabinet and
the Vice President would act for a coup d'etat because the Vice
President, unless le is new, is going to be looking into the future and
lie is going to be very reluctant, to act out of bounds.
Thank you very much, sir, for your contribution to the subcomn.nittee. We appreciate your taking the time.
Justice MSjtANNO. Ido want to express the hope that it, will be
clear that I have withdrawn from the statement ny espousal of the
plan to have the disability question sent, to the Judiciary Committees,
and t his, in no way, suggests any lessening of faith in and admiration
for the Judiciary Committees of the Senate and the House.
Senator Rn'it. I am certain neither committee will interpret it.
that way and the record is abundantly clear that you have amended
your.original proposal.
Tiha nlk you.
,Jlustice'MusANNo. Thank you, sir.
Senator BAYi. The next. witness will be Prof. Robert ])easy, who
is an associate professor at Providence College, who comes highly
recolmnended by my colleague, Senator Claihorne Poll, of Rhode
Island, who has been very interested in this whole subject. We appreciate Professor Deasy's willingness to appear here, as well as Senator Pell's interest in the subject.
Without objection, I shall ask that this transcript of the very fine
background of Professor Deasy be made a part of the record at this
point.
(The document referred to follows:)
EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND OF RonmT L. EASY

Providence College, 1949-53, A.B.: President, Theta Chapter Delta Epsilon
Signia, 1953; graduated Summa cum Laude (scholastic average 4.0).
Fordham University, 1953-54, M.A.: Completed all requirements In 1 year
(scholastic average 3.4) ; degree conferred in absentia February 1955 (returned,
took three courses summer 1956).
U.S. Army, 1954-6: Instructor, Ordnance School, Aberdeen Proving Ground,
Md., 195r O; awarded Certificate for Noteworthy Service (first time granted),
June 1956.
Providence College, 1956-44: Instructor, 1956-49; assistant professor, 195903; associate professor, 1963.
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Courses taught: "Survey of Western European History, Survey of U.S.
History, Modern American History, History of Presidential Elections, Diploniatic History of the United States, English History" (undergraduate division,
evening division, summer session, and one semester University of Ithode IslandNewport Division).
Committees and societies: Theta Chapter, Delta Epsilon Sigma, secretarytreasurer, 1957; Johannine Society, moderator, 1957; Committee on Studies,
1960-61: Student!Faculty Committee, 1963; assistant coach, Lacordaire Debating Union, 1958.
Rhode Island Civil War Centennial Committee, 1960; chairman, subcommittee
on education.
Rhode Island Social Studies Association, 1960--1.
Providence Visitor Vatican Council Essay Contest Committee.
Other activities: "Operation Schoolhouse," WJAR-TV, 1956-60; "The World
Around Us," WJAR-TV, 1960-61; "Operation Learning," WPRO-TV, 1964.
Publications: Book review, "Men To Match My Mountains," Providence
Visitor, January 1957. Editorial, "The Electoral College Has Functioned Well
and Continues To Do So," Providence Evening Bulletin, March 1962.
Guest lectures: Holy Name Societies: Communion breakfasts, 1957, 1958,
1959, and 1963; monthly meetings, 1960, 1962, and 1963.
School history clubs: 1961, 1962, 1963, and 1964.
Providence College: Johannine Society, 1957, 1959, and 1963; Theta Chapter,
1963 and 1964.
Present status: Sabbatical leave from Providence College.
Pursuit of studies: Doctor of philosophy in history at Boston College, Boston,
Mass.
Field of concentration: The Presidency of the United States.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT L. DEASY, PROVIDENCE COLLEGE
Mr. DEASY. First of all, in lieu of the testimony of the last witness
and his very astute statement, I feel somewhat embarrassed, at my

age, in comparison to his, coming before you and, also, some of the
things I shall say are quite different from the testimony of witnesses
heretofore included in the record. However, I would like to make
these statements, at the conclusion of which I shall feel free to have
you ask any questions and I shall try, to the best of my ability, to
answer them.
First,, on behalf of myself, as a member of the History Department
of Providence College, and through the courtesy of Senator Claiborne
Pell, of Rhode Island may I thank the members of this subcommittee
for the honor and privilege of speaking here today.
Presently, I am on sabbatical from the college studying at Boston
College. Having taught a course for 9 years on the "History of Presidential Elections," I have always been deeply interested in the problem
of succession and have just completed a seminar report on the topic.
The office of Vice President was created after much debate in the
waning weeks of the Constitutional Convention and was given only one
specific duty-that of presiding over the Senate. The problem of
succession after the Vice President, and of disability as well, were left
in the hands of Congress. Three times various Congresses have estabI ished a I ine of succession but only after long debate and the creation
of some bad feelings and various constitutional questions.
Only the act of 1792 was passed in what might be considered a
political vacuum. Representative Livermore was not worried about
the problem saving that the death, resignation, et cetera, of both the
President and the Vice President wouldn't happen in a hundred years.
In 1192, this seemed, evidently, like an alternative. Representative
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Burke was even more optimistic saying such a contingency wouldn't
happen more than once in 840 years.
Various proposals were made and rejected, one by one, until the
President pro tempore ofthe Senate and Speaker of the House were
finally chosen as the possible successors. With the caliber of men such
as Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson, then in the Cabinet, it
was obvious that politics did play some part in the deliberations as
contemporary testimony indicates.
With all its drawbacks, however, the plan was consistent with tradit ion on the State and prior to that on the colonial level.
By that I mean to say there was notlhing untoward in going into
the legislative branch to get a successor. It had been done.
With Congress completing its term, however, or political problems
arising from time to time there were occasions in our Nation's history
when neither of these congressional offices was filled. The act of 188"7
alleviated this prol)lem to some extent when it declared in favor of
members of the Cabinet in the order of the origin of the office. However, this tended to make the office appointive rather than elective
which was the original intent of the Constitution.
Historically during the 19th and through the early years of the
20th centuries the Secretary of State had been the second most iml)ortant figure in the party but with the stresses and strains of the
modern age, the creation of the Department of the Interior to assume
some of the heretofore Secretary of State's responsibilities, et cetera,
the Secretary's position was more attuned to foreign affairs and his
political stature was somewhat reduced.
It is superfluous to go into some of the personality conflicts that led
to the act of 1947. We are a political people and'it is impossible to
completely divorce constitutional developments from actualities. Yet
this is a perennial cry raised against all the acts passed thus far and
one not to be taken lightly. I admit that this is a sketchy outline of
the succession question aid will be glad to entertain questions on this
matter after completing this statement.
Examination of the records of the Constitutional Convention shows
it is obvious that even less consideration was given by the 1787 Convention members to the disability question. I firmly believe this cannot be ascribed to ignorance or malice on the part o? the farmers.
Surely, if their other writings are considered they were quite conversant with English and Roman history with all the examples of
leaders in these areas facing mental and physical handicaps, usurpation
of power, et cetera.
I believe they were wise in shunning that matter while they did
speak of some sort of succession. Many (if the framers also took public
or private part in the deliberations of the 1792 succession measure.
They may not have agreed on the particular line of succession but
most were in agreement that something along that line should be done.
This was in keeping with their constitutional mandate: establish the
Government but don't try to accomplish too much.
To draw up a list of physical and mental points for automatic disqualification would have been foolish in 1787 as it would be at any other
time. Law and medicine do not always overlap and any legal or
medical cabal would be always poor policy. The only limitations of the
Presidency were permanent, and rudimentary; age, residence, place of
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birth. To tamnper with these would possibly mean a "(lynastic" feud
possibly between the President and the Vice President, or possibly an
executive legislative impasse.
All of tle se would tend to diminish the most important elected official in the world, the U.S. President. I believe the present "agreement" status between the President and Vice President is sufficient.
To make it permanent, may at some time in the future paralyze rather
than expedite an emergency. It is a historical fact that words and
phrases of our Constitution have been interpreted at. a later date that
would have amazed the original designers. Originally the Vice President was supposed to be the. second most popular and second best man
in the country ; his power was greatly diminished by the passage of one
aiendnient, the 12th, and possibly you will make him all powerful
by this amendment, the 25th.
Regarding the proposed legislation itself, however, may I congratulate you all for your diligent efforts and I trust that the amendment in its final form may be the most thoughtful, equitable, and
permanent measures passed.
Before getting to the specifics of this present amendment may I say
that the awful tragedy of the death of President John F. Kennedy on
the streets of Dallas 14 months ago alerted everyone once again to the
ever-present danger of such a contingency arising. The theme of
the Speaker of the House being "only a heartbeat away from the
White House" has been echoed and reached time and again in news
media throughout the land. "Time is of the essence" is another cry,
but may I fervently say that Divine Providence has been good to our
land in sl)aring for then new President Johnson through the unexpired
term of John F. Kennedy, so that now once again the two top executive
positions are filled.
The urgency of legislation is still obvious but there is no longer
the aura of "panic" legislation. This could well have been ascribed to
any legislation passed before January 20 of this year and may I speak
with some authority when I say that historians would be the first to say
this in future years if anything untoward would have happened.
To examine some of the specifics of the measure may I say that
section 1 is excellent. The idea that the Vice President shall become
President clears up a problem originally created by the Constitution
and further confused by the 12th, 20thb, and 22d amendments. The
idea,if I may read it, the Vice President shall become President-there
is no wording here regarding "act as President," "assume office and
powers," and so forth-he becomes the President. This is good.
This consistency is not maintained however throughout the length
of the amendment.
Section 2 fails to give any time limit as the legislation of the last
session of Congress did when they indicated a 30-day period. We may
safely assume that a question of such moment Senate and House rules
will assure a large if not complete turnout for the vote but can we be
sure.

In such a moment of crisis it would be on the interest of the entire
country prescinding from party affiliation but can we predict that
there will never be party, sectional, or personal differences that may
develop to frustrate the aims of this section..
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It has been indicated in previous testimony here today that patriotism will rule the day. I trust that it will. But again, we do not want
to be caught short. We do not want to pass legislation where, unfortunately, if patriotism does not come to the fore, we may be stuck with
an embarrassing situation. There may be a time when party, sectional,
or personal differences may develop to frustrate the terms of accession.
Section 3 uses the terms 'powers and duties" and "Acting President"
rather loosely. Supposedly this was settled by the acecssion to power
of ,John Ti ler in 1841 yet it has been reopened again and there is the
ever-present argument among authorities that terms such as "The
President shall assume" and so forth are not interchangeable.
Also, what if personality conflicts frustrate a fully recovered man
from reasserting his rightful position. Some of these points may seem
quite hypothetical but of such things are great constitutional argumnents made.
Senator BAlIY. May I interrupt your statement ?
Mrl'. l)EASY. Yes.

Senator BAYH. I do not have a copy of your statement, before me;
therefore, it is difficult for me to follow you.
I thought I would mention at this point., or I might. not get it into
precise context, I am wondering what you are referring to as far as a
personality conflict preventing him from reassumning the powers, and
iow would you give him other protections than we have given him,
requiring the majority of the Cabinet to support the Vice President,
p)lus two-thirds of the Congress?.
Mr. DEAsY. Again, I was going to indicate here the idea of the
agreement tlhat we have. The legislation as pieced together here seems
to take care of all difficulties. We must have a majority of the Cabinet,
Congress will enter into the discussion, and so forth. 'Yet there mayI keep emphasizing that wordl-there may be at some time in the future,
and I trust there never will be, a time when the Vice President may
lave quite a bit of influence or sway over the members of the Cabinet.
There have been opportunities or there have been occasions right after
the Civil War, where a majority of the Congress were at least in certain instances violently opposed to what the President then was trying
to do. I admit these are extremes. But the whole point under consideration here is that although you are trying specifically to alleviate
a problem by a specific remedy-we must check with the Cabinet, we
must check with Congress-we might create one rather than clarify an
issue.

As I indicated earlier, I would prefer the agreement status to remain.
Senator BAY1T. Just the agreement?
Mr. DEASY. The private agreement which again would change, possibly, vith the Presidents; the agreement of Eisenhower with Vice
President Nixon, the agreement now between President Johnson and
Vice President Humphrey.
Senator BAYI1. Of course, this deals with one of the two problems
with which we are most apt to be confronted-namely, the President
feels himself slipping and know s he must have relief for the sake of
the country. The other would be where something happens quickly
to the President and the Vice President could with very little dispute
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with the concurrence of a majority of the Cabinet assume the powers
and duties of the office.
The object would be the difficult situation which former Attorney
General Brownell and my colleague, Senator Hruska, seem to be at
least in agreement on, where this would be a situation you might have
at some time. The private agreement does not cover either of the
two.
J)o you understand it?
Mr. DEASY. I agree.
Senator BAY1I. I think it does cover one, the second one, in which
the Vice President can take what action he feels is necessary under the
circumstances, but it does not cover point 3. In other words, under the
private agreement, the President has uncontrolled, unqualified authority to say, no matter if he is at that time a raving maniac, to say, "I
am vell."
Is that the way you interpret it?
Mr. DEASY. As I say, these problems, if we are tying ouselves
now down to a specific, a constitutional amendment which automatically will become the supreme law of the land, there may be
contingencies that we cannot envision today that may not be covered.
Whereas, each administration that comes in, whether it be a Republican administration or a Democratic administration, I would prefer
to leave that particular thing out, let the President and Vice President at the time work out some kind of agreement.
The question has been raised before that this might lead to some
kind of a court case or a constitutional test. But if we have this
prticular amendment to the Constitution, then this is the supreme
law of the land and we may find ourselves in a bind where the Constitution does not really settle the issue at all.
As an example, I referred a little earlier to the passage of the 12th
amendment. The last witness made an excellent case for updating, more or less, the office of the Vice President. It should be expanded. He made reference to businesses who had active vice
presidents. Yet in the same spirit of trying to alleviate a problem,
in 1803, the framers of the 12th amendment solved a problem
but created another, a larger problem. The party system had
developed, so they decided to have separate votes for President and
Vice President-all to the good, but in so doing, they took the office
of Vice President and practically dissolved it.
And the debates, as shown in the annals, were very prophetic.
I can remember one offhand, Representative Griswold saying that
if this happened, the office of the Vice President would be taken into
the marketplace to be sold to the highest bidder, to become a sectional thing or a large State-small State combination to try to win
the Presidency. And history has shown us that throughout most of
the 19th century, there is a lot of historical actuality to attest to the
fact that there were balances made between the Vice President and
the President.
Also, it is rather obvious that the office of Vice President was not
the second most important position, in the country in those days.
Rare are the students who can name the Vice Presidents, let alone
the ones who unsuccessfully ran for the office.
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Senator BAYH. I am not disagreeing with you at all. The 12th
amendment needs to be revised. Certainly, the office of Vice President is no longer what it used to be. That is one of the reasons we
feel impelled to do something, to see that we always have a Vice
President, not necessarily that lie only succeed to the Presidency, but
that if he does not, the President needs him to help carry on these
duties.
But I still want to explore how you feel that a President and
Vice President can, at some future time, come to an agreement. They
are not going to make that agreement until a crisis descends upon
them.
In other words, we are talking about health, the ability to recuperate.
Mr. DEASY. I would prefer that each-again, I do not think it
needs the passage of a constitutional amendment,--that each Vice
President and President, upon the assumption of office, on January 20
of every fourth year, would then, assuming that no problem has
immediately or forthwith developed, they would work out some
sort of an agreement, that this be known to them and more or less
known to the country. I would prefer-as I say, the office of
President without a doubt today is the most important elected
position in the world.
No. 1, I think, therefore, lie should be allowed to work out some
sort of a plan with his successor, the Vice President, in case of any
emergency, and regarding-well, I have more to say about it in my
statement.
Senator BAYH. Yes, continue with your statement, and pardon my
interruption.
Mr. DEASY. I am glad you asked the questions.
Sections 4 and 5 pose two problems. We must always guard
against political chicanery or personal feeling on the part of the Vice
President who is so powerful under these conditions. The second
problem is again one that has never been tested but can the office of
President, the most powerful in the world, be put into a state of suspended animation?
Can a President who has surrendered his "powers" even though
temporarily, reassert them? The Founding Fathers and the men involved in the act of 1792 were vehement in their maintenance of
the idea that this was strictly a temporary move.
These problems raised may be valid or not; it is up to you to decide.
Now we get to the heart of the matter; that is, the person who succeeds. Although the electoral college is an indirect approach, the
President is supposed to be an elected entity. This idea was frustrated by the 1887 law but was one of the major considerations in the
1947 law. I admit that if this amendment is passed it does become
the supreme law of the land yet the same thing may be said of the
12th amendment, which has caused consternation ever since.
Other proposals have been offered. The idea of reassembling the
electoral college upon the death of the incumbent has all sorts of inherent difficulties. As it meets on the State level, local politics may
interfere. Some of the original electors may have died und the
legislature and/or Governor may no longer be of the same party in
control when the electors originally met.
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As early as 1881, Representative Hammond of Georgia envisioned
three Vice Presidents and in 1886 Representative Dibble of South
Carolina suggested two; a plan reechoed by the then Representative
Mike Monroney in 1947 and more recently by former Senator
Kenneth Keating of New York.
The argument that no one would be willing to run for such an office
is widely mentioned, but in lieu of what the last witness said, the
increase in power and responsibility now enjoyed by one Vice
President has limited his time and there seems to be enough qualified men who are willing to adopt their party's mandate in this
regard.
Surely if the position is made appealing there will be enough candidates. Few have been the instances of a man refusing to run for
the Vice-Presidential office as it now exists. I can only list offhand
approximately four.
I believe the same could be said of a second Vice President if the
position were available and made important. This would make the
man known to the electorate before the election and prevent the
possibility of the incumbent naming a man who would be generally
unacceptable to the country at large although approved by its representatives in Congress for one reason or another.
If I might digress for just a moment, I do not mean to impugn
the motives or patriotism of Congress for one minute on this, but
an occasion may arise where there has been a bitter internal problem
or a bitter controversy between the Executive and the legislative,
and there may be--there may be an impasse.
Possibly you may consider my line of reasoning out of order as
this is no longer a part of this amendment but I suggest it as a
substitute. There are undoubtedly good reasons why you may find
my ideas unacceptable but I trust that you will give them your fullest thought. I would also prefer that the disability concept be kept
as is under the "agreement status--changed, expanded, brought upto-date or refined with the various new administrations that will
come in every 4 years.
Whatever your final decision may it be accomplished amicably
and justly without any consideration of offices and people holding
them at any given moment. Even the office of President has been
occasionally filled by men of less than superior qualifications yet we
don't consider abolishment of this office because of it.
Let us never be guilty of throwing out the baby with the bath.
Senator BAYTH. May I attempt to summarize quickly, as I have
understood it, your statement and we shall look to the record again,
when I have more time to consider what you have said at a slower
pace?
Mr. DEASY. Yes.
Senator BAYH. You feel that the problem of disability is adequately handled in the private agreement between the President and
Vice President?
Mr. DEASY. I think 'that it is or can be--or can be--without a constitutional amendment.
Senator BAYII. You see no concern about the possibility to which
you alluded, that this would be subjected to a court test only at a
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time when the Nation is confronted with the crisis. This does not
concern you?
Mr. DEASY. I would expect, as was mentioned by some of the witnesses before, the patriotism of the hour would acquiesce in the
decision, if the President were disabled and the Vice President moved
in. I think the Nation would accept that.
My only problem is it is more a matter of means than end. I think
it is basically an executive problem. Therefore, I think the executive
branch, and in this case, by "executive branch" I mean Vice President and President themselves, would be able to adjudicate the problein a little better. I admit the Congress is brought in directly by
the electoral college and so forth, but I trust that the more separation
of powers we have, the better off we may be.
As I say, 99 percent of my case is based upon hypothetical situations, suppositions of what may happen. But the more laws that
we make, the more amendments that we make, when we try to tie
down these to much, we may get ourselves into a very serious
situation.
Senator BAYH. May I suggest that you have been thinking of
hypothetical examples, but in the worst hypothetical example, you
apply your own reasoning, namely, that you are relying on the good
judgment and reasoning of the public of the country, as well as the
implications involved. You could come up with almost impossible
solutions, the Captain Queeg arrangement, for example. As President Eisenhower suggests don't you have to assume you are dealing
with reasonable men.
Only then can we reach a solution. Now, part 2-you suggest
then, as I understand it, the election of a second Vice President?
Mr. DEASY. Rather than the appointing, if the Vice President dies
and the President is to appoint a successor, I think that this tends
to frustrate the original framers of the Constitution.
Senator BAYII. Of course, as you know, you have to get the ratification of the election by the Members of Congress.
Mr. DEASY. Oh, right. As I said, that is where my plan would
necessitate, one, an amendment different from your plan, but, B, the
heart of your proposed amendment or the committee's I would leave
as is under the Executive arrangement. I would try to alleviate
the present problems, or the problems that may develop by, No. 1, the
creation, and therefore, a constitutional amendment would be necessary, the creation of an automatic successor standing in the win-a,
elected by the people indirectly through the electoral college, who
will be groomed, we would assume, for the position, whom everyone
would know about beforehand.
Senator BAYI. You are aware, of course, of some of our feelings
that now the office of Vice President has developed to a full-time
job and is not like the description Adams and the rest gave Co it;
that it would take long, hard thought before you would further
dissect this power. But you argued the opposite side and did it very
well.
Mr. DEASY. May I just say on that, I do not think, in lieu of what
some of the previous witnesses said, and because of their background
and experience, and organizations which they represent, more than
likely-and I would certainly acquiesce in it 100 percent-the amend-
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ment as proposed here in Senate Joint Resolution 1 will pass. But
my main point in my appearance here today is I would like to go
on official record as my main interest being that I do not think, No. 1,
we should be hasty. I think we are very fortunate in the fact that
nothing happened to President Johnson between November of 1963
and November of 1964.
And also, if legislation is not absolutely, positively necessary, possibly-possibly-we can do without it.
Senator BAYH. I agree. I do not believe in legislation just to go
through the activity. Some of us feel that the actuarial tables are
going to catch up with us. Although what our constitutional forefathers said-we would not lose both the President and the Vice President in a hundred years-is true: we are rapidly approaching the
second hundred years, and history has been trying to tell us something and we hadbetter listen.
I appreciate very much your coming. I appreciate the thought and
research that has gone into your testimony. I want to read -it over
again.
Mr. DEASY. May I just say, on behalf of myself and Providence
College, I want to thank you for the privilege of appearing here
today.
Senator BAYIT. Thank you.
Our final witness today is Mr. Martin Taylor, chairman of the Committee on Constitutional Law of the New York State Bar Association,
member of a distinguished New York City law firm and, as I said a
moment ago, a man who has given a great deal of thought to this
l)roblem.
STATEMENT OF MARTIN TAYLOR, NEW YORK STATE BAR
ASSOCIATION
Mr. TAYLOR. After what you have said, Mr. Chairman, I am embarrassed to exhibit my ignorance.
Senator BAYII. The chairman is not convinced that that will be the
result.
Mr. TAYI'oiI. There are really two proposals in your proposed amendment. The first is to provide that there shall always be a Vice President. That is the new idea of the discussions that have taken place
over the last 5 or 6 years. It is one that I think everyone approves of.
I have as to that only one question-why does it not provide for the
period between election and inauguration'?
Senator BAYT. May I answer the question?
Mr. TAYLOR. Yes.
Senator BAYH. I am certain you have read the message that the
President sent to Congress. He suggests, and I intended to pursue, I
hopelto consummation, that this matter be dealt with. The reason we
did not include this in the present measure-in fact, I think Senator
Monroney is one of those witnesses who came before us last year who
suggested that we should deal with this on a comprehensive basis. We
did iiot do so and have not done so because constitutional amendments
being what they are, requiring two-thirds of each House plus threefourths of the legislatures, are difficult to pass. For instances, I might
be in favor of the part on Vice-Presidential replacement, but I am op-
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osed to the disability provision. I am in favor of both the Vice-Presiential replacement and the disability provision, but I am opposed to
this nomination and taking oath of office provision.
Mr. TAYLOR. Is that not true of the other provisions? There are
always people who will raise issues about one thing or another, and
I would think that that would pass almost unnoticed and cure that
lapse.
--- Senator BAYIi. We feel we could deal with these successfully more
readily in separate resolutions. It is not in an effort to ignore the
problem, because I intend to introduce in the next few days legislation dealing with the whole problem of the actual election of the
President and the timespan that exists between the time that the
voters say "aye," and the time he says "I do."
Mr. TAYLOR. On that point, you have authority in mind. I thought
it was something that should be raised.
Senator BAYII. Yes, because this is a problem, particularly in the
day of rapid flight by jet airplanes and the complicated dangers the
presidential nominee and the President-elect are subject to. It is a
very valid point.
Mr. TAYLOR. The second phase I do not want to take your time
by reading, but if you will just note these statements in the testimony
before this committee:
In the hearings of June 11 and June 18, 1963, at page 33, the now
president of the American Bar Association, Mr. Powell; at page
17 or 18-and if I might quote myself, I say the same thing that
it would be better to leave the workincr out of the details to legislation
rather than putting it in the text or the Constitution. Going back
to the statement of Marshall that has been quoted over and over again,
only a broad enabling power should be given in the Constitution,
not implementation, not detail.
In that connection, I was very much struck with what the Senator
from Nebraska said this morning, which is that you have to define
"immediately," or you would have a serious constitutional question
as to whether there is a power in Congress for a legislative body to
make an executive decision. The answer to what he said that was
made was that it was not a decision, that it was something that took
place where he had to concur or disagree with the previous failure
to reach a decision if you please.
Well, it seems that is just as much a decision as any other decision.
If the last thing that had to be done depended on Conress, that is an
executive decision. That is deciding a fact of whether a person is
able to perform the duties of his office. In my view, that is contrary
to the principle that the function of Congress is legislative, not
executive.
I think the Senator from Nebraska has sufficiently emphasized that
but I had it in mind before. All I am doing now is saying that
agree with him, so I shall not go further with that.
Senator BAYH. May I ask your permission to incorporate your precious statement?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, surely.

Senator BAYH. As I recall, you did a very excellent job in articulating the opposing view.
42-68"-5---
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Mr. T.%YLOR. You had better limit it, because I find I am a hardened
veteran. I have been four times before this committee.
You mean 1963 and 1964'?
Senator BAY1. Let me suggest that one or the other of those,
both of which I am familiar withMr. TAYLOR. Before it is done, let me go through with you what
statements I have made.
Senator BAY11. Yes, consult with counsel on this, because you are
an avid supporter of this other position, and I think you state it very
well and I want the record to show your views.
(The record excerpts referred to are as follows:)
STATEMENT OF MARTIN TAYI.OR, CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, NEW YORK BAR ASSOCIATION

Senator KEATING. May I join in welcoming Mr. Taylor? He is one of our most
distinguished members of the bar and we will be interested in his views.
Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman. members of the subcommittee, I came here to
listen today. I have no prepared speech, no prepared statement. But as I have
been with the court, I think now 7 years, I think that the position which is taken
by our committeeSenator BAYn. Excuse me, Mr. Taylor; may I say that if you desire to suimit a more complete statement or an abridged statement after your testimony
here, we will be more than happy to permit you to do that or have you testify
a second time.
Mr. TAYIOR. Surely. Thank you very much, sir.
We agree, I think, that the American Bar having taken the thing up is In
extremely important step in the right direction. We all agree, and have done
for 4 or 5 years, that It requires a constitutional amendment. We all agree
that it Is the duties and not the office that succeeds.
So we are concerned with two questions. One is a constitutional question
as to whether this Is the way to amend the Constitution, and then the practical
one which Senator Keating has spoken of. This committee which I represent
is primarily a committee on constitutional law. So that my emphasis will be on
that.
I agree with the position which Mr. Powell stated for the American Bar last
June, which was in substance concurred In by the Deputy Attorney General and
which I made a concurring statement on. I think the reasons that that supported the conclusion that that was the sound constitutional way to do it still
exists.
In the first place, you have a basic fundamenal principle of constitutional
law that any amendment should be simple. I am substantially quoting from
John Marshall. It should not give detail. You see the error of that In a great
many proposals because, as time goes by, there might be great disagreement as
to the practicability of applying It under changed circumstances. So the fundamental that you give broad enabling powers in the Constitution is what you
should rely on, changing, if you please, Implementation with changing conditions. That was the way that Senate Joint Resolution 35 came to be eventually
evolved. The fundamental notion of It was even before the subcommittee of
the Senate In 1956 or 1957. It was reaffirmed, as Senator Keating said-I have
forgotten the exact stage of it-but it was substantially approved by your subcommittee last June.
Now, the present proposal of the American Bar, and again I agree that it is
Important to do something whether we agree about it or not, but the present proposal, I think, violates that basic principle of constitutional law.
It purports to provide the machinery. That may be controversial. Irrespective of whether It is a good principle or not, It does not seem to be the way to
do it, because If you take the broad enabling act, the Senate Joint Resolution
35, you give any method to determine inability without the act of any person.
Obviously, any tribunal would listen to the President If he said he was disabled.
It is not necessary to have a written declaration by him, even for the principle,
or determination. It puts a responsibility on the Vice President which, of
course, was never contemplated by the Constitution, of making a determination
where he might, in the past, have been in-there have been disagreements be-
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tween Presidents and Vice Presidents. In any event, It requires a decision at a
time which involves some measure of self-interest.
Then you have the other possibilities that in determination they do not agree.
There is the constitutional point again which I think should be very carefully
considered. The actual method of making the determination on going back as
provided In this suggestion is an act of Congress. Is that either theoretically
or practically sound at a time of disagreement? Let's say a national issue Is
to be faced. Is It sound to say that Congress should then enter the picture
and by vote, if you please, determine whether the Inability has ceased'?
Then finally-I will supplement it, as you realize I am speaking extemporaneously this morning. Finally, there is the very important thing that I did speak
about before, that all implementation should not be in the text of the Constitution.
That is a very brief outline of the position which this committee has taken and
I may say that has been reaffirmed by the unanimous decision of this committee
after the proposal of the American Bar Association.
I would be glad to answer any questions about it.
Senator BAYII. Senator Keating, this gentleman Is one of your constituents.
Do you have any questions to ask him?
Senator KEATING. Thank you very much. I, of course, agree with the gentleman.
Senator BAYJI. Is this a New York conspiracy?

Mr. TAYLOR. No; we have not conferred.

Senator KEATING. No; because I saw something to the effect that former Attorney General Brownell is now on the other side.

Mr. TAYLOR. That is right; he is.

Senator KEATING. He is for the long document to be written into the Constitution. I disagree with him and I agree with the present Attorney General, who
Is for the short, concise statement simply giving to the Congress the power to act
in this regard. So this is neither a New York nor a political conspiracy, nor
should it be, of course.
Mr. TAYLOR. I agree, Senator Keating. I have always disagreed with Mr.
Brownell about it. The present Deputy Attorney General also disagrees and
thinks the simple amendment is the way to do It. He Is on the record as having
so stated.
Senator KEATING. I congratulate you on getting your views unanimously
adopted by the association of the bar of which Mr. Brownell Is now the president.
Mr. TAYLOR. No; this is the State. He Is the chairman of the City Bar of New
York.
Senator KEATING. Oh, I see; this is the State. Has the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York taken any position?
Mr. TAYLOR. It has a committee on Federal legislation which has not yet, I
think, acted on it. It previously approved Senate Joint Resolution 35.
Senator KEATING. Yes; I know It did originally approve It. There seems to
be some change of view.
If you wish to proceed, Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.
Senator BAYH. I think we have a very legitimate question raised. As somebody who Is an ex-State legislator, I can certainly visualize the realism of considering this fear that Senator Keating has suggested, that we might not be
able to get a more detailed proposal ratified by three-fourths of the legislatures.
Did I understand, early In your remarks, that you were concerned about a
longer proposal, because It might be more difficult to get through theMr. TAYLOR. You gentlemen would have much more experience and knowledge about that than I would. I thought that was Senator Keating's fear. I
expressed no view about that on account of Ignorance.
Senator BAYH. You suggested that we should have broad general principles
in our Constitution. Yet, can we not have some agreement that there are areas
that are somewhat detailed and complex such as the Impeachment proceedings,
where the Constitution does go Into specifics that go so far as to relate where Impeachment proceedings shall be brought, who shall try them, and who shall
preside?
Mr. TAYLOR. Yes; there are two cases that do it-three, really. There is the
Impeachment clause. Of course, there is the enumeration of the President's
powers and all those powers that are given to Congress at great length.
Senator BAYIT. I find myself in agreement with you in the fact that It should
be a broad principle.
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Mr. TAYLOR. What you call the enabling powers are quite simple.
Senator BAYII. I agree with you that the whole principle should be a broad
statement, but certainly in some areas there needs to be specific loose ends tied
down.
Now, as I understand it, you feel that Senate Joint Resolution 35 would do
two main things: One, it would clarify the authority of a Vice President who
succeeds to the Presidency. He would no longer be acting President as once
thought.
Mr. TAYLOR. Right.
Senator BAYH. And second, that this would remove all of the question which
exists in the mind of some constitutional scholars, that the Congress does have
power to act. These are the two purposes of Senate Joint Resolution 35?
Mr. TAYLOR. I should have said that. There is, as you suggest, great disagreement as to whether it is necessary or unnecessary, but on the theory that someone would raise the constitutional question, it is better to dispose of it by having
some amendment, whichever school of thought you agree with. That is to say,
you eliminate the problem by having a constitutional amendment.
Senator BAYH. Since Senate Joint Resolution 35 deals solely with presidential
disabilityMr. TAYLOR. That is right.
Senator BAYH. Do you care to comment on the consensus or some other proposal that is before this committee concerning the replacement of the Vice
President?
Mr. TAYLOR. As we have taken no position on that, I would suggest that we
hold that in suspense, since I do not know that we have any clear policy on it.
I may say a subcommittee has been appointed to consider all of these things,
and I may later come up with a comment on that.
Senator BAYH. Fine. We would like to have those things for the record.
Senator Keating, do you have any further questions?
Senator KEATING. NO; I have none, thank you.
Senator BAYH. I also want to thank Mr. Taylor for coming. Additionally I
wish to point out that he was a member of the bar consensus group and has
spent a considerable amount of time on this entire matter.
Apparently we have all sorts of differences of opinion among us, but I hope
we can come to some general consensus.
Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you very much.

Mr. TAYLOR. I come to what I think is the main point-

Senator BAY1I. May I ask, before you go on to another point, on this
matter of intertwining of executive and legislative power, I, for one,
feel this should be avoided if at all possible. But do you not feel,
Mr. Taylor, that we have sufficient precedent in the 12th amendment
in which Congress itself ends up electing a President under certain
circumstances if neither candidate or no candidate gets a majority
of the electoral vote? Then Congress takes the determination oi who
the Chief Executive is going to be.
Also, in the impeachment proceedings we not only bring in both
Houses of the Congress, but bring in the dhief Justice of the Supreme
Court to preside over this proving. Does this not act as a precedent,
that there are specific times? Maybe we disagree that this is the
timeMr. TAYLOR. Is not that the only one?
Senator BAYH. That plus the election proceeding of the 12th amendment, in which Congress is the elective body and does elect the Chief
Executive.
Mr. TAYLOR. Well, that is a voting function, is it not, rather than a

decision function?

Senator BAYH. It is about the greatest function the Congress can
perform, deciding who is going to be President.
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I am concerned about this business of bringing in the Congress
but it seemed to me that with my colleagues who have joined us, tis
is a matter of the greatest possible moment, the removal of the Presi,
dent of the United States from office-temporary diability, true. But
should not we allow the elected representatives of the people themselves to have the final say so in the event we got into that small percentage of circumstances where you had disagreement between the
President on the one hand and the Vice President and majority of the
Cabinet on the other?
Mr. TAYLOR. I would agree with you from your point of view as an
expression of policy, that is a way to do it that might meet general
approval. I was only being somewhat technical about it as a matter of
constitutional law.
I do not think it was contemplated that Congress should have a
power of that kind. As a public policy thing, as you suggest, it would
probably satisfy more people than any other method. I think that
is probably so.
Senator BAYI. It not only would satisfy people, but I want to try
to get the best solution.
Mr. TAYLOR. Maybe they would be satisfied with the best result, I
do not know.
Senator BAYH. Go ahead with point 3. I am sorry.
Mr. TAYLOR. The other thing that I missed very much this morning,
particularly with the Attorney General, whom we have all congratulated in appearing in that capacity this morning. He did not mention our old friend, the written concurrence of the majority of the
heads of the executive departments or such other bodies as the Congress may by law provide.
Of course, that goes back historically to the amendment that the
Attorney General favored in the past, that the American Bar Association favored in the past, that I favored in the past. But it does not
say in this when that is to be done. When is Congress, by law, going
to enact another procedure? And if it comes before, does it not destory all the machinery that you have here? If it comes afterwards,
is it not going to result in confusion?
What is contemplated that is written as to when that act should
take place
Senator BAYH. Of course, you are familiar with Senate Joint Resolution 139, which is the forerunner of most of this, which has been
subjected to close scrutiny by yourself as a member of the bar committee and by the rest of us in our various capacities. Each of us had
tog
and take a little bit.
This is one of the areas in which my original proposal, as you recall,
did not comply. But there were others who said that the Supreme
Court should make this decision, that there should be a blue ribbon
panel consisting of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the
Speaker, the majority and minority leaders of the Senate, plus the
Surgeon General, an so on. Others have suggested that you should
not take the whole Cabinet, you should only take a committee of five
or six; that the whole Cabinet is too cumbersome, it would take too
long. There have been so many proposals that we thought, "let us get
agreement that the Cabinet," and as we now see it in the light of 1964
and 1965, the Cabinet is the best vehicle. Then, if history proves we
42-688-65--- 8
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are wrong, Congress can then, without going through tlhe rigmarole
another constitutional amendment procedure, make this determination'by statute that it should be another bodyMr. TAYLOR. In other words, what you are saying is that this contemplates an act of Congress which villal
afterwards scral) this machinery. Is that it?
Senator BAYyr. Yes. I think, as I recall the wording, that the
Cabinet or other body that Congress may by law prescribe.
Mr. TAYLOR. "Or such other body as Congress may by law provide."
When does it do that? Supposiing Congress has not passed an act?
Supposing the written concurrence and so forth, and then suddenly
Congress passes an act?
)o they stop what is going on?
'Senator BAYJI. Would not the reasonable interl)retation of that be
that the Cabinet would be the only body to act until Congress did 1y
law provide for another? When'Congres (lid provide another, this
would immediately be implemented.
Mr. TAYLOR. Well, would the result, of that e tChat whenever it
arose after that, the machinery which is in this amendment, would
become obsolete? Is that right?
Senator BAY1[. Only the Cabinet. Only the Cabinet as the body
which would support.. the hand of the Vice President.
Mr. TAYILOR. In other words, it contemplates that the decision be
made by the Vice President with the concurrence of a body, either
the Cabinet or another one created by act of Congress.
Senator 11AY11. Here is the exact wording of section 4, the same
wording as in section 5:
If the President does not so declare, then the Vice President, with the written
concurrence of the majority of the heads of the executive departments-

The Cabinet,
or such other body as the Congress may by law provide.

It would seen to me that it says very plainly that it is the Vice President with the written concurrence ol iamajority of the]heads of the
executive departments or such other body as Congress may by law provide. Unless the Congress by law provides, there is no otlier body.
Congress has not provided, and we do not contemplate that they will
unless the executive department heads, the Cabinet, cannot judicially
handle this.
Mr. TAYLOR. And the same thing would apply to the resumption of
powem and duties?
Senator BAYT. Yes; in section 5. I, for one, would prefer that that
were not in there.
Mr. TAYLOR. Well, it is less than our wish and more thani you warkt.
Now, to go back to the other pointSenator BAYH1. What would you prefer ? Would you prefer that we
specify the body in there?
Mr. TAYLOR. No; but that is something that has been debated before. I would, as I have said many times, and it has up to now been
advocated, I would think all this implementation should be in an act
of Congress.
Senator BAY1I. By statute?
Mr. TAYLOR. Yes.
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Senator IBAYU. Senate Joint Resolution 35, as Senator Keating
sponsored and Martin Taylor sponsored.
Mr. TAyAIi. Not alone. ButI do not think there is any use in reponting that, because you are very much committed to the other thing
and it. is no function of the bar association committee to oppose anything
Z we ctan be asked to do, I think, is to make suggestions, hoping
that they will be of some hell).
We have, in our last report,, said that if this worked out along the
general lines that you have suggested, you will have our support. I
inn putting it in that way rather than urging any more what is now
not. likely to be included.
To go back to one more thing, the final thing, the resumption of
the powers and duties, regardless of the constitutional question tlat
we have spoken of, separation of powers, this is not strictly my funclion; it is not a constitutional question, it is a practical one. Is not
that a hazardous thing in terms of time? I mean the whole purpose
of creating this machinery is to have a sununary way of dealing with
itcrisis.
that
Now, look at the things that have to take place. Let us suppl)
kind of an emergency which we all dread may happen, wars or disturbance or whateve -look at what has happened.
First, the President has to transmit his own conviction that he is
well. Then the Vice President has to say, "No, I do not agree with
you, you are not well." Then the Vice President has to have a talk
with t majority of the members of the Cabinet. They do not agree.
Then he hits to agree with this other body created by statute, and they
do not agree. IMeanwhile, airplanes are flying over the Potomac.
Then Congress, with no other guide as to urgency, imminence, time,
has to meet and make this executive decision that three other tribunals
and individuals have been unable to make.
Senator BAYn. May I follow through the specific example that I
think might hell) to make this a bit less entangled.
One, we shall talk about the resumption of power. In the situation
where the President voluntarily declares his own ability and resumes
the office without objection, or is unable to do that as covered in sections 2, 3, 4, and the Vice President takes over-90 percent of the time,
paragraph 5 is not going to come into play. So first of all, we start
out witI the President disabled. The Vice President is Acting
President. Now, any time that he is Acting President and the bombers
start coming over the Potomac, he can take methods that are necessary
to take care of the bombers coming over the Potomac.
So the President says, "I am able to resume the powers and duties
of the office," and one of two things can happen. The Vice President
says, "You are right, Mr. President, you take care of the bombers coming over the Potomac." In that eventuality, there is an immediate
transfer of power.
Alternative two, he says, "I am sorry, Mr. President, but the Cabinet
and I still believe that you, although you are able to walk and talk
are not the President that we want or need; you are not capable oi
taking care of the best interests of the people." So he continues to act.
There is no transfer of power there. There may be some question
as to the legitimacy of power, but he has it. He is still able to deal
with national emergency.
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Now, in this interim, the President says, "I am not going to take
this lying down. I want the Representatives of the people to decide.
Congress, tell the Vice President and the majority of my own Cabinet
that they are wrong."
Then the Congress decides the matter, forthwith or immediately,
as the case may be. All of this time, the Vice President is still able
to deal with national emergencies, find if Congress does not. deal with
this, if they do not support the hand of the Vice President and the
majority of the Cabinet, which quite frankly, I think the Vice President and the Cabinet would not act unless they were pretty well sure
of the support of Congress-but if they did not, if Congress did not
support tde, then immediately the power would go back to the L'resident and he could deal with the bombers coming in.
Mr. TAYLOR. If you think they would not do that unless Congress
agreed with them, what is the necessity for putt ing it in ?
Senator BRYJI. Because we are looking for this one chance in a
million, which I think quite frankltly will not exist, that there might
be a coup agreement between the Vice President and the majority in the
Cabinet. I do not know if you were present or not during the summary
I tried to make in support of the resolution after the fine presentation
by Attorney General Katzenbach and the very lucid colloquy between
him and Senator lIruska. This business of taking away the power of
a legally elected, lawfully constituted President of the United States,
power which can only be'given by the people, is of such serious nature
that I want to give the people and their representatives the last recourse
to say that the Vice President and the Cabinet have acted erroneously.
That is the only reason for Congress being in the picture.
Mr. TAYLOR. Therefore, if they have the last recourse, it must be
contemplated that they might have different views about it.
Senator BAYh. Yes.
Mr. TAYLXOR. Therefore, there would be delay.
Senator BAY-i. Yes-well, no.
Mr. TAYLOR. I mean your theory that a Vice President's position was
jeopardized by a decision of the Congress would have sufficient technical power, that is true; would it be likely that that is a satisfactory
way for a government facing a crisis to have a Vice President whose
position is jeopardized in that way?
Senator BAYH. You knowv, if you were Vice President and in a situation like that and the Cabinet supported you, despite this fact, I think
you would be in a much stronger position and feel much better about
this unusual and uncomfortable position in which you found yourself to be able to say, in addition to the majority of the Cabinet, "I have
the vote of Congress." I think you would be in a much stronger
position.
As somebody mentioned in the testimony this morning, that in the
white glare of publicity which Mr. Scherer and others give to this
subject, it is going to be obvious if someone is mentally ill oi physically
incapable of handling the powers and duties of the office. The Vice
President and the Cabinet would not dare to make this decision unless
it was obvious not only to the public but to the Congress.
Mr. TAYLOR. Going back to what the Senator from Nebraska said,
suppose there was not the requisite number of a vote? Then what
would happen?
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'Ihe Senator from Nebraska suggested the possibility that there
would not be a sufficient vote to make a decision. What would happen
then?
Senator B.yi. In other words, there was not the necessary twothirds majority to uphold the iand of the Vice President?
Mr. Ti-Lon. Yes.
Senator lI\Yii. And the majority of the Cabinet?
Mr. TA-LOR. Yes.

Senator BAvi-rr. The same thing that happIened when the effort was
made to impeach former President Johnson.
Mr. TA1yio.

The impeachment failed.

Senator B.xYr. So would the effort to retain power on the part of the
Vice President. The President would be reinstated.
Mr. TAYLOR. Then following your suggestion that it is imperative or
important that the elected Members of Congress have a fieal say about
it, would that be satisfactory if they had exercised their final say in an
o)p site way to what the Cabinet and the Vice President had done ?
Senator BAYir. It certainly would not be satisfactory. It would not
!e a desirable situation. Tlihis, as I pointed out repeatedly, and will
l)oint out again, is a situation for which there is no perfect solution.
This one particular case where you have a President fighting openly
with a Vice President and the majority of the Cabinet is a rather unfort unate situation, undesirable to say the least.
But I must say again that whenever you have a majority of the
President's own Cabinet supporting the "hand of the Vice President
who says, "Mr. President, we are awfully sorry, but you are not well,"
it is going to be an unusual Congress that does not go along with that.
It would be an unusual Vice President and majority of the Cabinet
that would get themselves in that position.
Mr. TAYLOR. Instead of arguing your questions, let me congratulate
you on your success to this point and hope that you have further success.
Senator BAYJI. I must admit the conversation I have had with you
here and that we have had both privately and publicly have done a
great deal, not only to stimulate my thought processes, but have helped
us arrive at a decision. I appreciate your coming.
Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, sir.
Senator BAY1. We have some additional statements I would like to
include in the record, one from Senator Pearson and one from Senator
Saltonstall, and, without objection, they will become a part of the
record.
(The statements referred to follow:)
STATEMENT OF ION. JAMES B. PEARSON, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF KANSAS

Mr. Chairman, the subject of presidential succession and disability is vitally
The electrifying
rapidity of events which centered on November 22, 1963, rivited the attention
of the Nation to the need for an effective succession and disability arrangement.
That attention, moreover, has remained both fixed and constant in the ensuing
Important to the stability and tranquility of this Nation.

14 months.

The problems surrounding presidential succession and disability have manifested themselves all too often in the course of American history. I need only
recall that 8 of the 36 Presidents of the United States have died in office. Eight
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Vice Presidents, furthermore, have either died in, or resigned from office. The
office of the Vice President has been vacant for 37 of our country's 188 years.
For 80 days of the Garfield administration and 2 years of the Wilson administration, the office of President was occupied by a man unable to perform his
duties because of physical disability.
In more recent history, President Eisenhower suffered three serious illnesses
during his 8 years in office. He was, fortunately, never incapacitated to the
extent of Garfield and Wilson.
The number of succession acts which have been legislated in attempting to
resolve the difficulties raised by either death or disability in the office of the
President indicate that we have failed to find an appropriate solution to these
problems. I think, however, that the joint resolution which the Senate accepted
in the final days of the 88th Congress is indeed one of the most meritorious of
any such proposal designed to capably deal with the subject matter at hand.
As a cosponsor of that proposal, I felt that It was the best of the many that had
been offered in the wake of events following the tragic death of President
Kennedy.
After considerable reflection, however, I do believe that one aspect of that
proposal could be effectively strengthened. For this reason, I have withheld
cosponsorship of Senate Joint Resolution 1 until I should have the opportunity
of presenting my remarks for consideration.
With respect to Senate Joint Resolution 1, it is possible that the office of the
Vice President could, under certain circumstances, remain vacant. This, in
turn, could hinder any further transition or succession should it be required.
Suppose, for example, that a President becomes disabled for one reason or
another. The Vice President would then become Acting President under the
provisions of Senate Joint Resolution 1. The office of the Vice President, however, would remain vacant so long as the disabled President continued to live.
Unfortunately, it is not inconceivable that an Acting President could also
be removed from the discharge of the powers and duties of the office of the
President by death or disability. If this should occur, provisions for succession
would revert to those of the Succession Act of 1947. Senate Joint Resolution 1,
as a result, would represent an improvement to the Succession Act of 1947 under
most circumstances-but not in all circumstances.
To guard against the contingency which I have mentioned, I suggest that
the provisions of Senate Joint Resolution 1 can be altered slightly in the form
of simple additions.
First, I feel there is merit in appending to the present provisions one which
states that the Vice President, upon becoming Acting President, nominates an
.individual to discharge the powers and duties of the office of the Vice President.
This nomination, in accordance with procedures in the provisions of Senate
Joint Resolution 1, would be subject to the concurrence of both Houses of Congress by majority vote. In this manner, the office of the Vice President would
always be occupied and the smooth transition of power assured.
Furthermore, provisions of Senate Joint Resolution 1 which apply to the relation between the President and the Vice President would have to be repeated
to apply equally to an Acting President and the person selected to temporarily
execute the duties of the office of Vice President. The same procedure would be
applied should the Acting President become disabled or refused to declare his
disability.
The procdeure for the resumption of the duties of the Office of the President
by either the President or the Acting President upon recovery would be identical
to those incorporated in the present provisions of Senate Joint Resolution 1.
I feel that the suggestions which I have outlined would tend to Insure a continuity of succession when the problem is one of Presidential disability. A few
simple additions, as I have previously stated, would be necessary to effect what
I have proposed. The intent and the structure of Senate Joint Resolution 1
would not be affected. It would only be extended.
I appreciate the fact that my remarks will be given due consideration by the
subcommittee and incorporated in the final form of the resolution if sufficient
merit should exist. As an expression of my confidence in the wisdom and ability
of the subcommittee, I wish to request that my name be added as a cosponsor to
;he measure before us.
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January 28, 1965.

BAYJI,

Chairman,Subcommittee on ConstitutionalAmendments, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, Washington,D.C.
My DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Last March I submitted a letter to this subcommittee
expressing my views on the dual problems of Presidential succession and Presidential Inability. I am taking this opportunity once again to urge the subcommittee to act on the proposal before it, so that our Constitution will be amended
to provide for a continuing and uninterrupted executive leadership.
As a cosponsor of Senate Joint Resolution 1. I feel that this resolution offers
a reasonable and workable solution to the failure of our Constitution to establish a clear policy on Presidential succession and disability. It provides for (1)
a successor to the President should the office of Vice President become vacant;
and (2) a formula by which the Vice President, without usurping the power or
position of the President, can assume the duties of the Presidential office should
the Chief Executive himself be unable to perform them.
On January 20, 1965, we inaugurated a President and Vice President for the
next 4 years. It was the first time in 14 months that we had had men in both
of our Nation's top offices to supervise the conduct of our domestic and international affairs. We must not allow such a potentially dangerous situation to
occur again. The President of the United States is the leader of the free world,
and we must insure that he has a constitutional successor at all times, someone
who can step in on short notice and assume his duties should the occasion arise.
Although it is true that each time the problem of Presidential succession has
been considered by the Congress different proposals have been advanced, I think
it is fair to say that this resolution, Senate Joint Resolution 1, is not a solution for
today alone. It has been subjected to exhaustive discussion and debate around
the country as well as here in the Congress. Last year it was approved by the
Senate without a dissenting vote. The proposal is carefully designed to endure
as our Constitution itself endures, and to meet the eventualities of the future
insofar as we can foresee them. I hope that we may now take advantage of the
initial progress made last session and approve this proposed amendment to the
Constitution.
Sincerely,
LEVERETT SALTONSTALL, U.S. Senator.

Senator BAYT. There have been people who have suggested that the
record remain open temporarily while hearings are going o in the
House on this subject. I wouldlike to say, however that the record
will not remain open for an extended period of time, because this subject has been discussed at great length and I feel that there is a matter
of great urgency.

Let me say that I share Professor Deasy's admonition that we should
not act in panic.

I do not think that any of the discussions we have had

to date or intend to have will be indicative of a panic situation, but
I do think that there is a sense of urgency and we shall not leave the
record open more than for a very few days. I do not intend to hold

additional hearings unless there is a compe]li.g reason that I do not
foresee.

If there is no further testimony, the hearings will be forthwith
closed. But prior to the termination of the hearing, I would like to
pay particular comment in gratitude to our recorder for the extended
time which she has put in here and for the fine way in which she has
made herself available today.
The hearing is closed.
(Whereupon, at 2:40 p.m., the hearing was closed.)

104

PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY

(The following material was received by the subcommittee and is
included in the record at this point:)
STATEMENT OF ION. SAM J. E iVIN, JR., A U.S.
NORTH

SENATOR FRoM TIE STATE OF

CAROLINA

Presidential succession and presidential disability have long needed constitutional clarification; and, I am, pleased to Join in cosponsoring Senate Joint Resolution 1, which, I feel, brings these problems as near to a solution as is possible.
Also, I would like to express my appreciation to the chairman of this subcommittee
for the fine work he has done in developing this resolution and in presenting it
to the Senate. le deserves the thanks of Congress and the American people,
for without his patience and understanding, the many divergent proposals to
solve these problems would never have been melded into a single comprehensive
measure.
I favor a system of filling a Vice Presidential vacancy that Is based on the
premise that Congress should choose the best man for the office at the precise
time the need for selecting a successor arises. That time occurs when the Vice
President dies or succeeds to the Presidency. Only then will attention be
focused on the qualities necessary to make a good President. This is accomplished
in Senate Joint Resolution 1, which provides that in the event of a Vice Presidential vacancy, the President's nominee to fill the vacancy shall be voted on by both
Houses of Congress. This method satisfies the requirement, voiced by President
Truman, that the "plan of succession be devised so that the office of President
would be filled by an officer who holds his position as a result of the expression of
the will of the voters of this country"; and by having the President nominate the
candidate, it will insure his compatibility with the nominee. Also, the need
for continuity is met. There will always be a Vice President who can participate
in the creation and execution of the policies of the existing administration.
The Constitution itself provides that the Vice President shall succeed the
President in the event of the latter's death or disability. Yet, the language Is
not free from doubt. Controversy centers on the problem of ascertaining whether
the Vice President assumes the office of President or only the "powers and duties"
of that office.
When Vice President Tyler succeeded President Harrison In 1841, h3 assumed
the office as President, not as Acting President. And every Vice President to
become President through succession has similarly been designated President.
However, there are some who still maintain that, constitutionally, the Vice President only serves as Acting President. Senate Joint Resolution 1 lays at rest this
ghost that has troubled authorities since the death of William Henry Harrison
by providing that the status of the Vice President on assuming the Presidency
shall be that of President.
There Is one point, which this measure fails to contemplate, that merits grave
consideration: Congress at an early date should prepare for the possibility,
however remote, of a simultaneous vacancy in the offices of both President and
Vice President. The subcommittee eliminated my proposal dealing with this
possibility not because the members felt that the proposal lacked merit, but
because they felt this measure added to a Joint resolution to remove defects in
the Constitution might Jeopardize the possibility of securing favorable action
on two essential changes which everyone conceded must be made.
The section on Presidential inability is particularly desirable since twice in
our country's history, with the disability of President Wilson and the lingering
illness of President Garfield, situations arose in which lack of provision for
Presidential disability led to indecision and confusion which could have had
serious consequences for our Nation. This resolution utilizes the Vice President,
Cabinet, and the Congress in the determination of Presidential inability, and,
thus. represents in the finest manner the system of checks and balances which
the Founding Fathers put in the Constitution to Insure that neither partisanship
nor tyranny could take charge of the American Government. When there is a
division between the executive branch and the legislative branch, Senate Joint
Resolution 1 prevents such partisanship as existed during Andrew Johnson's
administration by not allowing a political party controlling Congress alone to
determine whether the President is able to i)erform the functions of his office.
It is imperative for Congress to provide for the eventualities of Presidential
inability and Vice-Presidential vacancy, and I sincerely trust that the Senate
and the House of Representatives will soon approve this Joint resolution by the
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required two-thirds majority, and that three-fourths of the States will ratify
the proposed constitutional amendment in the shortest possible time. Such
action would remedy two very serious omissions in our Constitution---omlissions
which must be remedied if we are to insure the continuity and stability of our
Government.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAcoB K. JAVITS

I have been deeply concerned about the fact that, especially under present
world conditions, the Nation for the second time in 20 years has been without a
Vice President, an office whose function has grown in importance so greatly since
the drafting of the Constitution. For this reason in the 88th Congress I introduced Senate Joint Resolution 138, a proposed constitutional amendment providing for the election of a Vice President by the Senate and the House of Representatives when the incumbent ascends to the Presidency, subject to the advice and
consent of the new President. On December 12, 1963, I testified before this
subcommittee in favor of my proposal and for the need of immediate action on
this problem and oR the related problem of Presidential disability.
When this subcommittee arrived at the consensus of views on both problems
which was embodied in Senator Bayh's proposal, then Senate Joint Resolution
139, I felt that the need for prompt submission of a constitutional amendment to
the States outweighed my own desire for a somewhat different formula on Presidential ,uccession. I joined in sponsoring the reported measure and supported
it on the Senate floor when it was adopted by the Senate, on September 28, 1964.
Unfortumiately, sufficient time (1id not remain for the ('Iher body to act on it,
and the joint resolution is, therefore, again before us, now as Senate Joint Resolution 1. Again I am a cosponsor of Senate Joint Resolution 1, and I strongly
urge that it be reported favorably to the Senate as soon as possible. The impetus
of public concern which was generated during the 13 months when the office of
the Vice President was vacant must not 'be permitted to dissipate now that the
immediate need is no longer present. And the critical need for a constitutional
mechanism for dealing with Presidential disability is ever present. I commend
the chairman and members of this subcommittee for giving this measure the high
priority which it so much deserves. I also wish to commend very highly the
American Bar Association, which was so much responsible for the creation of the
consensus on this proposal which now exists.
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

February 1, 1965.
Hon. BIRCH BAYH,

Chairman,Subcommittee on Con8titutionalAmendment8, Seniate Judiciary Com.
mittee, Wa8hington,D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I share the concern displayed by you and the other
Members of the Senate who have joined with you in cosponsoring Senate Joint
Resolution 1 on the problem of Presidential disability and Vice-Presidential
vacancy.
We all recognize that a problem exists by virtue of the fact that during prolonged periods of time the United States has in the past been and, absent some
action by Congress, most assuredly in the future will be without the services of
a Vice President. The duties and responsibilities of the Vice President have
been greatly expanded in recent years and our country can ill afford to be without
a procedure whereby a vacancy in the office can be filled. I am pleased to join
with you in seeking some feasible method to provide for filling any vacancy
which might occur as soon thereafter as is practicable.
While there is obviously widespread agreement that something must be done,
there is also some disagreement on the best approach to the problem. There has
been criticism of the proposal for allowing the President to name a new Vice
President, even though this is subject to confirmation by a majority vote of both
Houses of Congress. The argument has been advanced that this method has
no relationship to any procedure now existing for filling a vacancy in an elective

office.

I much prefer the method set out in Senate Joint Resolution 25 to that contained in Senate Joint Resolution 1. Senate Joint Resolution 25, which I
introduced on January 15 of this year, calls for the election of a new Vice
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President by the very people who elected the Vice President at the most
recent election for President and Vice President-the electoral college. This
method has much to recommend itself in preference to the naming of a new
Vice President by the President: First, it does not violate the general electoral
process; second, it would allow the selection to be made by individuals closer to
the populace; and third, it would create a broader base of support for the person
chosen. In addition to these advantages, this method would allow filling the
office without any undue delay.
It is conceivable, and even likely, that the individual chosen by either method
would be the same. This does not concern me. What does concern me, however,
is the method by which he is chosen. It seems very logical that a new Vice
President should be elected by the electoral college which was elected at the
most recent presidential election.
Sections 3, 4, and 5 of Senate Joint Resolution 1, dealing with Presidential
disability, has my support. However, I ask you to give very earnest consideration to amending the first two sections of Senate Joint Resolution 1 to include
the substance of Senate Joint Resolution 25.
With best wishes,

Sincerely,

STROM THURMOND.

STATEMENT OF HON. KARL E. MUNDT, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE
OF SOUTH DAKOTA

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to present a statement to the subcommittee regarding the problem of presidential succession and presidential
disability. I congratulate the subcommittee and Chairman Bayh for the prompt
scheduling of these hearings and I urge equally prompt consideration and reporting of the proposed constitutional amendment. I believe the subcommittee is
engaged in a highly significant and important discussion as it considers this
amendment which has focused the attention and interest not only of all Members
of Congress but all thoughtful citizens of America. I am pleased to be associated
as a cosponsor of this proposal.
This amendment would merely confirm long-established precedent by making
a part of the body of the Constitution, the proposition that in the event of death,
resignation, or removal of the President, the Vice President or the next in line
of succession succeeds to the office of the President for the unexpired portion of
the term in counterdistinction to succeeding only to the "powers and duties" of
the office as an Acting President.
The amendment would add the new feature of providing for the prompt filling
of the office of Vice President in the event it should become vacant. It would
provide, quite simply, that when a vacancy occurs in the Vice-Presidency, the
President will nominate a person who shall become Vice President for the remainder of the unexpired term upon the approval of a majority of both Houses
of Congress. This procedure gives the President the power to choose his potential successor, someone with whom the President enjoys harmonious relations
and mutual confidence. The plan has the, added advantage of selecting a Vice
President with a minimum delay. In an age of advanced weapons and accelerated
pace in national and international affairs, we can ill afford protracted delays because the Vice-Presidency is generally recognized as carrying with it specific
and important responsibilities in the executive branch of government. In addition, this procedure contains the safeguard of congressional approval and might
be likened to the current nominating practice of both major political nominating
conventions which is to simply ratify, by convention vote, the presidential choice
for the vice-presidential nominee.
The matter of presidential disability has long been extremely difficult and
perplexing. This is emphasized by the fact that it has never been the subject
of legislation even though our Nation has experienced virtual constitutional
crises when faced with disability of our Chief Executive. During the lingering
death of President Garfield and President Wilson's disability, indecision and
confusion were apparent. No one would come to grips with the question so it has
never been squarely faced. Fortunately for our Republic, these disabilities occurred at times when our national and international situation was relatively
serene. The lesser disability of President Eisenhower in 1955, following his
heart attack, and the assassination of President Kennedy, dramatically underscored the seriousness of the matter in times of perpetual international tension.
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It is my opinion, and of a number of the expert witnesses who testified before
this committee last year, that the solution reached In handling this puzzling
problem Is a happy one. The determination of the commencement and termination of the inability of any President is simply a matter of fact. If the President
Is capable of notifying the Vice President of this fact in writing, then under the
terms of the amendment, the Vice President would assume the "powers and
duties" of the office. If the President is not capable of so declaring, then the Vice
President, with the concurrence of a majority of the heads of executive departments or such other body as Congress may designate, transmits this fact to
Congress and the Dowers and duties of the office evolve upon the Vice President.
The matter of terminating a temporary transfer of the powers and duties of
the Presidency has long perplexed constitutional scholars. This amendment, I
believe, has formulated a workable plan by providing that, when the President
transmits to Congress his written declaration that no Inability exists, he will once
again assume the powers and duties of his office. However, if the Vice President, with the concurrence of a majority of the heads of the executive departments or such other body as Congress may provide for in law, transmits to Congress within 2 days his written declaration that the presidential disability continues, then Congress will decide the issue by a two-thirds vote of both Houses.
The placing of Congress In the role of arbitrator is supported by ample precedent.
The Constitution now provides that Congress shall elect the President and Vice
President if the electoral college cannot elect and provides for the removal from
office of the President and Vice President by Congress. Neither of these instances
are considered a violation of the principle of maintaining the three separate
branches of government.
Mr. Chairman, we have gambled much too long with the question of presidential succession and presidential disability. Providence has smiled upon us
in the past. It is now imperative that we act quickly to resolve this constitutional dilemma. I urge this subcommittee to report this constitutional amendment so the Senate can approve it with dispatch.
CORINTHIAN ISLAND, BELVEDF-TzBURoN, CALIF.,

January 30, 1965.
Senator BIRCH BATH,

Chairman, Subcommittee on Clonstitutional Amendment8, Judioiary Committee
of the Senate, Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR BAYH: Please accept this letter and the supporting exhibits
as a statement to your Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments in connection with your hearings on Senate Joint Resolution 1 (the Bayh-Celler amendment).
On Thursday of this week when I was in Washington, I discussed this with
Mr. Larry Conrad, chief counsel of your subcommittee. He assured me that a
letter such as this would be acceptable as a statement. He instructed that I
address it to you.
When I met with Mr. Conrad, I left with him a copy of the book I wrote
entitled "Illegitimate Power," the history of the secret ballot we lack today;
its acceptance in our country's early years; its present-day power to reform
Congress, the conventions, and the parties.
I also directed Mr. Conrad's attention to a Legislative Reference Service study
issued by the Library of Congress on the procedure followed by the U.S. House
of Representatives in choosing the President in event no candidate has received
a majority of the electoral vote. This reports on the rules the House followed
in electing Jobn Quincy Adams as President in 1825. The responsibility for
the election fell upon the House under the 12th amendment.
The heart of my contention in this statement is that the word "ballot" In
article II, section 1, paragraph 2 and In the 12th amendment of 1804, equate to
"secret ballot" in terms of modern usage.
I believe a basic issue has been skipped in the drafting of Senate Joint Resolution 1.
In early America, the contrasting implications of voting by secret ballot and
voting viva voce to a call of the roll were not treated lightly. It is not my feeling
that these implications have been treated lightly by the sponsors of Senate
Joint Resolution 1. Instead, I find nothing in your records that Indicates the
fundamental issue involved has been treated at all.
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The reason for this is understandable. I discovered in writing "Illegitimate
Power" that the word "ballot" has changed meaning in the United States in the
past 125 years. Few know this. Fewer still appreciate its significance. Yet
this simple word is a -ey that opens the door to understanding values, old and
new, in our country's politics.
The fact that "ballot" In the 12th amendment means secret ballot is clearly
illustrated by the Legislative Reference Service study I have referred to. A copy
of this report is attached hereto as an exhibit.
It is also illustrated by a debate on voting method that took place In the House
on January 16 and 17 of 1829. I quoted large sections of this debate, taken from
Gale's and Seaton's "Register of Debates in Congress," in "Illegitimate Power."
Copies of these book pages are also attached hereto as a supporting exhibit.
In full perspective, this debate treats the issue of representative voting by
secret ballot on choices for leadership. The eloquent observations of Representatives Barringer and Bartlett more than support my contentions. I appreciate the
opportunity of being able to insert these gems of democratic thought of 1829
in the Senate's reports of 1965.
I bring this to your attention because, In the light of these precedents, I feel
a requirement for secret ballot voting legitimately belongs in the Bayh-Celler
amendment.
I refer specifically to the majority vote of confirmation required by both the
House and the Senate in section 2 of the Senate Joint Resolution 1 draft (pertains to filling the office of Vice President).
The office of the Vice President, and thus the succession to the Presidency,
involve considerably different responsibilities and type of precedents than do
the many appointments of the President which are subject to congressional
confirmation.
I wish to make two practical points. These extend beyond the issue of
legitimacy.
The first concerns the political situation that will exist if ever a President
dies, and the then elevated Vice President is required to act under section 2.
The nomination and confirmation of a new Vice President will immediately
be a power issue. Accordingly, it must be analyzed In terms of fundamental
power relationships.
Two chapters of "Illegitimate Power" are attached as supporting exhibits in
this respect. They state my thoughts on what I have termed the "constitutional
doctrine of the secret ballot."
If the Congress should be allowed to vote as it chooses in the confirmation
of the newly designated Vice President, the likelihood Is that the vote would
be taken viva voce to a call of the roll. Twenty percent of either body could
require a Journalizing of the vote In the absence of a specific voting requirement
akin to that of article II or of the 12th amendment.
The continuity that so aided President Johnson's succession to the Presidency,
and so stabilized a stunned nation, would be immediately jeopardized. Through
viva voce voting the two parties and the subpaxties within them could deal
among their members and enforce bloc voting. The new President would likewise have to deal for the support of his nominee. Partisanship would quickly
emerge. Politically inspired coalitions could develop the objective of discrediting
the new President. The result could be, not a free vote of conscience and instinctive judgment, but instead a dangerous power deal.
Contrarily, if the Bayh-Cellex amendment Is revised to call for secret balloting as does the 12th amendment, the influences of the voting method itself would
change the political environment in which the vote would be taken. No one
could be sure how anyone else was voting. Votes could not be bargained for
because delivery could not be checked.
Endorsements and commitments are not here at issue. What the secret ballot
does in leadership selection is free the judgment of those in the middle, those
who find it hardest to choose.
This leads to my second point. The issue becomes, directly, the qualities the
people of the United States seek in the Vice President (the man one heartbeat
away from the most encompassing position of power In the free world).
The Constitution is a living document. It has to fit changing conditions. Its
traditions and precedents should not be reversed. The Bayh-Celler amendment
should not sanction the transactions of the power dealers at the expense of the
secret ballot. A Vice President should be a person of superior qualities who
wins the votes, freely given, of a majority of the Members of both the House
and Senate.
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There are other considerations in my suggestion, though they are not as basic
as the points above.
They have to do with both our internal or national regard for our democracy,
and the representation we give our democracy in the eyes of the rest of the
world.
I do not think that the American people want to forego the protections of
the secret ballot in the election of a Vice President.
I do not think that the American people want the rest of the world to think
of the United States as a democracy where the secret ballot has been downgraded.
I believe the complex task of gaining passage of the Bayh-Celler amendment,
both in the House and in the Senate, as well as in the required number of
States, will be made easier by inserting a specific requirement of voting by secret
ballot in section 2.
Consideration should be given to a like instruction in section 5. However,
in this later section which pertains to a conflict between the President and Vice
President on the question of the President's disability, it is clear the precedents
and issues at stake are far different than those herein discussed.
In conclusion, I wish again to refer you to the remarks of Representatives
Barxinger and Bartlett of 1829. They present the human nature aspects of what
is at issue here, far better than can I.
I appreciate the opportunity of being allowed to present these many thoughts
and my specific suggestion to your subcommittee.
Respectfully,

0

LAURENCE G. KRAUS.

